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INTRODUCTION
Our criminal justice system now faces an opportunity to reexamine
its fundamental underlying assumptions by learning from its worst
miscarriages of justice. As DNA brings to light a growing number of
cases in which innocent people were convicted, exonerees increasingly
pursue civil rights lawsuits alleging that government misconduct caused
the flawed convictions. These novel civil actions draw together civil
rights, tort, and criminal law; upend longstanding limitations on
criminal procedure remedies; and most importantly, point toward
concrete solutions that can prevent such failures from recurring. The
result promises to provide a catalyst for wide-ranging institutional
reform, transforming the practices of law enforcement, prosecutors,
defenders, and courts in the future.
Until recently, civil rights law offered little recourse for one of the
worst deprivations the state can impose-the conviction and
incarceration of an innocent person. Instead, in criminal law, landmark
Warren Court decisions incorporated certain due process rights in order
to secure a "fair trial" for the accused.' In the last several decades,
however, the U.S. Supreme Court has stepped away from that
commitment. The unpopularity of criminal procedure rights has grown
due to the truth-defeating nature of their remedies, which exclude
probative evidence of guilt or reverse otherwise reliable convictions.
The Court proceeded to limit remedies with harmless error rules
grounded in the notion that convictions deserve finality, because in
general, convicted criminal defendants are actually guilty.2 Such rules
permitted, if not encouraged, appellate courts to hold constitutional error
"harmless" by finding that other evidence before the jury could support
its finding of the defendant's guilt.3
1. See infra Part I.D.
2. See infra Part II.B; see also JOSEPH F. LAWLESS, PROSECUTORIAL
MISCONDUrCT: LAW, PROCEDURE, FORMS, at xii-xiii (2d ed. 1999) (characterizing
modern harmless error doctrine as "basically a judicial assurance that nearly anything
will be tolerated in regard to an obviously guilty defendant"); Sam Kamin, Harmless
Error and the Rights/Remedies Split, 88 VA. L. REV. 1, 7 (2002) (providing empirical
evidence that harmless error "create[s] a firewall between constitutional rights and
remedies"); Carol S. Steiker, Counter-Revolution in Constitutional Criminal Procedure?
Two Audiences, Two Answers, 94 MICH. L. REv. 2466, 2470 (1996) ("[Tlhe Burger and
Rehnquist Courts have accepted to a significant extent the Warren Court's definitions of
constitutional 'rights' while waging counter-revolutionary war against the Warren
Court's constitutional 'remedies' of evidentiary exclusion and its federal review and
reversal of convictions.").
3. See infra Part II (discussing the U.S. Supreme Court's guilt-based focus in
developing its harmless error doctrine, which originated in Chapman v. California, 386
U.S. 18 (1967)).
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Over the past decade, DNA technology challenged the Court's
assumption of guilt with the postconviction exoneration of mounting
numbers of innocent people.4 Those exonerees increasingly have filed
federal actions seeking compensation from their former law enforcement
accusers. The first wave of these actions nationwide has resulted in
substantial judgments and settlements.'
Federal wrongful conviction actions share a novel construction-
they incorporate criminal procedure rights as an element in a civil
lawsuit. Such suits raise thorny questions of how due process rights
designed to function in criminal trials translate to a civil rights action,
questions which courts6 and scholars7 have not yet unpacked. Nor have
scholars examined what larger impact such civil cases may have on
criminal procedure .
4. See infra Part I.C.
5. For example, in Newsome v. McCabe, plaintiff James Newsome spent
fifteen years in prison and presented no expert testimony on damages or any evidence of
economic injury, and the jury awarded him $15 million in damages, an award affirmed
by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. See 319 F.3d 301, 302-03, 307(7th Cir. 2003); see also infra note 32 (discussing recent significant settlement awards in
wrongful conviction cases). A series of additional lawsuits are pending nationwide. See
cases cited infra notes 30, 32.
6. One reason that courts had not dwelled on these issues is that wrongful
conviction cases were rarely brought before DNA evidence was available. See
discussion infra Part I.B.
7. No scholarship suggests any overarching theory accounting for how such
hybrid claims function. A few writers have mentioned civil rights remedies for criminal
procedure violations in passing, but not with any theory for translating criminal rights to
civil rights. See, e.g., John R. Williams, Beyond Police Misconduct and False Arrest:
Expanding the Scope of 42 U.S. C. § 1983 Litigation, 8 SUFFOLK J. TRIAL & App.
ADVOC. 39, 61 (2003) (providing an excellent guide to malicious prosecution law, but as
to due process claims, noting only in the conclusion that "other fair trial denials" may
result in liability); Mitchell P. Schwartz, Comment, Compensating Victims of Police-
Fabricated Confessions, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1119, 1125 (2003) (discussing the causation
requirement in the context of claims for fabrication of confessions). The exception is
Michael Avery, who discusses constitutional theory for civil claims based on Brady v.
Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), and contends that civil due process law should provide
the standard for such claims. See Michael Avery, Paying for Silence: The Liability of
Police Officers Under Section 1983 for Suppressing Exculpatory Evidence, 13 TEMP.
POL. & CIv. RTS. L. REv. 1, 5-6 (2003). This Article takes a very different approach,
asking how criminal due process fair trial rights translate in a civil rights action, where
civil standards are relevant only as to the requirements of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ("Section
1983"), and in particular, the causation requirement.
8. Most commentators who have considered Section 1983 lawsuits have
expressed pessimism that such claims could provide recourse for the wrongfully
convicted. See, e.g., Adele Bernhard, Justice Still Fails: A Review of Recent Efforts to
Compensate Individuals Who Have Been Unjustly Convicted and Later Exonerated, 52
DRAKE L. REV. 703, 708-25 (2004) (advocating compensatory legislation and describing
barriers to civil suits in the law of immunity); Alberto B. Lopez, $10 and a Denim
Jacket? A Model Statute for Compensating the Wrongly Convicted, 36 GA. L. REV. 665,
691-93 (2002) (concluding that "making a section 1983 claim against police officers
WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW
This Article suggests that the way to look at fair trial claims in a
civil case is through the looking glass. Exonerations reverse the
operation of the criminal procedure rights, not their remedies. In a civil
case, constitutional error no longer appears as a procedural technicality
asserted by a probably guilty convict. Instead, fair trial rights vindicate
the truth, while government misconduct is revealed as having concealed
evidence of a person's innocence, leading to a gross miscarriage of
justice.
This reversal of the fundamental remedial paradigm leads to a
doctrinal result that harmless error rules, which all but bar relief in
criminal appeals, do not pose an obstacle in a civil case.9 Unlike in a
criminal appeal, where appellate judges have focused on whether
evidence of guilt could excuse constitutional error, in a civil case, the
tort law requirement of causation applies.'0 A jury decides whether
unconstitutional official conduct caused the unfair trial of an innocent
person." Federal wrongful conviction cases also reveal that, in its
enthusiasm for harmless error rules, the Court has shifted the
evidentiary burden of proving error not harmless to criminal defendants
by incorporating harmless error rules into the context of fair trial rights.
Examples include the "materiality and prejudice" prong of the Brady v.
Maryland right, 2 the right to effective assistance of counsel, the rule
that unduly suggestive eyewitness identifications can be nevertheless
reliable, and the totality of the circumstances test for coerced
confessions.'3 In civil actions, where a plaintiff must simply satisfy the
tort requirement of causation, those rules lose their harmful effect.
As a result, the underlying, substantive constitutional rights the
Supreme Court carefully insulated in the criminal context are exposed
for the first time. Criminal procedure rights, developed from the 1930s
through the Warren Court era, are not just underenforced constitutional
based upon a wrongful conviction is a daunting task with little chance of success");
Stephen M. Ryals, Analysis of a Civil Rights Cause of Action: A Wrong in Search of a
Constitutional Remedy, in 2 18TH ANNUAL SECTION 1983 CIVIL RIGHTS LrIGATION 163,
165 (George C. Pratt & Martin A. Schwartz eds., 2002) (stating that, among other
practical obstacles, "immunities, collateral estoppel, and the statute of limitations are all
potential land mines" that may impede wrongfully convicted individuals from bringing
civil suits to recover for their incarceration). However, these authors overdiagnose
immunity as an obstacle. See infra Part V.D. Many scholars focus exclusively on
weaker malicious prosecution claims. See infra Part I.B. There are an increasing
number of viable cases raising fair trial claims as discussed in this Article. Further,
enough of those cases exist nationwide, with large potential verdicts and political
repercussions, that the deterrent effect may be substantial. See infra Parts I.A, V.
9. See discussion infra Part mll.
10. See discussion infra Part El.
11. See discussion infra Part EI.B.
12. 373 U.S. at 87.
13. See discussion infra Part I.V.
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norms.' 4 Rather, these constitutional norms have not been enforced or
developed substantively except in the sense that criminal procedure
exclusionary rules serve substantive goals. The deterrent effect of the
exclusionary rules, however, remains equivocal, especially because the
harmless error doctrine often prevents substantive vindication of even
the modest goals of such rules. 5 That is, until now. With most avenues
for substantive development of criminal procedure closed off, a new
field of constitutional law awaits judicial definition.
This Article lays the groundwork for a larger project examining
systemic institutional repercussions of exonerations and wrongful
conviction suits.'6 In the years to come, federal wrongful conviction
cases may spearhead wide-ranging reform of our criminal justice
system. The criminal justice system has long been largely insulated
from tort liability. Nor has the Supreme Court required as a matter of
due process law protections shown to facilitate more reliable results,
such as: double-blind lineups, sequential lineups, videotaping of
confessions, enhanced discovery obligations of police and prosecutors,
adequate representation and funding for indigent defense, and auditing
of forensic crime laboratories."7 After all, courts rarely reach violations
of the relevant rights, instead finding error harmless. Civil cases may
finally lead to the adoption of long needed structural safeguards,
particularly given a convergence of interests: each reform is inexpensive
and provides law enforcement, prosecutors, and courts with the
information they urgently need to convict people reliably.
Comparatively, a few wrongful conviction cases may have a
dramatic effect because they represent the most egregious failures of our
criminal justice system. DNA permits scientific certainty in a few cases
that innocent people were wrongly convicted. Unlike run-of-the-mill
14. See Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of
Underenforced Constitutional Norms, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1212, 1220-24 (1978); see also
Louis Michael Seidman, Factual Guilt and the Burger Court: An Examination of
Continuity and Change in Criminal Procedure, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 436, 440 (1980).
15. See discussion infra Part II.
16. Future work will examine how wrongful conviction suits may serve as a
catalyst for systemic reform, by examining more deeply the institutional responses to
exonerations and civil suits, and comparing such structures to innocence commissions
and other administrative and legislative alternatives. This project mirrors prior work
examining how systemic reform arose against all expectations and despite a lack of
clarity in underlying legal rules in the context of racial profiling. See generally Brandon
Garrett, Remedying Racial Profiling, 33 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 1 (2001)
[hereinafter Garrett, Remedying Racial Profiling]; Brandon Garrett, Note, Standing
While Black: Distinguishing Lyons in Racial Profiling Cases, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1815
(2000). For additional work developing an "experimentalist" approach to civil rights
remedies, see Brandon L. Garrett & James S. Liebman, Experimentalist Equal
Protection, 22 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 261 (2004).
17. See discussion infra Part V.
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tort cases or even civil rights cases, both of which are commonly
thought to often not effectively deter constitutional violations, I8
exoneration itself self-selects the most serious cases best-suited to
illuminate and redress systemic problems. For that reason, wrongful
conviction cases have already provided a catalyst for structural remedies
altering the practices and relationships between law enforcement,
prosecutors, and the courts, and in the process, defied conventional and
pessimistic appraisals of the effectiveness of civil rights remedies.' 9
Further, civil cases uncover patterns and practices of violations through
broad federal discovery, resulting in municipal entities being held liable
for failing to remedy systemic deficiencies. The effect of suits will be
bolstered by the Federal Innocence Protection Act, which provides
financial incentives for reform, including monitoring of forensic crime
laboratories, best practices review, and effective assistance of counsel in
capital cases.'
Remedies from wrongful conviction suits may also feed back to
influence criminal procedure law and encourage judges to consider
adopting protections to prevent such miscarriages. During pretrial
suppression hearings, trial judges could consider systemic evidence
regarding the predictable causes of wrongful convictions, and also at
trial provide jurors instructions or expert testimony regarding reliability
of evidence based on such data. Appellate judges could target their
18. See discussion infra Part V.C.
19. In part, the remedial result, as will be elaborated in Part V.A, illustrates
the argument that Professor Daryl Levinson and others have used to counter "rights
essentialists": rights are defined by their remedies and vice versa. See Daryl J.
Levinson, Rights Essentialism and Remedial Equilibration, 99 COLUM. L. REv. 857,
857, 860 (1999). More importantly, the result moves beyond such debates as well as the
creeping pessimism over the past several decades about the effectiveness of civil rights
remedies in the face of judicial retrenchment, to show how robust rights and remedies
can evolve institutionally and independent of narrow judicial definition. See Paul
Gewirtz, Remedies and Resistance, 92 YALE L.J. 1425, 1427 (1987).
20. The Justice for All Act of 2004 was signed into law on October 30, 2004,
and provides a series of grants to states that provide positive incentives for reform. Pub.
L. No. 108-405, 118 Stat. 2260 (codified in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C. and 42
U.S.C.). Sections 421 and 424 of the law set out requirements for capital representation
improvement grants, particularly during trials, reporting on maintaining requirements
for qualified attorneys and specialized training. Id. §§ 421, 424, 118 Stat. at 2286,
2289. Section 413 provides incentive grants to implement "reasonable" measures to
preserve biological evidence and provides for postconviction access to testing. Id. §
413, 118 Stat. at 2285. The statute also provides in Section 411 a right to
postconviction DNA testing in federal criminal cases, together with requirements to
preserve biological evidence. Id. § 411, 118 Stat. at 2278. Section 431 provides for an
increase in compensation for the wrongfully convicted. Id. § 431, 118 Stat. at 2293.
Section 306 creates a National Forensic Science Commission to make recommendations
and disseminate best practices. Id. § 306, 118 Stat. at 2274. Section 303 provides grant
money for training programs and local forensic testing demonstration projects. Id. §
303, 118 Stat. at 2273.
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review toward violations raising dangers of wrongful convictions, rather
than simply rubberstamping error as harmless. The civil remedies
described may also evolve to provide more refined information about
what procedures supply reliable evidence.
Federal wrongful conviction claims thus upset a longstanding
academic and judicial understanding of constitutional criminal procedure
cases as a "world unto themselves" with no relationship to civil
constitutional law.2' Criminal procedure has long lacked a focus on
systemic and institutional causes of error. 2 Although civil and criminal
constitutional law share common constitutional provisions, the Court
separated them at birth and they developed apart.23 Both critics and fans
of the Court's constitutional criminal procedure decisions have long
advocated that "the Constitution needs to be put back into criminal
procedure,"' yet such intersections have rarely been explored by
scholarship on either side of the divide. 2' This Article is intended to
illuminate the deep connections between civil and criminal law rights,
and the pressing need to develop them in order to bring a substantive
focus to criminal procedure. The impact of these divergent bodies of
constitutional law may fundamentally alter the landscape of the
underlying constitutional rights and lead to reform of our criminal
justice system.
Part I provides an overview of the rise of federal wrongful
conviction cases, from common law roots to federal cases involving fair
21. See Donald Dripps, Akhil Amar on Criminal Procedure and Constitutional
Law: "Here I Go Down That Wrong Road Again", 74 N.C. L. REV. 1559, 1561 (1996)
[hereinafter Dripps, Amar on Criminal Procedure](contending that criminal procedure
decisions employ arbitrary rules that could not be maintained in civil constitutional
cases, and explaining that "[t]he academy has followed the Court and ratified this
dissociation of legal sensibility"); see also DONALD A. DRIPPS, ABOUT GUILT AND
INNOCENCE: THE ORIGINS, DEVELOPMENT, AND FUTURE OF CONSTITUTIONAL CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE 175 (2003) [hereinafter DRIPPS, ABOUT GUILT AND INNOCENCE] (arguing
that values of substantive constitutional law should inform criminal procedure); Deborah
Jones Merritt & Barbara F. Reskin, Sex, Race, and Credentials: The Truth About
Affirmative Action in Law Faculty Hiring, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 199, 219 n.56 (1997)
(noting that the Association of American Law Schools lists constitutional law as a
separate specialty from criminal procedure, and that "most academics consider these
distinct fields"); Suzanna Sherry, All the Supreme Court Really Needs to Know It
Learned from the Warren Court, 50 VAND. L. REV. 459, 476 (1997) (calling criminal
procedure "peripheral to core constitutional law").
22. See infra Part V.
23. See infra Part I.D. Even the Fourth Amendment, which provides both civil
remedies for violations and criminal procedure protections, has had its civil dimension
largely ignored by the academy. See Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First
Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 757, 758 (1994) ("The Fourth Amendment is part of the
Constitution yet is rarely taught as part of Constitutional Law. Rather, it unfolds as a
course unto itself, or is crammed into Criminal Procedure.").
24. See Dripps, Amar on Criminal Procedure, supra note 21, at 1561.
25. See sources cited supra note 21.
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trial claims, followed by a dramatic surge in exonerations due to DNA
technology. Part II discusses the Supreme Court's harmless error
doctrine, its guilt-based focus, and its extension to other rules in the
context of specific constitutional rights. Part III explains that, in a civil
action, the effect of exoneration and the 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ("Section
1983") requirement of causation reverses harmless error's guilt-based
remedial focus. 26  Part IV applies this theory to emerging federal
wrongful conviction claims based on (1) the Brady v. Maryland right to
have exculpatory evidence disclosed, (2) ineffective assistance of
counsel, (3) the right to be free from suggestive eyewitness identification
procedures, (4) coerced confessions, and (5) police fabrication of
evidence. Part V concludes by reflecting on the likely impact of
wrongful conviction cases on both law enforcement practices and
substantive development of constitutional criminal procedure
protections.
I. THE RISE OF FEDERAL WRONGFUL CONVICTION ACTIONS
Federal wrongful conviction actions arose out of a combination of
recent developments in forensic science and constitutional law. The
existence of wrongful conviction actions may be news to many. Front
page headlines have for some time brought home the deep changes that
science is working in our criminal justice system-from the arrest and
exoneration of a Portland, Oregon lawyer on terror charges based on
fingerprints,27 to the fabrication of ink evidence in the Martha Stewart
trial,2" to the steady increase in DNA exonerations of convicts across the
country.29 What is less widely appreciated is that science has also
exposed not just the factual innocence of persons wrongly convicted, but
the causes, revealing that such injustices could have easily been
prevented, and worse, that in a surprisingly large number of cases,
wrongful convictions were caused by police misconduct. Such police
misconduct, more often than thought, supports a federal civil rights
action.
26. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000).
27. Sarah Kershaw, Spain and U.S. at Odds on Mistaken Terror Arrest, N.Y.
TIMES, June 5, 2004, at Al (describing how the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)
pressed ahead with the prosecution of a Portland lawyer after Spanish authorities made
clear that their examination of fingerprint evidence found no match).
28. Jonathan D. Glater, Stewart Stock Case Is Jolted by Charge that an Agent
Lied, N.Y. TIMES, May 22, 2004, at Al (describing how the government charged the
FBI's ink expert in the Martha Stewart trial with two counts of perjuring himself on the
stand).
29. See generally The Innocence Project, at http://www.
innocenceproject.org/ (last visited Mar. 28, 2005).
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A wave of civil suits arising out of exonerations have already
resulted in landmark, multimillion dollar jury verdicts that should have
police departments, crime laboratories, and prosecutors concerned.' °
30. See infra note 32. Cases pending in federal courts nationwide, and
involving police misconduct resulting in wrongful convictions include: Pierce v.
Gilchrist, 359 F.3d 1279, 1301 (10th Cir. 2004) (discussing claims of fabrication and
malicious prosecution); Gauger v. Hendle, 349 F.3d 354, 363 (7th Cir. 2003)
(addressing allegations of false arrest and police perjury at trial); Patterson v. Burge,
328 F. Supp. 2d 878, 882, 903-04 (N.D. Ill. 2004) (denying the defendant's motion to
dismiss against the plaintiff, who spent thirteen years on death row until pardoned by
Illinois Governor George Ryan, and later claimed that the police coerced his confession,
fabricated evidence, maliciously prosecuted him, and suppressed police misconduct in
violation of Brady); Salaam v. City of New York, No. 02 Civ. 9685 (S.D.N.Y. filed
Dec. 19, 2003) (alleging fabricated and coerced inculpatory statements, Brady
violations, and prosecutorial misconduct in the arrests of five teens exonerated by DNA
thirteen years after their convictions in the "Central Park Jogger" case). In addition,
Cochran Neufeld & Scheck, LLP is currently litigating a number of wrongful conviction
cases nationwide. See, e.g., Lowery v. County of Riley, No. 5:04-CV-03101-JTM (D.
Kan. filed Mar. 25, 2004) (alleging that two officers nicknamed "Mad Dog" and "Dirty
Harry" coerced the plaintiff's confession, fabricated the confession by feeding facts, and
violated Brady and Monell, thereby resulting in the plaintiff's wrongful incarceration);
Bibbins v. City of Baton Rouge, No. 04-CV122-D-M1 (M.D. La. filed Feb. 24, 2004)
(alleging claims of fabrication of evidence, including a falsified arrest warrant, Brady
violations, and suggestive identification procedures in a case where a prisoner was
exonerated by DNA testing after spending sixteen years at Angola Prison); Godschalk v.
Castor, No. 02-6745 (E.D. Pa. filed Oct. 8, 2003) (alleging coerced and fabricated false
confession claims and Brady violations in a case where the plaintiff was incarcerated for
fifteen years for two sexual assaults before being exonerated by DNA testing; the
District Attorney settled for $740,000 in October of 2003, and the township for $1.6
million in April of 2004); Green v. City of Cleveland, No. 1:03CV0906 (N.D. Ohio
filed Aug. 7, 2003) (alleging the fabrication of a confession and serology evidence,
along with supervisory claims based on Monell v. Department of Social Services of New
York, 436 U.S. 658, 699 (1978), in a case where the plaintiff was exonerated by DNA
testing after thirteen years of incarceration); Long v. City of New York, CV-03-1495
(E.D.N.Y. filed June 18, 2003) (alleging suggestive identification procedures, failure to
investigate, and Brady violations, and raising Monell supervisory claims in a case where
the plaintiff was exonerated after six years of incarceration); Miller v. City of Boston,
No. 03-10805-JLT (D. Mass filed May 1, 2003) (alleging false arrest, fabrication of
serological evidence by the police and crime lab, suggestive identification procedures,
and raising supervisory and Monell claims in a case in which the plaintiff was
exonerated by DNA testing after being incarcerated for more than ten years); Burrell v.
Adkins, No. 3:01CV 2679 (W.D. La. filed Dec. 26, 2001) (alleging that Albert Ronnie
Burrell and Michael Graham each spent thirteen years on death row at Angola Prison for
a crime they did not commit due to the fabrication of forensic evidence, witness
coercion, fabricated testimony of a jailhouse snitch nicknamed "Lyin'" Wayne Brantley,
and Brady violations); Blake v. Race, No. CV-01-6954 (E.D.N.Y. filed Oct. 18, 2001)
(alleging fabrication of evidence, Brady violations, failure to investigate, and
supervisory liability in a case where the plaintiff was exonerated after spending eight
years incarcerated in the seventy-fifth precinct in Brooklyn, which had a practice of
framing innocent people using fabricated testimony of informants); Gregory v. City of
Louisville, No. 3:01CV-535-R, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7046 (W.D. Ky. filed Aug. 24,
2001) (alleging suggestive identification procedures, fabrication of hair comparison
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The size of the verdicts and settlements can be explained both by the
dramatic facts in such cases and the substantial damages years of
wrongful imprisonment can cause. The jury in James Newsome's case,
discussed below, for example, saw a life-size model of the eight-by-ten-
foot jail cell that he spent fifteen years in, and did not need to hear
damage experts to award him $15 million in compensatory damages.3"
For this reason, municipalities have agreed to substantial settlements in
order to avoid judgments or decisions that would create future legal
exposure. 2
evidence, and Brady violations in a case where the plaintiff was exonerated by DNA
testing after being incarcerated for eight years for a sexual assault); Lloyd v. City of
Detroit, No. 04-70823 (Mich. Cir. Ct. filed Mar. 4, 2004) (alleging that Eddie Joe
Lloyd, who was incarcerated for over seventeen years until he was exonerated by DNA,
was deceived by police into "confessing" to a sexual assault and murder he did not
commit while in a delusional state, on psychotropic medication, and legally committed to
a mental hospital, then violating Brady and fabricating evidence by concealing that they
fed him the details of that "confession"; also alleging the county grossly underfunded
defense counsel who never sought experts as to Lloyd's mental condition or to test
biological evidence); See also Peter Schworm, City Prepares Defense vs. Wrongly
Imprisoned Man, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 7, 2003, at 10 (describing a $10 million lawsuit
on behalf of Eric Sarsfield, who was exonerated through DNA testing after spending ten
years incarcerated for a sexual assault he did not commit, bringing Brady, fabrication,
and suggestive identification claims, and raising supervisory and Monell claims). The
author had the privilege to work on the Blake, Burrell, Long, Lowery, Miller, and
Salaam cases described above.
31. See Steve Warmbir, $15 Million for Unjust Prison Term, CHI. SUN-TIMES,
Oct. 30, 2001, at 2; see also infra Part I.A.
32. Recently, there have been many significant settlements in wrongful
imprisonment and conviction cases. See Jones v. City of Chicago, 856 F.2d 985, 988,
996 (7th Cir. 1988) (upholding an $801,000 award where police suppressed exculpatory
evidence); Reasonover v. St. Louis County, 4:01 CV 01210 (CEJ) (E.D. Mo. 2004)
(settlement for $7.5 million in a case where the plaintiff was wrongfully imprisoned for
sixteen years, and law enforcement concealed evidence including an exculpatory tape
recording); Martinez v. Brink's, Inc., No. CL0103469AH (S.D. Fla. Oct. 2, 2003)
(resulting in a $8.26 million verdict for malicious prosecution where the plaintiff spent
six months in pretrial detention), available at 2003 WL 22490171; Munoz v. County of
Fresno, No. CIV-F0206286 (E.D. Cal. 2003) (resulting in a $625,000 verdict for a
plaintiff who was falsely arrested and detained for fourteen hours); Gipson v. Aragon,
2002 No. CV-00-7212LGB (C.D. Cal. Apr. 12, 2002) (settlement for $275,000 for two
plaintiffs falsely arrested for four days), available at 2002 WL 32105285. Many of
these verdicts have been sustained on appeal. For state court settlements and verdicts,
see for example, Gayles v. City of Detroit, 16 MICH. TRIAL RPR., No. 01-CV-60038
(Mich. Cir. Ct. June 11, 2003) (resulting in a settlement of $800,000 for nineteen days
in jail on first degree murder charges based on a coerced false confession by an
eighteen-year-old mentally disabled man to the sexual assault and murder of a twelve-
year-old girl); Bravo v. Giblin, No. B1225242, 2002 WL 31547001, at *24 (Cal. Ct.
App. Nov. 18, 2002) (approving an award of $3,925,976, including $3,537,000 to
compensate for 1179 days of incarceration at the rate of $3000 per day, and $1 million
to compensate him for emotional distress suffered between the date of the incident and
the date of his sentencing; the total award to the plaintiff, including interest, was
$7,075,000 in a case involving violations of Brady and fabrication of evidence,); Kotler
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More significant than large compensatory awards, these lawsuits
represent miscarriages of justice that have attracted the attention of
actors on all sides: law enforcement, prosecutors, municipalities, and
civil rights organizations. In a short period of time, civil suits suggest
possibilities for bringing diverse actors together to collaborate on
systemic change in our criminal justice system. Many federal wrongful
conviction lawsuits focus on reform by including claims alleging a
pattern and practice of misconduct against crime labs for shoddy or
fraudulent forensic work, district attorney's offices for suppressing
exculpatory evidence, and police departments for permitting practices of
fabricating evidence, coercing confessions, suppressing evidence, or
conducting suggestive eyewitness identifications.33  Lawsuits have
v. State, 255 A.D.2d 429 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998) (affirming plaintiff Kerry Kotler's
$1.5 million verdict for almost eleven years of wrongful imprisonment); Coakley v.
State, 255 A.D.2d 477 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996) (affirming plaintiff Marion Coakley's
$450,000 verdict for spending two years and three months wrongfully incarcerated).
These settlements and verdicts have received heavy media coverage. See, e.g., Robert
Becker, Ford Heights Four to Get Their Settlement from County, CHI. TRW., Mar. 16,
1999, § 2, at 3 (describing the $36 million settlement between Cook County, Illinois and
four men wrongly convicted of a 1978 murder, three of whom were exonerated by DNA
testing); Andrea Elliott, City Gives $5 Million to Man Wrongly Imprisoned in Child's
Rape, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 2003, at B3 (describing the largest false conviction award
in New York City history in a case involving prosecution suppression of exculpatory
evidence); Karen Farkas, Wrongly Imprisoned Man Dreams of Fun, Helping Kids,
CLEVELAND PLAIN DEALER, Sept. 24, 2003, at BI (describing the settlement of
$750,000 for Jimmy Williams, who was released when the victim admitted she had not
seen the face of her attacker and her identification of him was false, after he spent ten
years incarcerated); Sean Gardiner, Detectives Sued in Murder Frame-Up, NEWSDAY,
Jan. 15, 2005, at A05, available at 2005 WLNR 471948 (reporting that Jeffrey Blake,
who was wrongly convicted based on false informant testimony, settled his New York
state unjust conviction claim for $1.3 million after serving eight years, and is currently
initiating a civil action against the individual detectives who elicited the false testimony,
see supra note 30); see also Thao Hua, $4 Million Goes to Man Wrongly Convicted of
Rape, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 30, 1998, at A3; Natasha Korecki, Jury Finds FBI Railroaded
Ex-Cop; Verdict Holds Agents Liable for $6.6 Million in Death Row Case, Cm. SUN-
TIMES, Jan. 25, 2005, at 3 (reporting that plaintiff Steve Manning won a $6.6 million
jury award for his fourteen years wrongly spent on death row because FBI agents
fabricated the testimony of a jailhouse snitch); Joel Landau, Former Death Row Inmate
Collects $5 M, NAT'L L.J., July 19, 2004, at 6 (describing the settlement of $5 million
between Roberto Miranda and police detectives and the public defender's office that had
a practice of using lie detector tests to decide whether to vigorously defend clients);
Stephen Scheibal, City Settlement: $5.3 Million to Exonerated Man, AUSTIN AM.
STATESMAN, Nov. 21, 2003, at Al (describing the $5.3 million settlement to
Christopher Ochoa, who spent almost eleven years wrongfully incarcerated where police
coerced his confession to a sexual assault and murder; the city in July approved a $9
million settlement for Richard Danziger, whose conviction was secured by coercing
Ochoa to implicate him). In other cases, legislatures enacted private bills to compensate
victims of wrongful conviction. See infra note 63.
33. See supra note 30 (discussing the Burrell, Green, Gregory, Godshalk,
Miller, Sarsfield and Salaam cases).
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already resulted in settlements to reform such practices, including relief
in the form of internal audits and other accountability measures that not
only prevent wrongful convictions, but also benefit law enforcement by
providing more reliable investigative tools.'
A. The Case of James Newsome
James Newsome's case provides a dramatic illustration of how a
typical wrongful conviction case unfolds in one of the first such cases to
go to trial. Newsome spent fifteen years in prison in Illinois for the
1979 murder of a seventy-two-year-old grocery store owner, Mickey
Cohen, which occurred during an armed robbery.35 The Chicago police
stopped Newsome near Wrigley Field and took him to the police station
to question him about another armed robbery.36 Satisfied with his alibi
to that armed robbery, the officers nevertheless decided to hold him for
lineups in the Cohen murder, because they noticed some resemblance to
a composite sketch drawn by one of the witnesses. 7 In 1980, Newsome
was convicted of Cohen's murder and sentenced to life in prison. a
The primary evidence of his guilt was the testimony of two
eyewitnesses, a grocery store employee and a frequent customer, who
identified Newsome at the lineup and then again at trial.39 The jury
apparently disregarded the alibi testimony of three witnesses who stated
that, at the time of the robbery, Newsome was watching TV soap operas
with them.' One can infer that race played a role in Newsome's
conviction; the jury was all white, the victim was white, and Newsome
is black." Newsome's direct appeals were denied,42 and the Supreme
Court denied certiorari.43
34. See Connie Schultz, City to Pay $1.6 Million for Man's Prison Time,
Cleveland Also Agrees to Review Old Cases, PLAIN DEALER, June 8, 2004, at Al
(describing the $1.6 million settlement for the thirteen years Michael Green spent in
prison for a sexual assault he did not commit, and noting that the city agreed to conduct
a forensic audit to reopen more than 100 cases that included testimony from the same
forensics lab worker who falsely testified in Green's trial and to randomly reexamine
other cases in which the city's laboratory conducted serology or hair analysis); see also
discussion infra Part V; infra note 291 (discussing the range of reforms adopted in
Boston).
35. See Newsome v. McCabe, 256 F.3d 747, 748-49 (7th Cir. 2001).
36. Rob Warden, Police Deceit and Erroneous ID Testimony Led to 15 Years
of Wrongful Imprisonment, at http://www.law.northwestem.edu/depts/clinic/wrongful/
exonerations/Newsome.htm (last modified Mar. 10, 2003).
37. Newsome, 256 F.3d at 748.
38. People v. Newsome, 443 N.E.2d 634, 634 (I11. App. Ct. 1982).
39. Id. at 635-36.
40. Id. at 636.
41. Id. at 637.
42. Id. at 637-38.
43. Newsome v. Illinois, 464 U.S. 934 (1983).
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In 1989, University of Chicago Law Professor Norval Morris
assisted Newsome in obtaining a court order requiring the Chicago
Police Department to run unidentified fingerprints from objects at the
murder scene handled by the killer through a new computerized state
fingerprint database.' The police officer who ran the search lied that
there was no match to the prints. It was not until five years later that
the Chicago police finally admitted that, in fact, the prints matched those
of an African American man named Dennis Emerson, who was on death
row for another murder. 45  Emerson was also wanted in 1979 for a
robbery and murder that occurred less than two miles from the scene of
the Cohen murder, of which Newsome was convicted.' It was also
discovered that, prior to Newsome's arrest in 1979, police had
suppressed their reports, which concluded that the fingerprints found on
objects handled by the killer at the scene did not match Newsome's
fingerprints.47
In 1994, the state appellate court vacated Newsome's conviction,
and after the prosecutor declined to retry him, the governor pardoned
him on the ground that he was innocent.48 Newsome had spent fifteen
years in prison for a murder he did not commit.49 While in prison, his
ailing mother had to raise his daughter, his life was threatened, and his
jail cell was set on fire because he refused to join a gang.-4 0
Newsome filed a federal civil rights action, alleging that the police
suppressed evidence in violation of Brady.5 After the federal civil
rights case was filed, additional misconduct surfaced. In 1999, it was
uncovered that the eyewitnesses who misidentified Newsome did not
simply make an honest mistake. 52 One eyewitness came forward and
testified that he was repeatedly threatened and coerced by two police
officers into identifying Newsome, who he knew was not the murderer
he observed, and that the officers warned him not to tell prosecutors
about this coaching.53 The officers were also observed pointing out
Newsome in the lineup to a second eyewitness.' In 2002, a federal
jury, faced with such dramatic evidence of police misconduct, awarded
44. Warden, supra note 36.
45. Id.
46. Newsome v. James, No. 96-C-7680, 2000 WL 528475, at *4 (N.D. 11.
Apr. 26, 2000); Warden, supra note 36.
47. Newsome, 2000 WL 528475, at *9 & n. 11.
48. Newsome, 256 F. 3d at 749.
49. Id.
50. Warmbir, supra note 31, at A2.
51. Newsome, 256 F.3d at 749, 752.
52. Newsome, 319 F.3d at 303.
53. See id.; Editorial, When Believing Isn't Seeing, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 30, 2002,
§ 1, at 16.
54. See Newsome, 319 F.3d at 303.
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Newsome a total of $15 million for the fifteen years he spent wrongfully
convicted.55 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
affirmed the verdict and award on appeal.56
Newsome, like a surprising number of exonerees, is concerned
about the systemic failures that led to his wrongful conviction.' He
now works as a director at the Chicago Center for Wrongful
Convictions. 58
B. Avenues for Compensation Before the DNA Era
In Newsome's case, forensic evidence (though not DNA testing)
provided some of the critical evidence of innocence that, in turn,
spurred a reinvestigation uncovering further police misconduct.5 9 In the
era before such forensic testing was widespread, however, little redress
or compensation was available to the exonerated for the years they lost.
Typically, when a person like Newsome is found innocent, he or she is
released without the state providing even the most minimal supportive
services available to convicts released on parole and whose convictions
were never vacated. In Louisiana, for example, a released prisoner,
guilty or innocent, receives "ten dollars and a denim jacket."'
Newsome first obtained some compensation three years after his release
under an Illinois statute, prior to filing his federal civil rights action.6"
Few states have such statutes, and the compensation is often paltry.62
55. Id. at 302-03.
56. Id. at 301.
57. See Michael Perlstein, Freedom No Cure All for Those Wrongly Convicted:
Jobs and Respect Often Remain Elusive, NEW ORLEANS TIMES PICAYANE, Mar. 30,
2003, http://www.truthinjustice.org/no-cureall.htm.
58. Id.
59. Warden, supra note 36.
60. Michael Ray Graham, Jr., on whose civil case I have been privileged to
assist, received nothing more than that for his fourteen years and 129 days in prison
along with fellow exoneree Ronnie Burrell; the ten dollars did not cover his
transportation home to Virginia. See Protecting the Innocent: Ensuring Competent
Counsel in Death Penalty Cases: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,
107th Cong. 40-41 (2001) (statement of Michael Graham); Sara Rimer, Two Death-Row
Inmates Exonerated in Louisiana, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 6, 2001, at A8.
61. 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 505/8(c) (1999) (enacted 1945).
62. See CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 4900-4906 (West 2000) (enacted 1941); 705 ILL.
COMP. STAT. ANN. 505/8(c); IOWA CODE ANN. § 663A.1 (West 1998) (enacted 1997);
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, §§ 8241-8244 (West 2003) (enacted 1993); MD. ANN.
CODE art. 78A, § 16A (2003) (enacted 1963); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 541-B:14(n)
(1997) (enacted 1977); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 52:4C-1 to :4C-6 (West 2001) (enacted
1997); N.Y. JUD. CT. ACTS LAW § 8-b (McKinney 1989) (enacted 1984); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 148-82 (2003) (enacted 1947); OHIo REv. CODE ANN. §§ 2305.02, 2743.48
(Lexis Supp. 2003) (enacted 1986); TENN. CODE ANN. § 9-8-108(a)(7) (Lexis Supp.
2004) (enacted 1984); TEx. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 103.001-.007 (Vernon
1997) (enacted 1965); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 14-2-13a (Michie 2000) (enacted 1987);
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Legislatures have occasionally enacted special bills compensating
individuals for the hardships they endured.63 According to a study by
the Innocence Project, only thirty-four percent of exonerees have ever
received any kind of compensation, and that more fortunate third often
receives very little. 6M Scholars have long advocated for the social and
moral need for statutory schemes by which the government would
compensate the innocent, 65 but they have met with little success.6
WIs. STAT. § 775.05 (2003-2004) (enacted 1979). The federal government and the
District of Columbia have each enacted a wrongful conviction statute. 28 U.S.C. §§
1495, 2513 (enacted 1948) (amended by Innocence Protection Act section 431); D.C.
CODE ANN. §§ 2-421 to -425 (2001) (enacted 1981); see also JIM DWYER ET AL.,
ACTUAL INNOCENCE: WHEN JUSTICE GOES WRONG AND How TO MAKE IT RIGHT 297-99
(2003) (describing how most such schemes provide very little compensation, and how in
states like New York that have fairer statutes, in practice, as litigated by defendants and
handled by courts, few concededly wrongfully convicted people see any meaningful
compensation).
63. See, e.g., S.B. 572, 2004 Leg. (Va. 2004) (proposing the payment of
$1,237,000 to Beverly Anne Monroe, who was wrongfully convicted and imprisoned for
ten years for murder due to the suppression of exculpatory evidence), available at
http://legl.state.va.us/cgi-bin/legp504.exe?051 + ful +SB572; DWYER ET AL., supra note
62, at 138-40 (describing the $1 million settlement to Glen Dale Woodall in West
Virginia, who was wrongly convicted based on fabricated testimony of the person in
charge of the state's serology laboratory); Bill Asks for Wrongf4l Conviction Payments to
Prisoner, ASSOCIATED PREsS, Dec. 28, 2003 (describing a $1.2 million settlement
approved by the legislature for Marvin Anderson, who spent fifteen years in prison for a
sexual assault he did not commit); Va. to Pay Exonerated Prisoner $1.2 M, ASSOCIATED
PRESS, Mar. 12, 2004 (describing the approval of a $1.2 million payment to James Earl
Ruffin who was released after twenty-one years in prison when DNA evidence
exonerated him.). Now that the size of municipalities' exposure in federal wrongful
conviction actions is becoming clear, perhaps more legislatures will now consider
compensation statutes.
64. See DWYER ET AL., supra note 62, at 298.
65. See, e.g., Edwin Borchard, State Indemnity for Errors of Criminal Justice,
21 B.U. L. REV. 201, 207 (1941) (arguing that the state should be strictly responsible
for compensating the wrongly convicted).
66. See Adele Bernhard, Exonerations Change Judicial Views on Ineffective
Assistance of Counsel, CRIM. JUST., Fall 2003, at 37, 41-42. In contrast, we have no
qualms about setting up comprehensive compensation schemes for victims of crimes;
almost all of the states and the federal government have such schemes. DALE G. PARENT
ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, COMPENSATING CRIME VICTIMS: A SUMMARY OF
POLICIES AND PRACTICES (1992). The Victims of Crime Act of 1994 ("VOCA"), 42
U.S.C. §§ 10601-10602, provides federal grants to supplement state funding of victim
compensation programs, and the Federal Victim and Witness Protection Act of 1982, 18
U.S.C. §§ 1514, 3555-3556, provides crime victims restitution, a right to a statement at
sentencing in federal cases, and victim and witness protection. In contrast, the federal
government pays a maximum of $5000 to a person wrongly convicted under federal law,
regardless of how many years they were incarcerated. DWYER ET AL., supra note 62, at
298. A new nonprofit that aims to "support exonerated persons in rebuilding their
lives" is the Life After Exoneration Program. See The Life After Exoneration Program,
http://www.exonerated.org/index.html (last visited Mar. 28, 2005).
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In the past, the exonerated also faced significant obstacles to
bringing lawsuits seeking compensation. Before DNA and other
forensic technology became available, it was very difficult for a person
to prove innocence.67 The traditional common law claim of malicious
prosecution arose out of the same common law tradition from which the
Fourth Amendment warrant requirement emerged-that when the police
act on a person, they must at all times have probable cause.68 The
common law claim had three elements: (1) the individual was prosecuted
without probable cause by law enforcement officers,69 (2) the
prosecution occurred with malice, or recklessness to the lack of probable
cause, and (3) the prosecution ultimately terminated in favor of the
accused.7" Although termination of the criminal proceeding did not have
to be because of innocence,7' the plaintiff would typically have to rebut a
defense of guilt, which the state could prove by a preponderance of the
evidence.72
By virtue of the simplicity of malicious prosecution, it sweeps
together all conduct officers engage in-anything that should lead an
67. See DWYER ET AL., supra note 62, at 309-28 (discussing obstacles to
exoneration, and how in countless cases because the "magic bullet" (evidence capable of
DNA testing) is lacking, innocents remain behind bars).
68. See Snyder v. City of Alexandria, 870 F. Supp. 672, 675, 678-79, 681
(E.D. Va. 1994) (explaining that the governor's pardon, of a plaintiff exonerated of rape
charges, constituted favorable termination such that the plaintiff could pursue a
malicious prosecution claim). At common law, a tort case for wrongful conviction could
include more general causes of action such as claims of intentional or reckless infliction
of emotional distress, negligent supervision, negligence, civil conspiracy, or torts such
as false arrest and abuse of process. See Limone v. United States, 271 F.Supp.2d 345,
359 n.13 (D. Mass. 2003) (address whether "favorable termination" is required for a
plaintiff to recover under tort claims, such as intentional infliction of emotional distress,
negligent supervision, and civil conspiracy). Common law did not provide additional
causes for relief if police engaged in particular egregious acts, such as subordination of
perjury or fabrication of evidence. Cases held that perjury and subordination of perjury
were not separate from an underlying lack of probable cause in torts under state law.
See Phelps v. Steams, 70 Mass. (4 Grey) 105, 105-06 (1855) (holding that there is no
common law cause of action for perjury).
Although the circuits are divided, several U.S. Courts of Appeals permit
federal malicious prosecution claims. See Leon Friedman, New Developments in Civil
Rights Litigation and Trends in Section 1983 Actions, in 2 18TH ANNUAL SECTION 1983
CIVIL RIGHTS LITIGATION, supra note 8, 231, 236-43 (providing an overview of the split
among the circuits). This Article expresses no view as to whether malicious prosecution
should stand alone as a constitutional claim; however, courts have not understood the
distinction between due process fair trial claims and a malicious prosecution claim. See
infra notes 309-10.
69. Generally, only police can be sued in malicious prosecution actions; judges
and prosecutors are almost entirely immune for their roles in wrongful convictions. See
discussion of immunity doctrine infra Part V.D.
70. 3 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 653 (1977).
71. See 3 id. § 659.
72. 3 id. § 657 & cmts. a-b.
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officer to believe that they lack probable cause provides evidence of
malice. On the other hand, malicious prosecution's breadth is also its
weakness-an often fatal weakness. So long as police can credibly show
that they had probable cause, any violation of a suspect's rights are
rendered nonactionable. The effect is not even a "no harm no foul"
rule.
C. The Role of DNA in Wrongful Conviction Actions
The recent wave of wrongful conviction lawsuits was made possible
by DNA testing technology, which can compare biological evidence left
at the scene of a crime with the genetic markers of a convict, thereby
providing conclusive evidence of innocence, and a powerful case for
compensating the exonerated.73 DNA testing was first used in 1989 to
exonerate an innocent man, Gary Dotson, who had been wrongly
incarcerated for ten years in Illinois.7 a Since then, there have been
steady increases in both the numbers and the rate of DNA exonerations,
as DNA testing has become increasingly sophisticated.75
DNA testing has its limits: it may never provide an avenue for
broad identification and compensation of the wrongly convicted.
Moreover, DNA testing can be used only in a limited number of cases:
when biological evidence may have been left by the perpetrator at the
scene of the crime, that evidence was collected by law enforcement, that
evidence was preserved, and the state permits access to such testing.
Making matters worse, our criminal justice system remains unconducive
to claims of innocence and requests for DNA testing. It is not entirely
clear that a petitioner may raise a cognizable claim of "factual
innocence" in federal habeas corpus.76 Claims to secure access to
73. Many of the recent federal wrongful conviction cases have been filed by
DNA exonerees. See cases cited supra notes 30 and 32.
74. Rob Warden, The Rape that Wasn't: The First DNA Exoneration in Illinois,
Center on Wrongful Convictions, at http://www.law.northwestern.edu/
depts/clinic/wrongful/exonerations/Dotson.htm (last modified September 8, 2003).
75. Sam Gross's comprehensive survey of 328 exonerations from 1989 through
2003 covers the period during which DNA testing on forensic evidence became
available, and concludes that roughly half of all exonerations were due to DNA testing.
SAMUEL R. GROSS ET AL., EXONERATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES, 1989 THROUGH 2003
(2004), available at http://www.law.umich.edu/newsandinfo/exonerations-in-us.pdf.
The study found "a steady increase in the number of DNA exonerations, from one or
two a year in 1989 to 1991, to an average of 6 a year from 1992 through 1995, to an
average of 21 a year since 2001." Id. at 4.
76. See Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 316 (1995) (stating that a remedy would
exist only when the evidence is so strong as to make the sentence "constitutionally
intolerable"); Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 417 (1993) (assuming that, for the sake
of argument, a persuasive demonstration of actual innocence would render a conviction
unconstitutional, and stating that if such a federal habeas claim existed, the threshold
would be "extraordinarily" high); Burton v. Dormire, 295 F.3d 839, 848 (8th Cir.
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postconviction DNA also face legal hurdles in federal courts,77 and local
law enforcement often vigorously resists DNA testing, for example, as
in the case of Roger Coleman.78
Despite these formidable obstacles, the number of DNA
exonerations continues to grow,79 raising difficult questions as to how
many innocent convicts languish in our prisons undetected, and how
much error we are willing to tolerate in the criminal justice system,
especially when life and death may be at stake.'u
2002) (holding that a state prisoner was not entitled to federal habeas relief based on his
claims of factual innocence); see also Judge Josephine Linker Hart & Guilford F.
Dudley, Available Post-Trial Relief After a State Criminal Conviction when Newly
Discovered Evidence Established "Actual Innocence", 22 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV.
629, 640 (2000) ("The opportunity for a state prisoner to obtain review of a claim of
actual innocence is also limited in federal court."); Bruce Ledewitz, Habeas Corpus as a
Safety Valve for Innocence, 18 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 415, 430 (1990-1991)
(discussing the views of some Supreme Court justices that one purpose of habeas corpus
is to provide a "safety valve" for factually innocent defendants).
77. See Seth F. Kreimer & David Rudovsky, Double Helix, Double Bind:
Factual Innocence and Postconviction DNA Testing, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 547, 552 n.21
(2002) (discussing cases representative of the "legal struggles over claims to access to
DNA for post-conviction testing"); see also Hart & Dudley, supra note 76, at 640-41
(discussing the limited circumstances under which federal postconviction relief is
available to state prisoners).
The Innocence Protection Act, adopted as part of the Justice for All Act, provides
a right to postconviction testing in federal cases and grants to encourage states to do the
same. See supra note 20. The Innocence Protection Act does not provide a right to file
for habeas corpus, as it states that "[a]n application under this section shall not be
considered an application for a writ of habeas corpus." Innocence Protection Act of
2002, S. 486, 107th Cong. § 103(a)(2)(d) (2002); Innocence Protection Act of 2002,
H.R. 912, 107th Cong. § 103(a)(2)(d) (2002).
78. See Laurence Hammack, Dispute Arises over Possible DNA Test, ROANOKE
TIMES, June 5, 2004, at Al (describing Virginia Governor Mark Warner's impending
decision as to whether he should order a new DNA test in the case in which Roger
Coleman was convicted, sentenced to death, and ultimately executed, based on sperm
recovered from a woman who was sexually assaulted and murdered in 1990).
79. The Innocence Project, founded by Peter Neufeld and Barry Scheck, keeps
count of the number of exonerations nationwide on its website. The number on March
27, 2005, was 157. Innocence Project, supra note 29; see DWYER ET AL., supra note
62, at 246 (recounting the factors that were present in sixty-two wrongful convictions);
Sharon Cohen & Deborah Hastings, Stolen Lives in Prison: DNA Evidence Is Setting
Free the Wrongfully Convicted. But What Happens to Them Then?, CONN. L. TRIB.,
June 24, 2002, at 1 (discussing an Associated Press study of 110 inmates exonerated by
postconviction DNA testing); see also EDWIN M. BORCHARD, CONVICTING THE
INNOCENT: SIXTY-FIVE ACTUAL ERRORS OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, at v-vi (1932).
80. See Hugo Adam Bedau & Michael L. Radelet, Miscarriages of Justice in
Potentially Capital Cases, 40 STAN. L. REV. 21, 36 (1987) (discussing the landmark
Hugo Adam Bedau and Michael L. Radelet study which concluded that twenty-three
innocent people have been executed in the United States in the last century); see also
RADELET ET AL., IN SPITE OF INNOCENCE: ERRONEOUS CONVICTIONS IN CAPITAL CASES
282-356 (1992) (updating Bedau and Radelet's 1987 study); Samuel R. Gross, Lost
Lives: Miscarriages of Justice in Capital Cases, 61 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 125, 125
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In addition to changing factual assumptions about error rates in the
system and the guilt of those we convict,"' DNA exonerations expose
fundamental legal assumptions in our criminal justice system: that guilty
jury verdicts are sound and should be preserved in the interest of
finality, and deference should be afforded to state courts, juries, and law
enforcement. Deferential harmless error review is grounded in the
substantive notion that convictions should not be disturbed where there
was sufficient evidence of guilt.' Once DNA shows that the defendant
is in fact innocent, however, constitutional error does not look so
harmless, especially in cases where the police and prosecutors engaged
in egregious misconduct, such as destroying evidence, coercing
witnesses, and fabricating and suppressing evidence of innocence.83
Innocence calls into question the judgment of state and federal appellate
courts, and sometimes even the Supreme Court, because all levels of
courts have denied reversal of convictions based on harmless error.
Exonerations thus provide the ideal social and moral backdrop for legal
challenges in civil rights lawsuits.
D. Fair Trial Claims Brought in Section 1983 Wrongful Conviction
Actions
Vacatur of the conviction is a prerequisite to filing a federal
wrongful conviction case as a result of the Supreme Court's 1994
decision in Heck v. Humphrey.' Roy Heck filed an action seeking
damages while still in prison and while his direct appeals in state court
were still pending.8 5 Following the traditional malicious prosecution
requirement that there be an ultimate termination in favor of the
accused, the Supreme Court held that a plaintiff can file a federal case
(1998) (arguing that erroneous convictions of innocent people result from "systematic
consequences of the nature of homicide prosecution in general and capital prosecution in
particular"); Robert E. Pierre & Kari Lyderson, Illinois Death Row Emptied, WASH.
POST, Jan. 12, 2003, at Al (quoting Illinois Governor George Ryan, who stated that
"'[t]he capital punishment system was haunted by the demon of error'"). Anthony
Porter came within forty-eight hours of his scheduled execution date before being
exonerated because of the investigative work of journalism students, who obtained a
confession from the actual murderer. REPORT OF THE GOVERNOR'S COMMISSION ON
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 1 (2002) [hereinafter GOVERNOR'S REPORT].
81. See Death Penalty Poll (2004) (discussing a 2003 poll where ninety-five
percent of the participants thought that innocent people are "sometimes" convicted of
murder), at http://www.pollingreport.com/crime.htm.
82. See discussion of harmless error doctrine infra Part II.B.
83. DWYER ET AL., supra note 62, at 265 (discussing the different ways that
prosecutors and police engage in misconduct).
84. 512 U.S. 477, 477 (1994).
85. Id. at 478-79.
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challenging unconstitutional conduct resulting in a conviction only after
that conviction is either vacated or pardoned. 6
Nor can every person whose conviction has been vacated
successfully bring a civil rights action. A wrongful conviction, like any
injury, is actionable under civil rights law only if it was the result of
official misconduct, and not only coincidence, mistake, or negligence.'
Police officers must have acted in a way no reasonable officer would
have acted,' and in many cases, there will be no evidence of
misconduct. For example, in a case where an eyewitness identified an
assailant, and DNA later proved that the eyewitness was mistaken, there
may be no evidence that the police unreasonably relied on that
eyewitness. A great surprise, however, has been the degree to which
official misconduct has played a significant role. According to an
Innocence Project study in 1999, in sixty-two percent of the cases where
the convicted individual has been exonerated, police or prosecutorial
misconduct was a significant factor.89  Further, although smaller
numbers of wrongful conviction suits can be brought than the number of
run-of-the-mill civil rights actions, the lawsuits that can be maintained
involve the most egregious miscarriages of justice in which a conviction
was vacated. Thus, through that filter, the cases brought may
disproportionately involve misconduct implicating systemic failures.
Similarly, the claims brought in wrongful conviction cases are
relatively few in number, but each focuses on systemic procedural
issues. The most common fair trial claims are: (1) Brady claims,
alleging that officials suppressed evidence that was exculpatory; 9° (2)
ineffective assistance of counsel; 9' (3) use of suggestive eyewitness
identification procedures; 92  (4) a coerced confession; 93  and (5)
86. Id. at 486. The Court held that, because Section 1983 creates a type of tort
recovery, it makes sense to look to the common law of torts as a starting point. Id.
87. See Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 333 (1986) ("In support of his
claim that negligent conduct can give rise to a due process 'deprivation,' petitioner
makes several arguments, none of which we find persuasive.").
88. See Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 200-07 (2001) (setting out the Court's
latest qualified immunity test, an objective reasonableness standard).
89. See DWYER Er AL., supra note 62, at 246 (explaining that "prosecutorial
misconduct played a part in 42 percent, and police misconduct in 50 percent" of
wrongful conviction cases).
90. 373 U.S. at 87. Such lawsuits are discussed infra Part IV.A. Examples
include the Atlins, Bibbins, Blake, Graham, Gregory, Green, Lowery, Long, Miller, and
Sarsfleld cases, see supra note 30, and the Newsome case, see supra Part I.B.
91. See infra Part IV.B (discussing the Miranda and Lloyd cases raising such
claims).
92. See supra note 30 (discussing the Atkins, Bibbins, Long, Miller, Newsome,
and Sarsfield cases).
93. See supra note 30 (discussing the Atkins, Ochoa, Lloyd, Lowery, and
Washington cases).
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fabrication of evidence, such as blood evidence, hair evidence, or
witness statements." Each of these claims is developed in Part IV. 95
Each fair trial claim must be brought under Section 1983, which
authorizes actions for violation of a federal right.96 The underlying
purposes of the statute are to compensate a civil rights violation and to
deter future wrongful government conduct.' There is no dispute that
criminal procedure rights are "secured by the Constitution" under
Section 1983, but until recently, courts have had little occasion to
consider how such rights apply in a civil case. Fair trial rights are
designed to prevent conviction of the innocent, 9 and the Court has
94. See supra note 30 (discussing the Atkins, Gregory, Lowery, Long, Miller,
and Sarsfield cases).
95. In addition to civil claims for violation of constitutional rights, it is possible
that rights-protecting prophylactics will provide civil recovery. In dicta, the Supreme
Court stated in its plurality opinion in Chavez v. Martinez that "[riules designed to
safeguard a constitutional right, however, do not extend the scope of the constitutional
right itself, just as violations of judicially crafted prophylactic rules do not violate the
constitutional rights of any person." 538 U.S. 760, 772 (2003). The Court added that
an appropriate remedy could be found in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Id. at 773. On the other hand, Justice Antonin Scalia added in his
concurring opinion that "Section 1983 does not provide remedies for violations of
judicially created prophylactic rules, such as the rule of Miranda v. Arizona, as the
Court today holds .... Rather, a plaintiff seeking redress through § 1983 must establish
the violation of a federal constitutional or statutory right." Id. at 780 (Scalia, J.,
concurring in part). This does not provide a firm indication of how the Court would
rule on the question of whether such rules can supply a Section 1983 cause of action.
Perhaps the Due Process Clause, as the plurality opinion suggests, could provide a civil
right of action. See Susan R. Klein, Miranda Deconstitutionalized: When the Self-
Incrimination Clause and the Civil Rights Act Collide, 143 U. PA. L. REv. 417, 440-41
(1994) (discussing the due process approach, but also noting that courts have rejected it).
Even if such rules do not provide independent civil causes of action, they would serve an
evidentiary purpose in a civil case. For example, the failure to provide Miranda
warnings and a waiver, though it may not in and of itself support a claim, would be
strong evidence that police officers were bent on coercion, especially where the
confession was later shown to be false.
96. 42 U.S.C. § 1983; Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994) (plurality
opinion) ("Section 1983 'is not itself a source of substantive rights,' but merely provides
'a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.'") (quoting Baker v.
McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979)). Section 1983, which was enacted because of
growing abuses in the southern criminal justice system, proves particularly apposite in a
wrongful conviction case where the claim is that state courts failed to prevent an
innocent person from being wrongly incarcerated. In doing so, Section 1983 can
"interpose the federal courts between the States and the people, as guardians of the
people's federal rights." Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 242 (1972).
97. Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 651 (1980). Section 1983
took on its modern shape in Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 167 (1961), a case
involving an unlawful search and police detention without probable cause or warrant.
98. Justice William Brennan's opinion in In re Winship expressed the centrality
of the presumption of innocence to our criminal justice system, calling it a "bedrock
axiomatic and elementary principle whose enforcement lies at the foundation of the
administration of our criminal law." 397 U.S. 358, 361-63 (1970) (citations omitted).
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barred trial practices that "'offend[] some principle of justice so rooted
in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as
fundamental.'" 99 Yet, the Court remains reluctant to impose other
safeguards, stating that "[d]ue process does not require that every
conceivable step be taken, at whatever cost, to eliminate the possibility
of convicting an innocent person."10°  A shifting balance between
innocence and the risk of wrongful conviction, and efficient prosecution
and conviction of the guilty, defines the Court's fair trial jurisprudence.
It is that balance which may be fundamentally altered by emergence of
civil suits seeking compensation for denial of a fair trial.' 0 '
II. THE COURT'S GUiLT-BASED HARMLESS ERROR RULES
A. The Chapman Rule
A natural question to ask about the increasing number of
wrongfully convicted individuals is why criminal and appellate courts
did not remedy constitutional errors long before innocent people
languished in prison. The answer in many cases is the doctrine of
harmless error. The fair trial rights described above were each
established during the Supreme Court's criminal procedure revolution,
The Court embraced notions of fundamental fairness in Brady as well, stating that
"[s]ociety wins not only when the guilty are convicted but when criminal trials are fair."
373 U.S. at 87.
99. Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 446 (1992) (quoting Patterson v. New
York, 432 U.S. 197, 202 (1977)); see also Schlup, 513 U.S. at 325 (noting that
"concern about the injustice that results from the conviction of an innocent person has
long been at the core of our criminal justice system"); Herrera, 506 U.S. at 419
(O'Connor, J., concurring) ("I cannot disagree with the fundamental legal principle that
executing the innocent is inconsistent with the Constitution."); Berger v. United States,
295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935) ("[Ihe twofold aim of [the law] is that guilt shall not escape or
innocence suffer.").
100. Patterson, 432 U.S. at 208.
101. See infra Part I.B and accompanying text for criticism of the Court's
increasing emphasis on guilt and not on due process values. One example is Manson v.
Brathwaite, which ended the per se exclusion of unconstitutionally suggestive
identifications for the reason that doing so "may result, on occasion, in the guilty going
free." 432 U.S. 98, 112 (1977). The Court has increasingly narrowed its focus by
examining each constitutional provision in light of its common law antecedents, rather
than underlying purpose, policy, or due process values. See Tracey L. Meares, What's
Wrong with Gideon, 70 U. CHI. L. REv. 215, 227-28 (2003) (discussing how the Court
is now concerned more with the context of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, rather
than broader due process considerations); David A. Sklansky, The Fourth Amendment
and Common Law, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1739, 1744 (2000) (addressing the Supreme
Court's increasing reliance on common law history in interpreting the meaning of Fourth
Amendment protections).
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dating from pre-World War II through the Warren Court.'02 On the
heels of that revolution, the Burger and Rehnquist Courts provided a
second, quiet revolution. The typical account is that the Burger and
Rehnquist Courts weakened the Warren Court's criminal procedure
decisions by distinguishing them and creating exceptions to their rules. °3
Contrary to that account, in the case of fair trial rights, the Rehnquist
Court assiduously preserved those landmark rulings as a constitutional
matter,"° while weakening the rights in an indirect way by limiting the
remedies for their violation, by ratcheting the strength of the doctrine of
harmless error.'°
Harmless error rules, first adopted by state courts in the nineteenth
century,I°6 became a matter of federal law in the Supreme Court case of
Chapman v. California, a homicide case in which the prosecutor
commented extensively during closing arguments on Chapman's failure
to testify in her own defense, thereby violating her Fifth Amendment
rights."° The California Supreme Court concluded that, under the state
constitution, the violation was harmless because it did not result in a
"miscarriage of justice. " '08 The Supreme Court ruled that federal law
governs whether federal constitutional error is harmless, and ruled that
102. The first six criminal procedure decisions predate the Warren Court and
established several basic due process rights. See Michael J. Klarman, The Racial
Origins of Modem Criminal Procedure, 99 MICH. L. REv. 48, 48-49 (2000). All of
these cases were egregious and four involved African American defendants from the
South. See id.
103. See generally FRED P. GRAHAM, THE DUE PROCESS REVOLUTION: THE
WARREN COURT'S IMPACT ON CRIMINAL LAW (1970); Peter Arenella, Rethinking the
Functions of Criminal Procedure: The Warren and Burger Courts' Competing
Ideologies, 72 GEO. L.J. 185, 187 (1983).
104. See Steiker, supra note 2, at 2469. For criticism, see Klein, supra note 95,
at 482-83 (arguing that it is the Court's obligation under the Constitution to create
remedies to safeguard constitutional rights).
105. Why has the Supreme Court fashioned limitations on due process criminal
procedure in this covert manner? One reason may be stare decisis, especially where
many of the cases establishing fair trial rights are considered landmark decisions
protecting the accused, that could not be casually undone. Another reason, described
below, is a focus on guilt and on granting discretion to preserve jury verdicts finding
defendants guilty. For an account of how the Court's approach in other contexts can be
understood as proceeding in a layered fashion, see generally Barry Friedman & Scott B.
Smith, The Sedimentary Constitution, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (1998).
106. All states now have harmless error rules. Chapman, 386 U.S. at 22
(noting that, in 1967, every state had harmless error rules). Harmless error rules did not
exist at common law, but gradually developed in the nineteenth century in both England
and America in response to the perception of an increase in unnecessary reversals of
otherwise sound jury verdicts for "technical" errors. See ROGER J. TRAYNOR, THE
RIDDLE OF HARMLESS ERROR 6-8 (1970); Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., Arizona v.
Fulminante: The Harm of Applying Harmless Error to Coerced Confessions, 105 HARV.
L. REV. 152, 156 (1991).
107. 386 U.S. at 19-20, 23-24.
108. Id. at 20 (citations omitted).
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error may be found harmless only if the court can conclude beyond a
reasonable doubt that the error contributed to the defendant's
conviction.0 9 Chapman's harmless error rule applies on appeal. The
remedy at trial for a violation of a right is exclusion of evidence or a
curative instruction."' On appeal, however, in order to determine
whether the denial of a remedy at trial deserves a "do-over," the
appellate court examines whether the constitutional violation
"contributed" to the conviction."' The state had the burden of proving
error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, a fairly high standard." 2
On its face, the Chapman harmless error standard seems
uncontroversial, even given the inherent difficulty of an appellate court
speculating what actually contributed to a jury's decision to find guilt.
Granting a new trial where it appears the jury could not have relied on
the unconstitutionally admitted evidence seems intuitively wasteful.
After all, Chapman initially functioned as protective common law in
order to insulate federal rights from state law unduly permissive of
constitutional violations. 1
3
B. Harmless Error's Focus on Guilt
From those fairly innocuous origins, harmless error rules expanded
to substantially undercut constitutional protections. Two developments
changed the nature of harmless error. First, without changing the
standard on its face, the Court has shifted the evidentiary burden by
asking whether error can be excused by other evidence of guilt.
Second, the Court has incorporated harmless error rules into the context
of fair trial rights.
109. Id. at 26. Chapman held that "before a federal constitutional error can be
held harmless, the court must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt." Id. at 24. This rule is similar to the nineteenth century rule that an
error would require a new trial if the "improper evidence ... had an effect on the minds
of the jury." Rex v. Ball, 168 Eng. Rep. 721, 722 (K.B. 1807); see William T. Pizzi &
Morris B. Hoffman, Jury Selection Errors on Appeal, 38 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1391,
1418-19 (2001) (recounting the history of harmless error doctrine at English common
law, and describing that, in many respects, the English rule became more forgiving of
criminal trial error during the nineteenth century).
110. See, e.g., Watkins v. Sowders, 449 U.S. 341, 346-47 (1981) (holding that,
in the context of witness identifications, either curative instructions or a suppression
hearing may remedy constitutional error).
111. Chapman, 386 U.S. at 26.
112. "Certainly error, constitutional error, in illegally admitting highly
prejudicial evidence or comments, casts on someone other than the person prejudiced by
it a burden to show that it was harmless." Id. at 24.
113. See id. at 21 ("[W]e cannot leave to the States the formulation of the
authoritative laws, rules, and remedies designed to protect people from infractions by the
States of federally guaranteed rights.").
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Federal lower courts have followed the Supreme Court's suggestion
that a court may find error harmless based on an assumption that
defendants are generally guilty. The Supreme Court reframed the
Chapman inquiry into an explicitly guilt-based inquiry in Rose v. Clark,
asking whether "a reviewing court can find that the record developed at
trial establishes guilt beyond a reasonable doubt."1 4 The Court has not
intervened as lower courts continue to cite the Rose formulation and ask
whether other evidence of guilt could support the jury's verdict."'
Rather than properly follow the Chapman standard and looking to
whether an error actually "contributed" to the jury's actual verdict, the
courts broadly search the record by asking whether independent
evidence of guilt taken alone could support the conviction. In effect, the
court is asking whether a hypothetical jury may have still found the
defendant guilty by imagining the constitutional violation never
happened." 6 Even if the most powerful evidence in a criminal case, like
a confession or forensic evidence, was coerced or tainted, an appellate
court can uphold the guilty verdict by finding that a jury could have
relied on untainted evidence peripheral to the state's actual case." 7 In
effect, the inquiry reverses the evidentiary burden. Rather than the
114. Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 579 (1986) (emphasis added). The Court
had earlier held that other evidence of guilt was relevant only to the harmless error
inquiry. See, e.g., Milton v. Wainwright, 407 U.S. 371, 372-73 (1972); Harrington v.
California, 395 U.S. 250, 254 (1969) (stating that constitutional errors "affecting the
substantial rights" of the convicted are not harmless errors).
115. The Court did note in Brecht v. Abrahamson that Chapman requires courts
to ask whether "there is a 'reasonable possibility' that trial error contributed to the
verdict." Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637 (1993) (quoting Chapman, 386
U.S. at 24). Some lower courts, however, continue to follow the Rose test. See, e.g.,
United States v. Worthon, 315 F.3d 980, 984 (8th Cir. 2003) (finding the admission of
prior bad act evidence harmless "in light of the overwhelming evidence" of guilt);
United States v. Guzman, 167 F.3d 1350, 1353 (11th Cir. 1999) ("Overwhelming
evidence of guilt is one factor that may be considered in finding harmless error.");
United States v. Casoni, 950 F.2d 893, 917-18 (3d Cir. 1991); Clark v. Moran, 942
F.2d 24, 27 (1st Cir. 1991) (describing the proper question as "whether the properly
admitted evidence presented such overwhelming evidence of guilt that we can conclude,
beyond a reasonable doubt, that the jury would have returned a verdict of guilty without
having received the tainted evidence"); Hunter v. Clark, 934 F.2d 856, 860 (7th Cir.
1991) (finding that "any error was harmless in view of the overpowering evidence
of... guilt").
116. A second doctrine, the independent evidence doctrine, provides that, if
police obtain evidence in violation of the Fourth Amendment, that evidence may
nevertheless be used if police independently had knowledge of those facts from a legal
source. See, e.g., Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392
(1920). The important difference is all in the timing-the rule is retrospective and it
permits police to cure the error by finding the evidence from a legal source. The
harmless error doctrine, on the other hand, is based on the evidence presented at trial.
117. See United States v. Manganellis, 864 F.2d 528, 539 (7th Cir. 1988)
(citation omitted).
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government having the burden to show harmless error beyond a
reasonable doubt, it can instead avoid the question of error entirely.
The inquiry is the opposite of what Chapman requires, that is, a narrow
examination whether there is a "reasonable possibility" that the error
"contributed" to the jury's actual decision."I8
Nevertheless, "the guilt based approach to harmless error has taken
hold in our courts," working a "dramatic expansion of the doctrine."119
In many cases, guilt is the "the sole criterion by which harmlessness is
gauged.""o Making matters worse, the Court made the rule on habeas
review far more deferential,' based on "the State's interest in the
finality of convictions," and noted that convictions are not just "final"
but "presumptively correct."" 2  For example, defendants once found
guilty by jury are presumed guilty.123 At the same time, the Court
extended the harmless error doctrine to the full range of criminal
procedure rights." Prior to Chapman, constitutional errors could not
be harmless,"2 but now only the rare case is not subject to harmless
error analysis, a doctrine of "almost universal application."1 6  Even
118. See Fahy v. Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85, 86-87 (1963). Part of the problem
is that the Chapman rule is indeterminate. See Kamin, supra note 2, at 17-18.
Harmless error is a malleable doctrine. Id. at 62 (providing an empirical study
demonstrating the malleability of the doctrine).
119. Harry T. Edwards, To Err Is Human, but Not Always Harmless: When
Should Legal Error Be Tolerated?, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1167, 1171-72 (1995). "I
believe that, more often than not, we review the record to determine how we might have
decided the case; the judgment as to whether an error is harmless is therefore dependent
on our judgment about the factual guilt of the defendant." Id. at 1171.
120. Id. at 1187.
121. Brecht, 507 U.S. at 623 (setting a new standard on habeas review that the
error must have had a "substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the
jury's verdict") (quoting Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 776 (1946)).
122. Id. at 635, 637. The Court also noted "the frustration of 'society's interest
in the prompt administration of justice'" as a reason for a higher standard. Id. at 637
(quoting United States v. Mechanik, 475 U.S. 66, 72 (1986)). For criticism of Brecht,
see James S. Liebman & Randy Hertz, Brecht v. Abrahamson: Harmful Error in Habeas
Corpus Law, 84 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1109 (1994).
123. Such deference is also distinct from the truth-seeking function of criminal
procedure. The Court stated that there is a "public interest in placing probative evidence
before juries for the purpose of arriving at truthful decisions about guilt or innocence."
Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477, 489 (1972). Here, the Court defers to jury verdicts
even where unreliable, nonprobative evidence was before the jury. Id. at 489-90.
124. Id. at 490.
125. See YALE KAMISAR ET AL., MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: CASES,
COMMENTS AND QUESTIONS 1569 (10th ed. 2002) ("Prior to the 1960's, it generally was
assumed that constitutional violations could never be regarded as harmless error. Aside
from one ambiguous ruling at the turn of the century, a Supreme Court finding of
constitutional error had always resulted in a reversal of the defendant's conviction.").
126. Brecht, 507 U.S. at 651-52 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("[T]here are few
errors that may not be forgiven as harmless.") (citing Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S.
279, 306-07 (1991)); see Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 282 (1993) (Rehnquist,
Federal Wrongful Conviction Law
coerced confessions may be found harmless in light of other evidence of
guilt, despite the devastating impact of a confession.
27
The application of harmless error in practice has made vindication
of constitutional rights prohibitively difficult during criminal appeals.
Harmless error doctrine erodes the deterrent effect of exclusion-
violations can be excused based on a discretionary, flexible, and broad
examination of all of the evidence before the jury, taking account of any
general perception of the guilt of the defendant."2 Worth distinguishing
from harmless error rules are bright line rules that constitute exceptions
to the definition of the constitutional right in the first place. 29 Bright
line rules also underprotect constitutional rights, but they clearly define
permissible bounds of police behavior. Harmless error provides no
guidance to law enforcement or prosecutors, but instead defers only to
guilty jury verdicts.' 3° The message to prosecutors is that, if there is
some other reliable evidence of guilt, even a constitutional violation may
be excused.'' The message to law enforcement officers is that
unconstitutional ends justify the means to obtain evidence of guilt. 32
C.J., concurring) ("[IMt is the rare case in which a constitutional violation will not be
subject to harmless-error analysis."); United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499, 509
(1983) ("Since Chapman, the Court has consistently made clear that it is the duty of a
reviewing court to consider the trial record as a whole and to ignore errors that are
harmless, including most constitutional violations.").
127. Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 289 (stating that a confession was coerced, yet
finding the constitutional violation to be harmless error). For a criticism of this method,
see Ogletree, supra note 106, at 161-72, and John Paul Stevens, The Bill of Rights: A
Century of Progress, 59 U. CHI. L. REv. 13, 16 & n.9 (1992).
128. Justice Felix Frankfurter famously wrote: "it is an abuse to deal too
casually and too lightly with rights guaranteed by the Federal Constitution, even though
they... may be invoked by those morally unworthy." Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443,
498 (1953). Judge Harry Edwards, Chief Judge of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit, wrote in 1995: "[w]e commit just such an abuse when we
hold errors harmless in a criminal case based solely on our own perceptions of a
defendant's guilt." Edwards, supra note 119, at 1195; see also United States v.
Jackson, 429 F.2d 1368, 1373 (7th Cir. 1970) (Clark, J., sitting by designation)
("'Harmless error' is swarming around the 7th Circuit like bees.").
129. Such exceptions have been crafted in the Fourth Amendment context in
circumstances aiding law enforcement's investigatory functions, such as the automobile
inventory search exception. See, e.g., South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 364-
72 (1976).
130. See Daniel J. Meltzer, Harmless Error and Constitutional Remedies, 61 U.
CHI. L. Rsv. 1, 28 (1994) ("Determining whether an error is harmless under any
standard is not likely to create clear rules that will be helpful in future cases.").
131. See Rose, 478 U.S. at 588-89 (Stevens, J., concurring) ("An automatic
application of harmless error review in case after case, and for error after error, can
only encourage prosecutors to subordinate the interest in respecting the Constitution to
the ever-present and always powerful interest in obtaining a conviction in a particular
case.").
132. Thus, harmless error is not an example of courts underenforcing
constitutional norms for reasons of institutional deference. See Sager, supra note 14, at
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The result undermines precisely those rights designed to prevent the
wrongful conviction of the innocent.'33
C. A Second Layer of Harmless Error Rules
Expanding the reach of its guilt-based approach, the Court
incorporated a second set of harmless error rules in the context of
several fair trial rights.1" One would think it redundant to do so where
the general doctrine now covers all constitutional violations. The
additional layer, however, undercuts defendants' rights far more
severely. The Chapman standard places the burden of showing harmless
error on the state. The guilt-based approach has the effect of reversing
that burden. By embedding harmless error in the context of particular
constitutional rights, the Court explicitly makes it the criminal
defendant's burden to show that a violation was not harmless.13 5
One example of this burden reversal is the standard for ineffective
assistance of counsel. The Supreme Court held in Strickland v.
Washington that a conviction may only be overturned if the performance
of counsel affected the outcome at trial, and again, the focus is on
whether evidence of guilt taken alone could support that outcome. 136
This "camouflaged harmless error doctrine"' 137 creates a higher, often
prohibitively difficult, outcome-determinative standard. As the
subsequent Parts will discuss, the Brady right to have exculpatory
evidence disclosed and the right to be free from suggestive identification
procedures each contain individualized harmless error rules, which place
harsher burdens on defendants.
1219-20 (arguing that, while judicial underenforcement of structural constitutional
values often makes sense, criminal procedural guarantees must be enforced vigilantly).
133. Unlike "constitutional common law"-prophylactic rules that protect
rights-harmless error limits the deterrent effect of constitutional rights even when they
are violated, and it operates to undercut prophylactic remedies as well.
134. Commentators have noted the Court's incorporation of harmless error in
the ineffective assistance of counsel area. See infra note 137. Commentators have not
noted such incorporation in the area of suggestive identifications.
135. See Edwards, supra note 119, at 1178.
136. 466 U.S. 668, 690-92 (1984).
137. See David McCord, Is Death "Different" for Purposes of Harmless Error
Analysis? Should It Be?: An Assessment of United States and Louisiana Supreme Court
Case Law, 59 LA. L. REV. 1105, 1159-61 (1999) (calling such a rule in the ineffective
assistance of counsel context a "camouflaged harmless error doctrine"); see also Kamin,
supra note 2, at 51-52 ("Ineffective assistance claims, therefore, appear to incorporate
harmless error analysis into the substantive standard.").
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III. REVERSING THE GUILT PARADIGM IN A CIvIL ACTION
A. Why Harmless Error Does Not Apply in a Civil Case
Courts have found it intuitively obvious that harmless error rules do
not apply in civil cases.'38 The reasons why harmless error does not
apply have remained undeveloped by courts and commentators, but they
follow from the application of the elements of Section 1983 and the
principles of res judicata. Where harmless error operates during
criminal appellate review, it serves no function once the criminal
process has terminated in a vacatur of the conviction. Appellate
decisions upholding the conviction or finding error harmless have
necessarily been vacated by the time a person can bring a Section 1983
action. In Heck, the Supreme Court required that "a § 1983 plaintiff
must prove that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct
appeal." 139 The vacatur of the underlying conviction deprives the res
judicata or collateral estoppel effect of any prior appellate decisions
finding constitutional error harmless.'4"
Further, the issues relevant to civil rights claims are different. For
example, when new evidence is available in a civil case regarding error
at the criminal trial, such evidence is especially relevant when the civil
claim is that officials concealed or fabricated evidence during the
138. See, e.g., Newsome, 319 F.3d at 303 (upholding a jury verdict where jury
instructions did not reference harmless error). Dozens of other federal decisions
involving wrongful conviction claims discuss causation, but none discuss harmless error.
See, e.g., supra notes 30, 32.
139. 512 U.S. at 486-87. The conviction may also be "expunged by executive
order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or
called into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus." Id. at
487.
140. "[A] judgment which is vacated, for whatever reason, is deprived of its
conclusive effect as collateral estoppel." Dodrill v. Lundt, 764 F.2d 442, 444 (6th Cir.
1985). This must be so, because
Any other rule would needlessly and astronomically proliferate the
number of issues raised on appeal. If a judgment could be entirely vacated
yet preclusive effect still given to issues determined at trial but not
specifically appealed, appellants generally would feel compelled to appeal
every contrary factual determination. Such inefficiency neither lawyers nor
judges ought to court.
Id.; see also Bagley v. CMC Real Estate Corp., 923 F.2d 758, 762 (9th Cir.
1991) ("Once [plaintiff's] conviction was reversed, there could have been no collateral
estoppel effect of any kind on his civil rights claims."); Spurlock v. Whitley, 971 F.
Supp. 1166, 1177 (M.D. Tenn. 1997) ("Plaintiffs allege that Plaintiff Marshall's guilty
plea conviction was subsequently vacated, and therefore, it can have no preclusive effect
in this action."); Snyder, 870 F. Supp. at 690 (stating that a criminal conviction in
Virginia, vacated pursuant to a DNA exoneration, "'would not be given preclusive effect
in a § 1983 action with respect to any issues, including issues that were actually and
necessarily decided'") (quoting Haring v. Prosise, 462 U.S. 306, 316 (1983)).
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criminal process.'41 For that reason, the Supreme Court has indicated 42
that, following a vacatur, any decisions during a criminal appeal lack
collateral estoppel effect; this notion is well-settled among the lower
courts. 
14 3
Second, the tort elements of Section 1983 require a violation of a
federal right, breach, causation, and damages.'" According to the
language of Section 1983, no law limits those elements. "' While a
criminal appellate court may deem harmless an error too minor to justify
a do-over of the trial, Section 1983's harm element assesses the
economic and emotional damages caused by the wrongful conviction of
an innocent person, as well as the possibility of added punitive
damages.' 46 The remaining Section 1983 element does raise issues
relevant to harmless error-the requirement of causation.
141. As the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has recognized,
if a successful state prosecution, based upon the use of information
obtained by violating the defendant's constitutional rights, could bar a civil
rights action against the police for violating his rights ... on theories of resjudicata or estoppel by judgment, the Civil Rights Act would, in many cases,
be a dead letter.
Ney v. California, 439 F.2d 1285, 1288 (9th Cir. 1971); see also Darrah v. City of Oak
Park, 255 F.3d 301, 311 (6th Cir. 2001) (holding that different issues were litigated in a
case in which the plaintiff alleged that officers made material misstatements of fact at
probable cause hearing, rather than at trial).
142. The Supreme Court, without reaching the question, noted on an analogous
issue in Heck, that harmless error would be irrelevant to a Section 1983 action regarding
unfair trial-related search and seizure violations. 512 U.S. at 487 n.7.
143. See Harris v. Roderick, 126 F.3d 1189, 1198 (9th Cir. 1997) (pretrial
finding of probable cause not dispositive in subsequent § 1983 action where the original
finding was "'tainted by the malicious actions of the government officials [involved]'")
(alteration in original) (quoting source omitted); Bagley, 923 F.2d at 762 (finding as a
general proposition independent of any state's law that "[o]nce his conviction was
reversed, there could have been no collateral estoppel effect of any kind on his civil
rights claims"); White v. Frank, 855 F.2d 956, 961-62 (2d Cir. 1988) ("[Tlhough an
indictment by a grand jury is generally considered prima facie evidence of probable
cause in a subsequent civil action for malicious prosecution, this presumption may be
rebutted by proof that the defendant misrepresented, withheld, or falsified evidence.");
Snyder, 870 F. Supp. at 689 ("[Tlhe claim [plaintiff] now presents is that other police
misconduct tainted the victim's identification, a claim that was neither litigated nor
decided in the original proceedings.").
144. Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 266 (1978) ([It remains true... that
substantial damages should be awarded only to compensate actual injury or, in the case
of exemplary or punitive damages, to deter or punish malicious deprivations of rights.").
145. Section 1983 "was intended to '[create] a species of tort liability' in favor
of persons who are deprived of 'rights, privileges, or immunities secured' to them by the
Constitution." Id. at 253 (quoting Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 417 (1976)).
146. Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 56 (1983).
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B. Exoneration and Causation
The civil standard to determine whether a constitutional error
sufficiently contributed to a wrongful verdict is not the criminal appeals
standard of harmless error. Instead, Section 1983's requirement of
causation applies and a civil jury decides whether that requirement is
met.'47 The difference may often result in relief being granted where it
would be denied in a criminal appeal governed by harmless error."4
The discussion that follows sheds light on the differences between the
two standards.
The exoneration itself provides the first substantial difference
between tort causation and harmless error standards. Innocence sheds a
harsh light on the question of what caused a conviction. So much of the
toothlessness of the harmless error rule comes from courts' departure
from doctrine, where, rather than following Chapman, courts isolate
untainted evidence of guilt and ask if it could support a verdict. In part,
courts may be captured-repeat players unwilling to take on the onerous
burden of reviewing constitutional error in so many seemingly meritless
cases where defendants appear guilty despite some unfairness at trial.4 9
A civil case can only be brought after a vacatur and, in practice, an
exoneration, which selects in advance the most egregious violations,
those involving the conviction of an innocent person. Any evidence of
guilt is revealed as faulty, if not false, and constitutional error was likely
terribly harmful. Only in an unusual case would conduct so egregious
as to violate the Constitution nevertheless not be significant enough to
cause a wrongful conviction. '" In a civil case, a plaintiff is also entitled
to rebut insinuations that error was harmless because of likely guilt by
providing evidence of innocence to the jury. "'
147. No court has discussed this issue. The only commentator on the issue
concluded that the test should be that "[ilf other evidence is sufficient, there is no but-for
causation, and hence the officer should not be held liable under Section 1983."
Schwartz, supra note 7, at 1137.
148. In addition, in a civil case, unlike a criminal case, a constitutional issue is
usually decided first. See, e.g., Milton, 407 U.S. at 372.
149. Courts have ratcheted the harmless error doctrine in a manner that several
federal judges have found troubling. See supra Part H.B.
150. The sorts of cases where causation would be an obstacle would be those in
which there is intervening causation, where the person was not tried, or in Fourth
Amendment cases, because they may be brought at the time of arrest, not at the time of
conviction.
151. Courts have found evidence of innocence relevant to damages and to rebut
an insinuation by civil defendants that a plaintiff was guilty and the violations were
harmless. See, e.g., Newsome v. McCabe, 2002 WL 548725, at *6 (affirming that
evidence of innocence and pardon was properly presented to the jury; excluding that
evidence "would have invited the jurors to draw the impermissible inference that he was
actually guilty, and, thus, absolve defendants of any misconduct").
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Unlike harmless error, which is a decision for deferential appellate
judges, a Section 1983 case involves the question of whether causation
existed; this is a mixed question of law and fact and thus, a question for
a civil jury to decide. 52 This difference is profound. Civil juries are
not repeat players, and therefore will not presume guilt when they know
to a scientific certainty that an innocent person was convicted.
The civil tort requirement of causation is also more relaxed than the
Court's guilt-based formulations of harmless error. Section 1983's
requirement of causation has two parts. First, as to showing a cause-in-
fact, a plaintiff must be able to state a "but for" causal connection
between the actionable conduct and the wrongful conviction. 5 3 Second,
the proximate causation requirement of Section 1983 asks that a jury
decide whether the injury was a "foreseeable" consequence of events
that the government official set into motion.1
Given a mixture of evidence admitted properly and improperly at
trial, the question is whether official misconduct sufficiently tainted the
trial. Tort law provides a standard for examining such joint causation
questions that relaxes the "but for" causation requirement-official
misconduct need not be the sole cause-in-fact, so long as it was a
substantial factor.5' That standard comes from the traditional tort law
rule regarding multiple sufficient causes of a harm.' 56 A wrongful
conviction in which a jury may have before it many pieces of evidence,
which taken alone could support a conviction, seems a paradigmatic case
152. Cf. United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 512 (1995) (explaining that the
"materiality" question on summary judgment is typically one for the jury).
153. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS § 41, at 265
(5th ed. 1984) ("An act or an omission is not regarded as a cause of an event if the
particular event would have occurred without it.").
154. See, e.g., Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277, 285 (1980). Unlike
harmless error rules that defer to jury guilty verdicts, Section 1983's emphasis is on
deterring civil rights violations and holding officials responsible. The Court instructs
that Section 1983 "should be read against the background of tort liability that makes a
man responsible for the natural consequences of his actions." Malley v. Briggs, 475
U.S. 335, 344 n.7 (1986) (quoting Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 187 (1961)). The
language of Section 1983 suggests as much: the statute states that liability is imposed on
"[e]very person" who, under color of law, "subjects, or causes to be subjected," a
person to a constitutional violation. 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
155. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILITY § 26
cmt. J [hereinafter RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS].
156. See id. § 27 reporter's note a ("There is near-universal support recognizing
the inappropriateness of the but-for standard for factual causation when multiple
sufficient causal sets exist."); David A. Fischer, Successive Causes and the Enigma of
Duplicated Harm, 66 TENN. L. REv. 1127, 1129 (1999) ("In multiple sufficient cause
cases, the 'but for' test cannot identify which event caused an injury because each of the
multiple forces alone was sufficient to cause the injury."). For an excellent in-depth
discussion and advocacy of a substantial factor approach to harmless error, see JASON
M. SOLOMON, CAUSING CONSTITUTIONAL HARM (manuscript at 28-34, on file with
author).
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of "overdetermined causation" for which such a "substantial factor" test
applies.'57 Under such approaches, the defendant faces a high burden to
maintain an affirmative defense that the official misconduct was not a
substantial cause of the harm. 
15 8
Tort law standards undo the Supreme Court's guilt-based harmless
error inquiry. While under a guilt-based harmless error rule, the
appellate court can rule that the criminal jury could have still come out
the same way, in a tort case, a civil jury can find liability so long as the
tainted evidence was a "substantial factor" at trial.
The tort standard makes all the difference in the typical
"overdetermined" wrongful conviction case where several pieces of
evidence alone could have supported the jury's verdict. For example, in
Pierce v. Gilchrist, there was outright police fabrication of hair and
blood evidence, but there was also an initial eyewitness identification of
the defendant that was erroneous, but not the result of any misconduct
or police suggestion.' 59 Although those two pieces of evidence each
provided powerful evidence of guilt, the identification did not excuse
forensic fraud."6 Similarly, in Newsome's case, the jury concluded that
157. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS, supra note 155, § 26 cmt. j
(explaining that the "primary function" of the substantial factor test was to permit the
"factfinder to decide that factual cause existed when there were overdetermined causes-
each of two separate causal chains sufficient to bring about the plaintiff's harm, thereby
rendering neither a but-for cause"); see also 2 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §
432(2) (1965) (stating the traditional rule on joint causation, that if one cause is due to
misconduct, a second natural or innocent cause does not affect "but for" causation, but
"the actor's negligence may be found to be a substantial factor in bringing it about").
158. The Supreme Court has addressed a somewhat analogous standard of
causation in employment cases. In Mt. Healthy City School District Board of Education
v. Doyle, the Court set forth that a plaintiff need only show by a preponderance of the
evidence that relying on unconstitutional evidence (there, speech protected by the First
Amendment) was a "motivating factor" in the decision-maker's action (there, a school
board decision not to rehire plaintiff). 429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977). The defendant then
had an affirmative defense to show by a preponderance of the evidence that it would
have reached the same decision absent reliance on improper evidence. Id. The Court
adopted the same reasoning under Title VII in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins. 490 U.S.
228, 246 (1989). However, Congress then legislated that, under Title VII, a plaintiff is
entitled to some relief even if a defendant meets its affirmative defense. 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-5(g)(2)(B) (2000 & Supp. 2003). In a wrongful conviction case, unlike in an
employment case, the defendant's own motive is not mixed, nor is intent an element
under Section 1983. Regardless, under either traditional tort law or Mt. Healthy, the
plaintiff has a minimal burden while the defendant faces a high burden to maintain a
defense that the official misconduct was not a cause of the harm.
159. 359 F.3d 1279, 1282 (10th Cir. 2004).
160. See id. at 1300-01 (holding that a fabrication claim survives a motion to
dismiss). In Pierce, the victim initially told police that Pierce was not the rapist, but
later, according to a police affidavit, she identified him in a photo lineup. Id. at 1282.
Defendant Dr. Joyce Gilchrist then concluded that his hair was consistent with thirty-
three hairs found at the crime scene; however, Pierce alleged that Gilchrist's findings
were fabricated. Id. Pierce also alleged that Gilchrist concealed that his blood
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the witness's identification during a lineup identification was coerced by
the police.' 61 There was no evidence of impropriety as to another
witness who identified Newsome as the person he saw making a
getaway. 62 The jury concluded that there was "a reasonable probability
that the result of the criminal proceedings would have been different if
the evidence had been disclosed to the defense," and the court affirmed
that due to the police coercion of one witness, "the integrity . . . of the
entire investigation, is called into question."'1
63
This is not to say that the causation standard is not rigorous. In
many cases, violations may be of a minor nature so that a jury could
fairly conclude that they did not cause the wrongful conviction.'
Proximate causation raises one issue unique to wrongful conviction
cases where police conduct investigatory work, but then pass their case
on to a district attorney to prosecute. If police provide fabricated
evidence to prosecutors, then police cannot "hide behind the officials
whom they have defrauded" and claim that the prosecutors' reliance was
an intervening cause. 65 For example, the deputy sheriff in Burge v.
contained an enzyme, PGM-2- 1, which conclusively precluded him from being the
attacker. Id. An FBI reexamination in 2001 found that, in fact, none of those hairs
matched Pierce's and that Gilchrist fabricated false inculpatory evidence in other cases.
Id. at 1283. The court rejected Gilchrist's argument on a motion to dismiss that the
lineup created probable cause and thus her conduct did not contribute to a malicious
prosecution. Id. at 1300.
161. Newsome, 2002 WL 548725, at *3.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. For example, a police report indicating a minor inconsistency in one
eyewitnesses' description that was suppressed might not be found to be a "but for" cause
where there was other much more powerful (though false) evidence such as eyewitness
identification testimony. Nor would such failure to provide what at the time appeared to
be innocuous information be a foreseeable cause of the conviction, even if later it turned
out to be highly exculpatory based on testimony at trial.
165. See, for example, Jones v. City of Chicago, where the Court stated:
[A] prosecutor's decision to charge, a grand jury's decision to indict,
a prosecutor's decision not to drop charges but to proceed to trial-none of
these decisions will shield a police officer who deliberately supplied
misleading information that influenced the decision....
... If police officers have been instrumental in the plaintiff's
continued confinement or prosecution, they cannot escape liability by
pointing to the decisions of prosecutors or grand jurors or magistrates to
confine or prosecute him. They cannot hide behind the officials whom they
have defrauded.
856 F.2d at 994; see also Newsome, 256 F.3d at 752; Sanders v. English, 950 F.2d
1152, 1163 (5th Cir. 1992); Robinson v. Maruffi, 895 F.2d 649, 655 (10th Cir. 1990);
Goodwin v. Metts, 885 F.2d 157, 162 (4th Cir. 1989); Smiddy v. Varney, 803 F.2d
1469, 1471 (9th Cir. 1986); Anthony v. Baker, 767 F.2d 657, 660-62 (10th Cir. 1985).
The Supreme Court has held that a coercive interrogation by police may violate the Fifth
Amendment and cause harm if it is later used against that person by the prosecution in a
criminal case. Chavez, 538 U.S. at 765-66.
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Parish of St. Tammany admitted that he hid police reports that "'could
probably make [them] lose the case'" if disclosed during the criminal
investigation of a suspect who was subsequently wrongly convicted. I"
A plaintiff is compensated for all fruit an official casts down from the
poisonous tree.' 67 It is a different matter if there is a break in the causal
chain, such as when police fabricate evidence, but that evidence was not
admitted at trial, there was no trial, 16 or the defendant was charged with
a different crime. 69  In those instances, superceding events make the
causal connection too tenuous.170
To summarize, while harmless error has become a guilt-based
inquiry permitting appellate courts to excuse error based on other
evidence of guilt, in a civil case, a jury asks whether misconduct itself
was a significant contributing cause-after an exoneration. This Article
next examines each fair trial right in turn.
IV. INCORPORATING FAIR TRIAL RIGHTS IN A CIVIL ACTION
A. Brady v. Maryland
The Brady right provides a cornerstone of federal wrongful
conviction law. This watershed case requires prosecutors to provide the
defense with all material favorable evidence, '' and also prohibits police
from misrepresenting, failing to document, or hiding evidence from the
defense.' 72  Suppression of exculpatory evidence has long caused
166. 187 F.3d 452, 461 (5th Cir. 1999).
167. Schwartz, supra note 7, at 1137.
168. See Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 20 F.3d 789, 795 (7th Cir. 1994) (explaining
that there is no Section 1983 claim for fabricating evidence where that evidence is
merely kept "in a drawer, or framed ... and hung ... on the wall").
169. See, e.g., Kelly v. Curtis, 21 F.3d 1544, 1547-48 (11th Cir. 1994)
(demonstrating a situation in which the plaintiff had also been charged and properly
incarcerated based on a second crime).
170. For example, if the unconstitutional conduct was false testimony in front of
the grand jury, the grand jury indictment may break the causal chain when that
testimony was not presented at trial; however, if the police officer uses that false
testimony to then mislead a prosecutor, there is causation under Section 1983. See Jones
v. Cannon, 174 F.3d 1271, 1286-87, 1289 (11th Cir. 1999); Taylor v. Meacham, 82
F.3d 1556, 1564 (10th Cir. 1996); Reed v. City of Chicago, 77 F.3d 1049, 1053 (7th
Cir. 1996).
171. 373 U.S. at 87; see also Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103, 110-12
(1935) (holding that the use of perjured testimony and suppression of exculpatory
evidence amounted to a denial of due process).
172. Kyles v. Whitley extended Brady to information held by police investigators
but unknown to prosecutors. Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 437-38 (1995); see also
Jean v. Collins, 221 F.3d 656, 663 (4th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (agreeing that police who
deliberately withhold exculpatory evidence and prevent prosecutors from complying with
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wrongful convictions. 73  Law enforcement has little incentive not to
"bury" exculpatory evidence as the defense may never discover the
existence of the evidence; if the defense does, at most the remedy is
reversal; and in most cases, any violation will be deemed "harmless."
Yet, once a person is exonerated, a civil claim can capture the
revelatory impact of an exoneration-that government misconduct
concealed evidence probative of a person's innocence. Brady provides a
particularly powerful civil claim when officials concealed the
unreliability of evidence, such as forensic evidence, confession
evidence, or eyewitness identification evidence. In doing so, Brady
provides an umbrella under which other fair trial claims may lie 74-the
harm resulting from suggestive witness identification procedures, a
coerced confession, or fabricated evidence arises also because police and
prosecutors concealed those violations from the defense.
Over the past two decades, Section 1983 cases in a majority of the
circuits have upheld civil claims and verdicts against police officers for
Brady violations.'75 The thorny issue of translation from criminal claims
Brady violate the Due Process Clause); Spurlock v. Satterfield, 167 F.3d 995, 1005 &
n.17 (6th Cir. 1999); Fero v. Kirby, 39 F.3d 1462, 1462 (10th Cir. 1994); Walker v.
City of New York, 974 F.2d 293, 299 (2d Cir. 1992); Jones, 856 F.2d at 995; C.
Newsome, 256 F.3d at 752 ("[Defendant] does have a due process claim in the original
sense of that phrase-he did not receive a fair trial if the prosecutors withheld material
exculpatory details.").
173. According to an Innocence Project study, in thirty-four percent of all
exonerations, police suppressed exculpatory evidence, and prosecutors did so in thirty-
seven percent of all exonerations. Innocence Project, Police and Prosecutorial
Misconduct [hereinafter Innocence Project Study], at http://www.innocenceproject.org/
causes/policemisconduct.php (last visited Mar. 28, 2005). Further work analyzing data
on official misconduct is needed; the study does not break the data down into categories
of misconduct, although the methodological task of defining what counts as misconduct
would be difficult (for example, would misconduct necessarily require a judicial finding,
and if so, would findings in a vacatur, on habeas review, verdicts in civil cases, or
perhaps a press or investigative report suffice?). Sam Gross's study did not analyze how
many exonerations resulted from police misconduct, but its findings provide some strong
indication of the degree of misconduct, because perjury and false confession cases
account for forty-four percent and fifteen percent of exonerations respectively; in each
such case, there is a Brady violation. See GRoss ET AL., supra note 75, at 139-41.
174. Brady often provides a "piggyback" cause of action taking on the
traditional function of malicious prosecution; examples of this include the Long, Miller,
and Sarsfield cases. See supra note 30.
175. See, e.g., Manning v. Miller, 355 F.3d 1028-29, 1031 (7th Cir. 2004)
(denying FBI agents' absolute and qualified immunity motions as to a Section 1983
Brady claim); Newsome, 256 F.3d at 747, 753 (rejecting the defendants' qualified
immunity defense in a case involving wrongful conviction, imprisonment, and
prosecutorial withholding of evidence); Daniels v. United States, 254 F.3d 1180 (10th
Cir. 2001); Gonzales v. McKune, 247 F.3d 1066, 1075 (10th Cir. 2001) (explaining that
the prosecution's withholding of potentially exculpatory DNA evidence resulted in a
Brady violation); Nuckols v. Gibson, 233 F.3d 1261, 1267 (10th Cir. 2000) (holding
that a Brady violation occurred when the prosecution withheld evidence that would have
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to civil claims arises because a Brady claim exists only if one can show
"materiality" and "prejudice," that is "if there is a reasonable
probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the
result of the proceeding would have been different." 176  This type of
requirement should sound familiar from the preceding discussions-it is
an internalized harmless error requirement. Indeed, the Supreme Court
in Kyles v. Whitley recognized it as a harmless error requirement, but
characterized it somewhat more stringently; lower federal courts have
done the same.1 71 On its face, the materiality and prejudice requirement
is not so different from the civil standard. Whether a defendant can
show a "reasonable probability" that a jury would have had a reasonable
doubt concerning guilt is like a "substantial factor" test, and more
lenient than "but for" causation, where the question is whether a
different outcome was "more likely than not.""79 The difference is in
enabled the defense to test the credibility of a witness on cross-examination); McMillian
v. Johnson, 88 F.3d 1554, 1567, 1568 (11th Cir. 1996) (holding that a Brady violation
occurred when investigators failed to turn over exculpatory evidence to the prosecutor);
Smith v. Sec'y of N.M. Dept. of Corr., 50 F.3d 801, 835 (10th Cir. 1995) (holding that
a Brady violation occurred when there was a "reasonable probability the result of the
proceeding would have been different" had certain evidence been disclosed); United
States v. Endicott, 869 F.2d 452, 455 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding that a Brady violation
occurred when government agents had knowledge of false testimony evidence and when
the disclosure of the false testimony had a reasonable likelihood of affecting the jury's
verdict); Jones, 856 F.2d at 995 (holding that a Brady violation occurred when
investigators concealed evidence from prosecutors in order to circumvent the Brady rule
that investigators do not have to keep records of all investigative activities); Boone v.
Paderick, 541 F.2d 447, 453 (4th Cir. 1976) (holding that a Brady violation occurred
when there was a "reasonable likelihood" that the jury's decision would have been
affected had it known that the defendant was promised favorable treatment contrary to
the prosecutor's representations to the jury that no such promise was made); Hilliard v.
Williams, 516 F.2d 1344, 1350 (6th Cir. 1975) (holding that a Brady violation occurred
when the prosecution offered false and misleading testimony during the defendant's
trial).
176. United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985).
177. 514 U.S. at 435-36. In Kyles, the Court explained that "once a reviewing
court applying Bagley has found constitutional error there is no need for further
harmless-error review" because the standard for materiality is more stringent than the
Brecht standard, requiring a "substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining
the jury's verdict." Id.; see also Bagley, 473 U.S. at 679-80. The standard adopted
was one of "a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the
defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different." Bagley, 473 U.S. at
682.
178. Federal courts sometimes describe the issue of prejudice to the defendant as
a question of harmless error. See, e.g., United States v. Ramirez, 174 F.3d 584, 588
(5th Cir. 1999); United States v. Bruck, 152 F.3d 40, 47 (1st Cir. 1998); United States
v. Figueroa-Lopez, 125 F.3d 1241, 1246 (9th Cir. 1997); United States v. Sasser, 971
F.2d 470, 481 (10th Cir. 1992); United States v. Carr, 965 F.2d 408, 412 (7th Cir.
1992); United States v. Sanchez, 963 F.2d 152, 156 (8th Cir. 1992).
179. The Court stated in Kyles that "[t]he question is not whether the defendant
would more likely than not have received a different verdict with the evidence, but
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application, as the Brady standard permits a court to examine the
"reasonable probability" by broadly asking whether suppression
"undermines confidence" in the outcome, and it permits courts to ask
whether evidence of guilt taken alone could support a guilty verdict."s
Innocence upsets that deferential framework. If the Brady
"materiality and prejudice" requirement exists as a harmless error
limitation, then guilt-based deference disappears in a civil rights lawsuit
where one knows an innocent person was convicted. In a civil case, the
question whether evidence sufficiently contributed to a conviction is a
causation question for a jury. It would not make sense to ask two
separate parallel questions, namely, whether "materiality and prejudice"
is met and whether causation it met. Regardless, the inquiry changes
when a civil jury knows that the defendant was innocent and any
evidence of guilt was unreliable or false."8 ' Most significant is the effect
of exoneration-causation will not be a hard question for a jury to
answer when an exoneration involves concealment of powerful evidence
of guilt, such as an eyewitness identification, a confession, or forensic
evidence. For that reason, in Newsome, although the civil jury was
instructed to decide whether there was "a reasonable probability that the
result of the criminal proceedings would have been different if the
evidence had been disclosed to the defense,""n the jury found that the
evidence satisfied that standard because police concealed that they had
threatened witnesses into identifying a man they knew they did not
recognize from the crime scene.8 3 More difficult cases may arise as to
concealed evidence more peripheral to the jury's verdict, which could
not fairly be characterized as a "substantial factor." Such cases would
also not raise the possibilities for systemic reform discussed below.
whether in its absence he received a fair trial, understood as a trial resulting in a verdict
worthy of confidence." 514 U.S. at 434.
180. Id. (citing Bagley, 473 U.S. at 678).
181. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit dismissed a Section 1983
Brady claim, improperly stating that the plaintiff did not show a "reasonable
probability" of a different outcome. Smith v. Holtz, 210 F.3d 186, 187, 196 (3d Cir.
2000) (dismissing a Brady claim on the basis that the suppressed evidence was not
material and not sufficient "to [undermine] confidence in the outcome") (citing Bagley,
473 U.S. at 678).
182. 2002 WL 548725, at *3 (citations omitted). The requirement of a
"reasonable probability" of a different outcome is inapposite, though also easily
satisfied. One knows that a trial did not result in a "verdict worthy of confidence"
despite the suppression of evidence, once the conviction is vacated. When a person has
been found innocent, and police hid violations of constitutional rights or evidence of
innocence from prosecutors, causation should be clear.
183. Newsome, 319 F.3d at 302-03.
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Illustrating confusion in courts over transposing criminal law rights
claims to civil rights claims,'" two federal circuit courts of appeals have
added heightened requirements to civil Brady claims that appear
nowhere else in civil rights law, because the courts likely perceived that
only the most willful suppression of evidence should be actionable. The
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit added a "bad faith"
component to the Section 1983 claim based on a Brady violation.1 The
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit recently followed suit by
ruling that law enforcement can only be liable for an "intentional"
violation of Brady." Yet, intent is not an element of the Brady test;
Brady made clear "that the suppression by the prosecution of evidence
favorable to an accused upon request violates due process when the
evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the
good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.""7 A "bad faith" subjective
component has no legal basis,' but that minority rule illustrates how far
some courts have gone to insulate malicious conduct that resulted in an
innocent person's conviction.
Civil Brady suits point in the direction of lasting structural reform,
that is, they target concealment of violations that prevented substantial
evidence of innocence from coming to light before the criminal trial,
particularly coerced confessions, eyewitness identifications, and
fabrication. One simple remedy for such violations remains
inexpensive, but not widely adopted-open file policies for criminal
discovery. Brady violations become crystal clear given full access to
184. An example of a court confused in the opposite way is the district court in
Kittler v. City of Chicago; the Kittler court strangely suggested in dicta that a Brady
claim is the only fair trial claim that may be brought. No. 03-C-6992, 2004 WL
1698997, at *5 (N.D. 11. July 27, 2004). The court based this misapprehension on the
Newsome case which the court stated "makes no provision for a denial of a fair trial
claim based on a fabrication of evidence as [the plaintiff] suggests." Id. at *5 A
fabrication claim is independently viable based on longstanding precedent. See infra
Part I.E.
185. Jean v. Collins, 221 F.3d 656, 656 (4th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (holding that
police may be liable under Section 1983 for violating Brady, but that a plaintiff must
show an actual "bad faith deprivation of ... due process rights"); see also Reid v.
Simmons, 163 F. Supp. 2d 81, 84, 91 (D.N.H. 2001) (citing to Jean, but then holding
that the officer must act with "bad faith").
186. Villasana v. Wilhoit, 368 F.3d 976, 980 (8th Cir. 2004).
187. 373 U.S. at 87 (emphasis added).
188. Such a rule is found nowhere else in civil rights law or the law of official
immunity. The Due Process Clause itself contains no state of mind requirement, except
that the Court has indicated that, in certain instances, more than negligence may be
required. Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344, 347 (1986); Daniels v. Williams, 474
U.S. 327, 330 (1986). Qualified immunity provides an "objective" standard. See
Anderson v. Creighton, 83 U.S. 635, 641 (1987) (adding to the immunity inquiry the
question of whether a reasonably well-trained officer would know that the conduct would
violate constitutional rights).
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police and district attorney's files, which plaintiffs receive under federal
civil discovery rules. Although the Supreme Court has not been willing
to require this type of discovery as a constitutional matter in criminal
cases in order to prevent suppression of exculpatory evidence, 8 9 federal
courts have routinely ordered prosecutors to produce this evidence in
civil rights cases filed by exonerees. 9 The only way to know if
evidence was suppressed by police is to examine what the prosecutors
had in their files and to depose them about what they knew. That kind
of scrutiny of suppressed information that led to a wrongful conviction,
and an examination of whether police engaged in a pattern of such
suppression, will at a minimum, put pressure on police departments to
adopt policies aimed at preventing suppression of exculpatory
evidence.' 9'
When officers conceal evidence of innocence in violation of Brady
obligations, training and discipline can encourage officers not to engage
in such constitutional violations. Focusing on systemic reform,
189. United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 104, 109 (1976). The Court in
Agurs stated:
If everything that might influence a jury must be disclosed, the only
way a prosecutor could discharge his constitutional duty would be to allow
complete discovery of his files as a matter of routine practice.
Whether or not procedural rules authorizing such broad discovery
might be desirable, the Constitution surely does not demand that much.
Id.
190. See, e.g., Ostrowski v. Holem, No. 02-C-50281, 2002 WL 31956039, at
*3--4 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 21, 2002) ("[Mjany courts have found the work-product privilege
unavailable when a prosecutor in a prior criminal investigation later objects to discovery
by a litigant in a related and subsequent civil lawsuit."); Schultz v. Talley, 152 F.R.D.
181, 184 (W.D. Mo. 1993) (explaining that nonparty assistant attorneys general may not
assert the work-product privilege for an investigative file); Doubleday v. Ruh, 149
F.R.D. 601, 606 (E.D. Cal. 1993). The Doubleday court stated that:
"we have not been directed to, nor have we found, any authority
holding that a public prosecutor-having completed his investigation and
having announced, after failing to obtain an indictment, that no further action
would be taken by him-is entitled to rely upon the work product doctrine
when the fruits of [the] investigation become relevant to civil litigation to
which he is not a party."
149 F.R.D. at 606 (quoting Shepard v. Superior Court of Alameda County, 550 P.2d
161, 169 (1976)).
191. See GOVERNOR'S REPORT, supra note 80, at 22. The Report of the
Governor's Commission on Capital Punishment recommended that
(a) The police must list on schedules all existing items of relevant
evidence, including exculpatory evidence, and their location.
(b) Record-keeping obligations must be assigned to specific police
officers or employees, who must certify their compliance to the prosecutor.
(d) The police must give the prosecutor access to all investigatory
materials in their possession.
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plaintiffs have brought systemic claims under Monell v. Department of
Social Services of New York,'92 for maintaining a custom, policy, or
practice of permitting Brady violations against law enforcement, and
more interestingly, against prosecutors who, absent such a Monell
claim, would remain absolutely immune. 193  Such claims, especially
given the size of verdicts like that in Newsome, may for the first time
deter institutions from permitting repeat violations and failing to ensure
through policy or training that material evidence is produced to defense
counsel.
Change may also arise where exonerations illuminate the serious
consequences of the government's errors, thereby convincing law
enforcement and prosecutors that it is in their best interest to institute
bright-line open file policies and training designed to prevent
suppression of evidence."9 Only such structural reform can lead to
lasting protection against wrongful convictions.
B. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Civil claims alleging ineffective assistance of counsel provide an
opportunity to remedy one of the most intractable causes for wrongful
convictions-the gross inadequacy of counsel provided to indigent
defendants, even in capital cases. Poor lawyering was a major cause in
almost a quarter of the cases in which innocent people were exonerated
by DNA.1 95 Although criminal defendants have a right to counsel,"9 the
Supreme Court has so watered down the standard for ineffectiveness that
even death sentences have been upheld in notorious cases where
attorneys slept through trial, were drunk, used heroin and cocaine
during trial, did not interview witnesses, or were absent for lead
192. 436 U.S. at 699.
193. Count VI of the complaint in Burrell alleged that "Union Parish District
Attorney Adkins, in his official policymaking capacity, created and maintained a custom,
policy and/or practice within his office of withholding exculpatory evidence from
opposing defense counsel and presenting perjured testimony and false evidence and
argument to the jury." Complaint 25, Burrell (No. 3:01CV 2679) [hereinafter Burrell
Complaint]. Also, Count VI of the complaint in Miller alleged that failure to train and
supervise employees resulted in a constitutional violation. Complaint 106-08, Miller
(No. 03-10805-JLT); see also Andrea Elliott & Benjamin Weiser, When Prosecutors
Err, Others Pay the Price; Disciplinary Action Is Rare After Misconduct or Mistakes,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 21, 2004, at 25 (describing evidence uncovered in a wrongful
conviction case after a pattern of Brady violations in the Bronx district attorney's office).
194. For example, in response to a high profile exoneration where exculpatory
witnesses' statements were suppressed, North Carolina Attorney General Roy Cooper
has called for statewide adoption of open file policies. Andrea Weigl, Lawyers Debate
Openness, NEws & OBSERVER, Mar. 15, 2004, at B1.
195. See Innocence Project Study, supra note 173 (finding that twenty-three
percent of all DNA exonerations were due to bad lawyering).
196. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 339-40 (1963).
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prosecution witnesses.' 97 As a result of the Court's toothless test for
ineffectiveness, municipalities often provide grossly inadequate
representation, providing few funds and retaining incompetent
lawyers.'98 Individual lawyers may lack malpractice insurance and it
may be difficult to collect compensation from them, but the
municipalities responsible for their assignment to criminal cases may
now, for the first time, be held liable.'99
Harmless error again plays a central role in this turnabout. The
Supreme Court held in Strickland v. Washington that a conviction may
only be overturned if the performance of counsel was so ineffective that
it affected the outcome at trial.2°° The "prejudice" prong may be
decided without even reaching the question of whether counsel was
ineffective, 21 and courts generally base their decisions on the "totality
of the evidence before the judge or jury," that is, whether there was
strong evidence of guilt. 2  The Court also underscored the "strong
presumption of reliability" of jury verdicts."°3 Courts applying the
doctrine on appeal commonly conclude that, due to sufficient evidence
of guilt presented at trial, any ineffective assistance did not affect the
outcome.' 4 The Strickland test, then, is a harmless error rule; as
commentators have noted, the Strickland rule thus creates a
"[c]amouflaged [h]armless [e]rror [d]octrine."2' The Supreme Court
acknowledged as much in Kyles, quoting an Eighth Circuit case for the
proposition that "'it is unnecessary to add a separate layer of harmless
error analysis to an evaluation of whether a petitioner in a habeas case
197. See DAVID COLE, No EQUAL JUSTICE: RACE AND CLASS IN THE AMERICAN
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 76-81 (1999).
198. See id.; see also Stephen B. Bright, Counsel for the Poor: The Death
Sentence Not for the Worst Crime but for the Worst Lawyer, 103 YALE L.J. 1835, 1870
(1994).
199. See Bernhard, supra note 66, at 40-41 (describing obstacles to the pursuit
of a malpractice action).
200. 466 U.S. at 691.
201. Id. at 695, 697 (recommending that courts not reach the merits of
ineffectiveness claims, stating that "[i]f it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim
on the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice ... that course should be followed").
202. Id. at 695.
203. Id. at 696. The Court further stated that "the entire criminal justice
system" should not have to suffer by being burdened with ineffective assistance of
counsel claims. Id.
204. See Darrin Hurwitz & Sarah K. Eddy, Thirty-First Annual Review of
Criminal Procedure, Right to Counsel, 90 GEO. L.J. 1579 & nn.1460-63, 1594-95
n.1513 (2002) (discussing generally the ineffective assistance of counsel standard and
collecting cases setting out the "deficient performance" resulting in a "fundamentally
unfair outcome" standard applicable to an ineffective assistance of counsel claim).
205. See Kamin, supra note 2, at 51-52 ("Ineffective assistance claims,
therefore, appear to incorporate harmless error analysis into the substantive standard.");
McCord, supra note 137, at 1159-62.
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has presented a constitutionally significant claim for ineffective
assistance of counsel.'"' The Strickland Court similarly explained that
it was adopting the Brady "materiality" standard, which it called a
harmless error rule.' As with other internalized harmless error rules,
the rule enhances the harmless error standard because although the
"reasonable probability" standard does not depart from civil causation,
in application, courts isolate evidence of guilt and strongly presume the
verdict was reliable. 20s
While most, if not all, public defender systems remain chronically
underfunded and overworked,' 9 the situation is exacerbated in many
public defender systems in which the same county or city governmental
entity both runs the police department and makes decisions to underfund
indigent defense. A municipality can be liable for wrongful conviction
of an innocent person when it fails to provide effective counsel the same
way it can be liable if it fails to supervise its police officers or forensic
analysts. In the past, systemic challenges to indigent defense funding
schemes faced severe hurdles in federal court, where it was difficult to
show prejudice under Strickland in the absence of an individual plaintiff
who was innocent, convicted due to poor representation, and
subsequently exonerated."' l The wave of exonerations over the past
206. 514 U.S. at 436 n.9 (quoting Hill v. Lockhart, 28 F.3d 832, 839 (8th Cir.
1994)). The Court added, "[i]n sum, once there has been Bagley error as claimed in this
case, it cannot subsequently be found harmless." Id. at 436. The Court had earlier
disclaimed in dicta that the "prejudice" prong is a harmless error rule by stating that
"[hiarmless-error analysis is triggered only after the reviewing court discovers that an
error has been committed. And under Strickland... an error of constitutional
magnitude occurs in the Sixth Amendment context only if the defendant demonstrates (1)
deficient performance and (2) prejudice." Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 369 n.2
(1993); see also William S. Geimer, A Decade of Strickland's Tin Horn: Doctrinal and
Practical Undermining of the Right to Counsel, 4 WM. & MARY BILL RTs. J. 91, 131
(1995) ("In spite of the Court's recent pronouncement [in Lockhart v. Fretwell] that
Strickland's application does not involve harmless error analysis, the contrary is
obviously true.") (footnotes omitted).
207. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693.
208. See infra note 224.
209. Suzanne E. Mounts, Public Defender Programs, Professional
Responsibility, and Competent Representation, 1982 Wis. L. REv. 473, 483 & n.50
("[A]lmost every study made of defender programs has noted very serious shortcomings
that are traceable directly to lack of funds."); see Charles J. Ogletree, Jr. & Yoav Sapir,
Keeping Gideon's Promise: A Comparison of the American and Israeli Public Defender
Experiences, 29 N.Y.U. Rv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 203, 210 (2004) (describing systems
for public defender funding).
210. See generally Richard J. Wilson, Litigative Approaches to Enforcing the
Right to Effective Assistance of Counsel in Criminal Cases, 14 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc.
CHANGE 203 (1986); Margaret H. Lemos, Note, Civil Challenges to the Use of Low-Bid
Contracts for Indigent Defense, 75 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1808 (2000); Note, Gideon's
Promise Unfullled: The Need for Litigated Reform of Indigent Defense, 113 HARV. L.
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decade has changed that, and thus, the first cases alleging such claims
are being successfully brought in federal court.21
The most notable case is Miranda v. Clark County, a case brought
by Roberto Miranda, who was sentenced to death and spent fourteen
years on death row until his conviction was vacated based on ineffective
assistance of counsel.1 2 Miranda's public defender, who was one year
out of law school and had never tried a murder case, let alone a capital
case, interviewed just three of the forty witnesses Miranda told him
could prove his innocence and who had information about the actual
perpetrator.23 To make matters worse, Clark County assigned its least
experienced attorneys to capital cases as a matter of policy; the county
also had a policy of allocating fewer resources to cases where they
believed their client was guilty based on the client failing a polygraph
test, as Miranda did.214 In 2002, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit, sitting en banc, concluded that Miranda did have a Monell
claim against the county for maintaining policies that, as alleged, all but
guaranteed him ineffective assistance.215
In civil ineffective assistance cases, the Strickland standard should
lose its harmless error "prejudice" prong. In a Section 1983 case,
following the rubric proposed, the jury should be instructed to decide
whether the ineffective assistance or inadequate funding scheme caused
a wrongful conviction. An additional instruction on "prejudice" would
serve no purpose. Regardless of what instructions are given, however,
REv. 2062 (2000). Efforts in state court were more successful. See, e.g., N.Y. County
Lawyers' Ass'n v. Pataki, 727 N.Y.S.2d 851 (Sup. Ct. 2001).
211. One egregious case is that of Eddie Joe Lloyd, who filed a civil rights case
in 2004. Lloyd was exonerated by DNA evidence after spending seventeen years in
prison for sexual assault and murder. See Complaint & Demand for Jury 1-3, Lloyd
(No. 04-70823). Lloyd was a delusional patient on psychotropic medications in a mental
institution, and was coerced by police into repeating facts they fed to him in a
.confession." Id. 11 1, 69-83. Lloyd's attorneys were provided only $150 by the
county to investigate and conducted no meaningful investigation; they conducted no
forensic testing that could have proved his innocence, and they did not retain a
psychiatrist to evaluate him despite his highly delusional condition and his commitment
to a mental hospital. Id. 11 85-87, 92. Lloyd's attorney did not present any defense
witnesses, did minimal cross-examinations, and delivered a five-minute closing,
although the stakes were high because it was a capital case. Id. 93. The complaint
alleged that Wayne County's policy and practice of providing inadequate funding for
defending the indigent and appointing grossly incompetent attorneys resulted in Lloyd's
conviction. Id. 121-26.
212. 319 F.3d 465, 467 (9th Cir. 2003).
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Id. at 470-71 (finding that "the complaint states claims against Harris and
the County for the policy of allocating resources on the basis of apparent guilt or
innocence" maintaining a "deliberate pattern and policy of refusing to train lawyers for
capital cases known to the county administrators to exert unusual demands on
attorneys").
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innocence reverses the Strickland equation. The kind of overwhelming
evidence of guilt that appellate criminal courts typically cite to can no
longer excuse grossly inadequate counsel. Once a defendant is found
innocent, a jury is likely to conclude, given evidence of systemic
disregard for representation, that counsel's inadequacies violated due
process.
Two years after the Ninth Circuit decision, Clark County, its public
defender's office, and police department settled with Miranda for $5
million.216 If municipalities adequately fund and supervise public
defenders, they will not be vulnerable to policy and practice claims like
those brought by Miranda.2"7 For most municipalities that grossly
underfund and undersupervise counsel for indigent clients and that never
before faced any consequences under the Supreme Court's Strickland
test, wrongful conviction actions and the possibility for verdicts as large
as Miranda's should provide ample incentive for systemic change.
Perhaps equally useful, civil cases and discovery shed light on the
degree to which inadequate funding and supervision caused such
egregious miscarriages. Future settlements should encourage institutions
to take advantage of that information and target resources toward
defending those indigent defendants who face a special risk of a
wrongful conviction.
C. Suggestive Eyewitness Identification Procedures
Of all the due process rights in the criminal context, the law of
suggestive identifications is the most confused. One thing is clear,
however, and that is the Supreme Court's doctrinal progression toward
admitting even unconstitutional eyewitness identifications. Civil cases
may return the Court's focus to preventing mistaken identifications, an
area where adoption of simple procedures can prevent grave harms.
Incentives for reform are urgently needed, as mistaken eyewitness
identifications have long been the leading cause of wrongful convictions,
implicated in more than two-thirds of exonerations.28 Police use three
sorts of eyewitness identification procedures-lineups, showups, and
216. Carri Geer Thevenot, Settlement Ends Ex-Inmate's Saga, LAS VEGAS REV.
J., June 30, 2004, at IA.
217. See discussion of Monell standards infra Part V.C.
218. See GRoss ET AL, supra note 75, at 3, 7-8, 19 (finding that eighty-eight
percent of wrongful convictions in rape cases were due to eyewitness misidentifications,
and forty-nine percent of wrongful convictions in murder cases were due to eyewitness
misidentifications; the figure across all wrongful convictions is seventy-two percent).
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photo arrays. 219  Each is fraught with the well-known danger of
misidentifying of the innocent.22
The Supreme Court has stated that "[t]he vagaries of eyewitness
identification are well known" and "the annals of criminal law are rife
with instances of mistaken identification.""' Perception and memory
itself are inherently not just incomplete, but also unreliable; not only do
people have difficulty remembering more than a few characteristics of a
person,'m but expectations tend to conflate incidents, and witnesses have
particular difficulty identifying members of another race. 23  Moreover,
"the witness must testify about an encounter with a total stranger under
circumstances of emergency or emotional stress. "The witness's
recollection of the stranger can be distorted easily by the circumstances
or by later actions by the police."' Further, witnesses are unlikely to
change their mind later if the police have suggested to them that the
219. Nathan R. Sobel, Assailing the Impermissible Suggestion: Evolving
Limitations on the Abuse of Pre-Trial Criminal Identification Methods, 38 BROOK. L.
REV. 261, 263-64 (1971).
220. See Carl McGowan, Constitutional Interpretation and Criminal
Identification, 12 WM. & MARY L. REV. 235, 238 (1970) ("The vagaries of visual
identification evidence have traditionally been of great concern to those involved in the
administration of criminal law."); Gary Wells et al., Eyewitness Identification
Procedures: Recommendations for Lineups and Photospreads, 22 LAW & HUM. BEHAV.
603, 603 (1998) (explaining that empirical evidence demonstrates that "false eyewitness
identification" is the leading cause of convicting innocent people); Gary L. Wells & Eric
P. Seelau, Eyewitness Identification: Psychological Research and Legal Policy on
Lineups, 1 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 765, 785 (1995) (discussing the diminished value
of the criteria used in eyewitness identifications). See generally DWYER Er AL., supra
note 62, at 53-100 (discussing mistaken eyewitness identifications).
221. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 219, 228 (1966). Justice Frankfurter
wrote that "[t]he identification of strangers is proverbially untrustworthy. The hazards
of such testimony are established by a formidable number of instances in the records of
English and American trials." FELIX FRANKFURTER, THE CASE OF SACCO AND
VANZETTI: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS FOR LAWYERS AND LAYMEN 30 (1927). Professor
Elizabeth Loftus cites a 1983 Ohio State University doctoral dissertation estimating that
over half of wrongful convictions per year are due to mistaken eyewitness identification.
Elizabeth F. Loftus, Ten Years in the Life of an Expert Witness, 10 LAW & HUM.
BEHAV. 241, 242-43 (1986).
222. See ELIZABETH E. LOFrUS, EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY 35-39 (7th prtg.
1996).
223. Id. at 36-39. Indeed, police need not go so far as to instruct the witness
who to identify; subtler cues may lead to misidentification, given the fragile state a
witness may be in. See Wells & Seelau, supra note 220, at 767-68, 773-78. Witnesses
may also choose a person that looks most like the perpetrator, and may not realize that
they can say that no one looks like the perpetrator. See Roy S. Malpass & Patricia G.
Devine, Eyewitness Identification: Lineup Instructions and the Absence of the Offender,
66 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 482, 483 (1981); Gary L. Wells & Elizabeth A. Olson, The
Other-Race Effect In Eyewitness Identification: What Do We Do About It? 7 PSYCHOL.
PUB. POL'Y & L. 230 (2001).
224. Manson, 432 U.S. at 112.
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defendant is the person they saw because they now remember it that
way.' Meanwhile, the issue of identity may practically dispose of the
entire criminal trial. 2  A jury will tend to place special trust in the
reliability of an eyewitness, especially the victim of a crime; "there is
almost nothing more convincing than a live human being who takes the
stand, points a finger at the defendant, and says 'That's the one! ' "2"
Effective, inexpensive solutions have long been available to help
solve this problem. Social science research indicates that double-blind
procedures, which simply ensure that the officers conducting the
identification do not know the suspect, substantially reduce mistaken
identifications because even well-meaning police can unconsciously
make suggestions to the witness through physical cues. 22s  Yet, few
departments have adopted such procedures, perhaps out of lack of
awareness of the consequences of failing to do so.229 For decades the
Court has taken a hands-off approach, remaining unwilling to act on
such data and unwilling to rule out any police procedure as per se
suggestive.
Instead, the legal response to this problem has been schizophrenic-
divided between constitutional rights and guilt-based harmless error
rules that limit remedies for those rights. The Supreme Court began by
establishing a due process right to be free from unduly suggestive
procedures. The first case dealing with suggestion was Stovall v.
Denno, which involved a show up procedure in which the suspect was
taken to the hospital where the murder victim's wife, also injured in the
assault, was recovering.' The Court concluded that, although one-on-
225. See Fredric D. Woocher, Note, Did Your Eyes Deceive You? Expert
Psychological Testimony on the Unreliability of Eyewitness Identification, 29 STAN. L.
REV. 969, 970 (1977).
226. Wade, 388 U.S. at 229 (explaining that, once a witness has chosen
someone out of a lineup, the witness is unlikely to change his mind later, resulting in
termination of the identity issue before trial).
227. Watkins v. Sowders, 449 U.S. 341, 352 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(footnotes omitted); Manson, 432 U.S. at 120 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (stating that
"juries unfortunately are often unduly receptive to [eyewitness identification]
evidence"). Empirical studies have also shown that much of what is known about the
factors affecting eyewitness identification is not "within the jury's common knowledge."
Roger B. Handberg, Expert Testimony on Eyewitness Identification: A New Pair of
Glasses for the Jury, 32 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1013, 1035 (1994).
228. See ROBERT ROSENTHAL, EXPERIMENTER EFFECTS IN BEHAVIORAL
RESEARCH 286-87 (1966) (discussing the use of "unintended cues"); Wells & Seelau,
supra note 220, at 775-78.
229. See infra notes 262, 364.
230. 388 U.S. 293, 295 (1967). Stovall is part of the United States v. Wade
trilogy decided on the same day. Wade recognized the "high incidence of miscarriage of
justice" resulting from the admission of mistaken eyewitness identification evidence at
criminal trials. 388 U.S. 218, 228 (1967). Wade created a new prophylactic remedy,
holding that an out-of-court, postindictment identification would not be admissible unless
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one show up procedures are "widely condemned" as improper,231 under
limited circumstances, a prompt show up could be necessary and
appropriate.2 32 The due process rule was strict in that if the procedure
used was "unnecessarily" suggestive, the identification would be
excluded. 23
The Court began to back away from that due process rule in the
years that followed by adding a layer of harmless error.2" In Manson v.
Brathwaite, the Court adopted a two-step test, asking first whether the
procedure was unduly suggestive, and second whether it was otherwise
"reliable." 235  The reliability prong is based on several factors first
established in Niel v. Biggers,236 including the witnesses' opportunity to
view the suspect, the witnesses' level of certainty, and the time that
elapsed between the observation and the eyewitness identification
procedure. 237 The Manson rule thus gives a court broad discretion to
survey the record to determine whether, despite suggestive conduct so
serious as to violate due process, the witnesses' identifications were
"reliable."
The Manson Court thus all but invited lower courts to focus on
guilt and not on the requirements of due process. In Manson, the Court
emphasized the same guilt-based interests motivating the expansion of
harmless error doctrine, that is, deferring to a jury's "reliable"
determination of guilt. The Court noted a general concern with the
efficient "administration of justice," which would be undermined by
reversal of convictions." The Court also cited to a more explicit
concern with a guilt-based interest in preserving convictions, stating that
the prior per se approach could exclude not just reliable evidence but
defendant's counsel was present. Id. at 235-36. Gilbert v. California was also part of
the Wade trilogy, and "present[ed] the same alleged constitutional error in the admission
in evidence of in-court identifications... considered [in Wade]." 388 U.S. 263, 264
(1967).
231. Stovall, 388 U.S. at 302.
232. See id.
233. Id. at 301-02. Prior to Stovall, suggestiveness was a factor for the jury to
weigh; it was a purely evidentiary issue as to the probative value of the evidence. See,
e.g., United States ex rel. Kirby v. Sturges, 510 F.2d 397, 406-08 (7th Cir. 1975).
234. In Neil v. Biggers, the Court suggested a new test: "whether under the
'totality of the circumstances' the identification was reliable even though the
confrontation procedure was suggestive." 409 U.S. 188, 199 (1972).
235. 432 U.S. at 114.
236. 409 U.S. at 199.
237. Manson, 432 U.S. at 114.
238. Id. at 112. Indeed, the Court cited Justice John Paul Stevens. "Mr.
Justice Stevens, in writing for the Seventh Circuit in Kirby ... observed: 'There is
surprising unanimity among scholars in regarding such a rule [the per se approach] as
essential to avoid [the] serious risk of miscarriage of justice.'" Id. at 111 (first
alteration in original) (citation omitted).
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also "may result, on occasion, in the guilty going free." 23 9 It would be a
"[d]raconian sanction" on the prosecution to reverse and grant a new
trial when the unconstitutionally suggestive identification was reliable.2 ' °
The Manson Court clearly preserved, as a matter of principle, the
due process standard as set out in the Wade trilogy, emphasizing that
"[tihe standard, after all, is that of fairness as required by the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." 24' Thus, the due
process rule set out in Stovall remains good law and the "reliability
factors" limited only the exclusionary remedy and not the due process
right. Like the harmless error rule, the Manson rule focuses on
independent evidence of reliability: "reliability is the linchpin in
determining the admissibility of identification testimony., 242
One important difference between the harmless error rule and the
Manson rule, is that the Manson reliability analysis determines
admissibility of identification evidence at trial, typically at a pretrial
Wade hearing, rather than on appeal, when the general harmless error
rule applies.243 On balance, however, the Manson rule, as characterized
by the Court, asks even a trial court to conduct a harmlessness inquiry
by looking at other evidence to determine whether constitutional error
should be excused.
Providing further evidence that the reliability factors functionally, if
not nominally, act as a harmless error rule, Manson invited courts to
engage in a sweeping, guilt-based analysis in order to excuse suggestive
police procedures. After recounting all of the evidence of Brathwaite's
guilt, describing in detail how he admitted he had visited the apartment
239. Id. at 112.
240. Id. at 112-13. The rule "serves to limit the societal costs imposed by a
sanction that excludes relevant evidence from consideration and evaluation by the trier of
fact." Id. at I10.
241. Id. at 113. Only one other passage suggests otherwise. The Court
explained that Judge Harold Leventhal "correctly has described Stovall as protecting an
evidentiary interest and, at the same time, as recognizing the limited extent of that
interest in our adversary system." Id. (citing Clemons v. United States, 408 F.2d 1230,
1251 (D.C. Cir. 1968)). This again does not suggest that the due process rule is not
constitutional; it is a fair trial right, which protects due process at trial. Judge Leventhal
called the right the "Stovall due process right." Clemons, 408 F.2d at 1251.
The Court noted the rejection of rigid exclusionary rules in cases fashioning
exceptions to the exclusionary rule. See Manson, 432 U.S. at 113. Unlike in the Fourth
Amendment context, the Court did not set out any bright-line exception to the rule that
admission at trial of unduly suggestive procedures violates due process. The analogy
indicates that the Court instead achieved the desired flexibility using a harmless error
rule. The Court also noted that, "[u]nlike a warrantless search, a suggestive
preindictment identification procedure does not in itself intrude upon a constitutionally
protected interest." Id. at 113 n.13. This is because the due process right is violated
only upon introduction at trial.
242. 432 U.S. at 114.
243. Id.
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where the eyewitness identified him as having sold drugs "[l]ots of
times," the Court offered a tepid caveat-that the evidence of his guilt
"play[ed] no part in our analysis." 2" Justice John Paul Stevens, in his
dissenting opinion, cautioned that "in evaluating the admissibility of
particular identification testimony it is sometimes difficult to put other
evidence of guilt entirely to one side," but believed the majority
sufficiently avoided that "pitfall. 2"
Justice Thurgood Marshall, in his dissenting opinion, warned that it
might prove to be difficult for judges to resist relying on other evidence
of guilt while determining whether a constitutional violation in
identification is harmless.2" "[The Court seems to be ascertaining
whether the defendant was probably guilty." 7  Justice Marshall's
prediction came to pass. The Supreme Court has not intervened as
many of the circuits, taking the hint from Manson, have made no secret
of their holdings that corroborating evidence of guilt can render an
eyewitness identification "reliable," some even calling such independent
evidence of guilt a "sixth factor" as to reliability." There are troubling
implications of this approach, not the least of which is that the apparent
244. Id. at 110&n.4, 116.
245. Id. at 118 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
246. See id. at 128 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
247. Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
248. Several circuits have followed this "sixth factor" test and held that the
admission of an impermissibly suggestive identification may amount to harmless error
based specifically on other evidence of guilt. See, e.g., United States v. Diaz, 248 F.3d
1065, 1103 & n.48 (lth Cir. 2001) (finding a suggestive in-court identification to be
harmless error due to other overwhelming evidence of guilt); Evans v. Lock, 193 F.3d
1000, 1003 (8th Cir. 1999) (same); Johnson v. McCaughtry, 92 F.3d 585, 597 (7th Cir.
1996) (same); United States v. Wilkerson, 84 F.3d 692, 695 (4th Cir. 1996) (holding
that a court "may also consider other evidence of the defendant's guilt when assessing
the reliability of the in-court identification"); United States v. Rogers, 73 F.3d 774, 778
(8th Cir. 1996) (finding a witness identification reliable where two other witnesses
similarly identified the defendant); Gilday v. Callahan, 59 F.3d 257, 270 (1st Cir. 1995)
(finding an eyewitness identification properly admitted where the defendant had
confessed to significant facts); United States v. LaPierre, 998 F.2d 1460, 1465 (9th Cir.
1993); United States v. Napoli, 814 F.2d 1151, 1156-57 (7th Cir. 1987) (considering
the fact that the defendant drove a car similar to what witnesses described in determining
whether identifications of the defendant were reliable); Meadows v. Kuhlmann, 812
F.2d 72, 76 (2d Cir. 1987) (considering "overwhelming evidence of guilt").
Other circuits reject this "sixth factor" guilt-based approach as improper and
instead follow the general harmless error approach. See, e.g., United States v.
Emanuele, 51 F.3d 1123, 1128 (3d Cir. 1995). As a separate harmless error approach,
courts have held that admission of an impermissibly suggestive identification does not
call for reversal where the defects in the identification were presented to the jury. See,
e.g., Hornbuckle v. Groose, 106 F.3d 253, 257 (8th Cir. 1997).
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guilt of a defendant means that the defendant has less in the way of
constitutional rights."
The harmless error rule looks very different once a court knows
suggestive procedures contributed to an eyewitness falsely identifying an
innocent person-the legal doctrine folds in on itself. In a civil rights
case, different standards apply, even to the same underlying facts and
rights. The issue is not whether a criminal jury reliably reached a guilty
verdict, but whether objectively unreasonable or unduly suggestive
identification procedures employed by police foreseeably contributed to
mistaken and unreliable identifications and thus, deprived the accused of
a fair trial. A civil jury decides this question.
Moreover, few courts have dealt with civil suggestion claims thus
far, but a series of cases pending nationwide raise them.' Several
courts have properly recognized that the core constitutional violation
occurs when the procedures employed are suggestive.2' If so, the
factors crucial to the finding of "reliability" in the criminal inquiry
become completely irrelevant. Once the person is exonerated, the court
knows the witness's identification was false, if not unreliable. The only
question is whether police suggestion caused a misidentification. That
will rarely be a difficult causation question for a jury to decide. The
harms of suggestive conduct during eyewitness identification
procedures, while not intuitive to the layperson, can be easily explained.
The Supreme Court explicitly warned of the dangers of suggestive
procedures and ruled that they "increase the likelihood of
misidentification.'
249. For criticism of these decisions, see Rudolf Koch, Note, Process v.
Outcome: The Proper Role of Corroborative Evidence in Due Process Analysis of
Eyewitness Identification Testimony, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 1097, 1102 (2003) (discussing
the "importance of considering only corroborative evidence that is directly related to
whether the witness independently identified the defendant"). As Judge Amalya Kearse
explained in Raheem v. Kelly when rejecting such an approach: "proper inquiry seeks to
fathom whether the witness's identification is worthy of reliance, that is, whether it
provides a foundation on which the factfinder can reasonably depend." 257 F.3d 122,
140 (2d Cir. 2001).
250. See, e.g., supra note 30 (discussing the Atkins, Long, Miller, and Sarsfleld
cases); see also cases cited infra notes 251-54.
251. Geter v. Fortenberry, 882 F.2d 167, 170-71 (5th Cir. 1989) (reversing
summary judgment as to a claim of suggestive line-up procedures); Geter v.
Fortenberry,. 849 F.2d 1550, 1559 (5th Cir. 1988) ("[A] police officer cannot avail
himself of a qualified immunity defense if he procures false identification by unlawful
means ... for such activity violates clearly established constitutional principles.");
Solomon v. Smith, 645 F.2d 1179, 1185 (2d Cir. 1981) (holding that a defendant's right
to due process of law includes the right not to be the object of suggestive police
identification procedures that create a "substantial likelihood of irreparable
misidentification") (internal quotations omitted).
252. Biggers, 409 U.S. at 198 ("[I]t is the likelihood of misidentification which
violates a defendant's right to due process.").
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The evidence the plaintiff may put on in such a case will reveal the
irrelevance of the Biggers reliability factors. In each case, criminal
courts had admitted suspect identifications as reliable, when victims later
came forward and described how police told them who to identify3 In
Newsome, the jury delivered its $15 million verdict likely crediting both
the testimony of one of the eyewitnesses that police coerced him into
choosing Newsome, and an officer's admission that they improperly
showed witnesses photographs of Newsome to increase the chances the
witnesses would identify him.'
Further illustrating unreliability in the Newsome case, an expert
witness, Professor Gary Wells, a leading authority on witness
misidentification," 5 conducted an analysis of reliability far more
sophisticated than the Supreme Court's list of factors. Wells ran tests
with subjects using photographs of the real murderer and then of
Newsome to determine the likelihood (which was less than 1 in 1000)
that, absent suggestion, three eyewitness could independently choose an
innocent man.56 One important feedback effect of civil cases could be
an increased willingness of criminal courts to admit such expert
testimony into evidence in order to educate juries on the unreliability of
eyewitness identifications.
Other courts misunderstand the harmless error nature of the
"reliability" factors that the Court set out in Manson and conflate
harmless error with the constitutional rule. Some courts state that,
because the right is a due process right to a fair trial, it provides no
remedy in a civil case; rather, it is only an evidentiary prophylactic
rule. 7  These courts simply have misconstrued the Supreme Court's
253. See supra note 30 (citing the Long and Sarsfield cases).
254. 319 F.3d at 303. There, the plaintiffs did not bring suggestive
identification claims, but instead brought malicious prosecution and Brady violation
claims, alleging that the police concealed evidence and used suggestive line-up
procedures. Newsome, 256 F.3d at 749, 753; see also supra note 174 (discussing the
use of Brady as an umbrella for such claims).
255. The Seventh Circuit upheld the district court's denial of a challenge to his
expert testimony based on Federal Rule of Evidence 702, which in effect codifies the
holding of Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 580 (1993).
Newsome, 319 F.3d at 306.
256. Newsome, 319 F.3d at 305-06. The Seventh Circuit, interestingly, did not
reach the issue of whether such conduct violates the due process rule against suggestive
identification procedures, but instead ruled that officers suppressed the evidence that
demonstrated that they used suggestive procedures to secure false eyewitness
identifications violating Brady. Id. at 305 ("ITlhe constitutional violation justifying an
award of damages is not the conduct of the lineups but the concealment of evidence
about them.").
257. See Pace v. City of Des Moines, 201 F.3d 1050, 1055 (8th Cir. 2000)
("The jurisprudential doctrine described in Manson v. Brathwaite... against the
admission of unduly suggestive lineups is only a procedural safeguard, and does not
establish a constitutional right to be free of suggestive lineups."); Hutsell v. Sayre, 5
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undoubtedly confusing ruling in Manson, which added "reliability"
factors that go to the question of whether unconstitutional identification
procedures were "harmless."2 Reliability factors should not apply in a
civil suit, where the procedure is known to have been false and a jury
could conclude that an innocent person was wrongly convicted because
the police used suggestive, unconstitutional techniques to obtain an
incorrect eyewitness identification.
Civil rights lawsuits encourage the adoption of reliable eyewitness
procedures, grounded in solid social science data, by shedding light on
the miscarriages that result from failure to adopt simple, inexpensive
procedures. For thirty years, the Court has been unwilling to require
the police to reform eyewitness identification practices known to result
in easily avoidable wrongful convictions of innocent people." While
the Court has long stated that police departments may adopt such
procedures for their own interests-" [t]he interest in obtaining
convictions of the guilty also urges the police to adopt procedures that
show the resulting identification to be accurate"26°-that weak invitation
has largely been ignored. Additionally, the Court's confused harmless
error based reliability test provides little or no meaningful incentive to
adopt better procedures. Civil cases may change the current state of
affairs. Even assuming that innocent people will be exonerated based on
biological evidence in only a few cases, one $15 million verdict, as in
Newsome, is enough for a police department to reconsider a decision not
to pay, for example, the nominal cost of conducting double-blind lineup
procedures that dramatically reduce the possibility of suggestion.
26 1
The information that civil suits bring to light may further encourage
actors to come together to adopt solutions. Such reform already
occurred in Boston, Massachusetts, as the city is facing several high
F.3d 996, 1004-05 (6th Cir. 1993) (describing suggestive identification as an evidentiary
interest). In Hensley v. Carey, however, the Section 1983 claim was for conducting a
suggestive lineup not introduced in a trial, and therefore, the court properly found no
fair trial right implicated. 818 F.2d 646, 649 (7th Cir. 1987). Several courts have
similarly properly denied a civil remedy when there was no introduction of the
identification at trial. Cerbone v. County of Westchester, 508 F. Supp. 780, 786
(S.D.N.Y. 1981); Pyles v. Keane, 418 F. Supp. 269, 275 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
258. The Court is careful to say so when it reluctantly adopts a prophylactic
rule; indeed, the Court now appears to have taken back its prophylactic rationale for
Miranda. See Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 437-38, 440 n.5 (2000)
(stating that the Miranda rule has constitutional underpinnings, where in the past the
Court "repeatedly referred to the Miranda warnings as 'prophylactic'").
259. See supra notes 228-29.
260. Manson, 432 U.S. at 112 n.12.
261. See THoMAS P. SULLIVAN, POLICE EXPERIENCES wrrH RECORDING
CUSTODIAL INTERROGATION (2004) at http://www.law.northwestern.eduldepts/
clinic/wrongful/documents/SullivanReport.pdf (last modified June 9, 2004) (discussing
the nominal cost of videotaping and its great savings, particularly in contesting
interrogation procedures).
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profile wrongful conviction lawsuits alleging the use of suggestive
eyewitness identification procedures. Recently unveiled reforms,
adopted through a joint study by the district attorney and the police
department, include the use of double-blind lineups, asking eyewitnesses
to sign statements regarding their level of confidence in the
identification, offering eyewitnesses a "none of the above" option, and
recording all statements by suspects. 262
The effect of these reforms may, in the end, erode the harmful
effects of the Manson test and render it defunct. Criminal courts may
increasingly instruct juries regarding scientific evidence of the
unreliability of eyewitness identifications, order double-blind lineups to
be conducted, and permit expert testimony, particularly when law
enforcement fails to adopt the remedies described.263 Thus, public
information regarding the worst cases involving exonerations may
generate remedies in which institutions collect a range of useful data that
assists actors on all sides to prevent future mistakes.
D. Coerced Confessions
Innocence also transforms the right to be free from a coerced
confession when an exoneration shows to a scientific certainty that a
confession is false, and thus, likely the product of coercion or
fabrication.
The area is ripe for reform; the criminal law remains hostile to
scrutiny of false confessions. While courts have long examined
confessions to assess voluntariness, 4 the Supreme Court has been
262. See Maggie Mulvihille, A Big Push for Justice; City to Make Sweeping
Changes to Prevent Wrongful Imprisonment, BOSTON HERALD, July 20, 2004, at 2.
After the Suffolk County District Attorney's Office took the lead and convened a "Task
Force on Eyewitness Evidence," the city responded by adopting the suggested reforms,
and thus, Boston became first major city to adopt such sweeping reforms. Id. The
Miller and Sarsfield cases discussed above are both Boston cases alleging the use of
suggestive eyewitness identification procedures. See supra note 30. The State of New
Jersey and Madison, Wisconsin, currently employ such measures, as does St. Paul,
Minnesota, in a pilot program. Suzanne Smalley, Police Update Evidence Gathering:
Suspect Identification Is Focus of Changes, BOSTON GLOBE, July 20, 2004, at B1.
Boston will also require certification of its forensic crime laboratory. Id.
263. Barry C. Scheck, Mistaken Eyewitness Identification: Three Roads to
Reform, CHAMPION, Dec. 2004, at 4.
264. See, e.g., Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477, 485 (1972) ("The use of
coerced confessions, whether true or false, is forbidden because the method used to
extract them offends constitutional principles.") (citations omitted); Bram v. United
States, 168 U.S. 532, 561-63 (1897) (holding a confession inadmissible where the
accused was forced to remove his clothes during an interrogation and made to believe
that his silence would implicate him). As the Court stated in Spano v. New York:
The abhorrence of society to the use of involuntary confessions does
not turn alone on their inherent untrustworthiness. It also turns on the deep-
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reluctant to exclude confessions because they are so powerfully
probative of guilt. Coercion remains very difficult to prove in a
criminal case under the deferential "totality of the circumstances" test.265
As Professor Charles Ogletree has written: "[o]nce a suspect
confesses... to police, the subsequent trial is often merely a formality;
the suspect bears the almost impossible burden of countering the
statement and establishing her innocence."266
While it is difficult for laypeople to imagine, people of sound mind
can, admit to crimes they did not commit, after sufficient pressure from
police.267 DNA evidence has uncovered mounting numbers of cases in
which factually innocent people confessed to crimes. 26' For example,
Eddie James Lowery, who spent ten years in prison for a sexual assault
that he did not commit, filed a federal civil rights action in Kansas after
being exonerated by DNA evidence.'9 He was a twenty-one-year-old in
the U.S. Army when he was involved in a minor auto accident near the
home where a sexual assault occurred that same night.27 The police
officers, nicknamed by their coworkers "Dirty Harry" and "Mad Dog,"
had no suspects for the crime.27 The elderly victim could not describe
her attacker at all, so they decided to coerce a confession from
Lowery.tm Over a two-day period, after refusing Lowery an attorney
and food, threatening him that he could not leave until he admitted to
committing the sexual assault, and having him repeat after them the
details they gave of how the crime was committed,273 Lowery broke
down and cooperated. He may have assumed he could prove his
rooted feeling that the police must obey the law while enforcing the law; that
in the end life and liberty can be as much endangered from illegal methods
used to convict those thought to be criminals as from the actual criminals
themselves.
360 U.S. 315, 320-21 (1959).
265. Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 434 ("The due process test [for coercion] takes into
consideration 'the totality of all the surrounding circumstances-both the characteristics
of the accused and the details of the interrogation.'") (quoting Schneckloth v.
Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 226 (1973)).
266. Charles J. Ogletree, Are Confessions Really Good for the Soul?: A
Proposal to Mirandize Miranda, 100 HARV. L. REv. 1826, 1844-45 (1987).
267. See DWYER ET AL., supra note 62, at 92 (stating that "[miost jurors can't
swallow the idea that people would admit to crimes they had not committed" and
describing cases of innocent people confessing to crimes they did not commit).
268. See Steven A. Drizin & Richard A. Leo, The Problem of False Confessions
in the Post-DNA World, 82 N.C. L. REv. 891 (2004) (analyzing 125 recent cases
involving false confessions).
269. See Complaint 1 1, Lowery (No. 5:04-CV-03101-JTM) [hereinafter
Lowery Complaint]. The author helped draft Lowery's complaint.
270. Id. 121.
271. Id. 66.
272. Id. 11 23-49.
273. Id. 112-3.
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innocence once he retained a lawyer, but he was wrong. The jury
convicted him based only on the two officers' testimony that he
confessed, and it was not until the rape kit was found twenty years later
that DNA evidence conclusively cleared his name.274
Exoneration shows conclusively that a confession was false, but to
violate due process, a plaintiff must show that the police officers
engaged in unconstitutional coercion. The Supreme Court's due process
test looks to the "circumstances" of a confession to determine whether it
appears voluntary. As in harmless error analysis, the Court not only
looks to the reliability of the confession itself, but more broadly to "the
surrounding circumstances" in terms of how the interrogation was
conducted, "the characteristics of the accused," and also perhaps to
independent evidence of guilt, that is, "the details of the
interrogation."275 The Court has also relaxed the standard by which the
prosecution must show that the confession is voluntary (only by a
preponderance of the evidence) for the stated guilt-based purpose of
placing before the jury "probative evidence. "276
The Court held early on that evidence of whether the confession is
reliable has nothing to do with the question of whether a defendant's will
was overborne. 277 More recently, however, in a controversial decision
in Arizona v. Fulminante, the Supreme Court undid the practical
significance of that ruling, and held that an involuntary confession may
be harmless error based on other evidence indicating guilt. 278  Lower
courts have commonly found Miranda violations harmless, 279 but a few
have gone further and found involuntary confessions to be harmless. 21
274. Id. 4-7.
275. Id.
276. See Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 168 (1986); Lego, 404 U.S. at
489.
277. See Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 544 (1961); Doby v. S.C. Dep't
of Corr., 741 F.2d 76, 76, 78 (4th Cir. 1984) (reversing because the trial court erred in
considering the truthfulness of a confession while determining voluntariness of the
confession).
278. See 499 U.S. at 296, 306-12. The Court held that because "an involuntary
confession may have a more dramatic effect on the course of a trial than do other trial
errors ... this simply means that a reviewing court will conclude in such a case that its
admission was not harmless error." Id. at 312. Earlier, the Court even held that,
"[w]here the record is so evenly balanced that a conscientious judge is in grave doubt as
to the harmlessness of an error," the admission of a coerced confession is not harmless.
O'Neai v. McAninch, 513 U.S. 432, 437 (1995). The Court also previously held in
Jackson v. Denno that, when the state obtained a coerced or involuntary statement, it
cannot argue for its admissibility on the ground that other evidence demonstrates its
truthfulness. 378 U.S. 368, 391 (1964).
279. See, e.g., Tanideff v. Senkowski, 135 F.3d 235, 245 (2d Cir. 1998)
(finding the admission of incriminating pre-Miranda statements harmless error because a
subsequent "Mirandized" confession was admissible); Cooper v. Taylor, 103 F.3d 366,
370-71 (4th Cir. 1996) (finding the admission of a third confession harmless error based
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Exoneration casts doubt upon each of these deferential doctrines by
upsetting their grounding in determinations as to the reliability of a
confession. Once a person's conviction is vacated or a person is
pardoned, a false confession cannot be viewed as harmless error or as
reliable, probative evidence the jury should hear, nor can it easily be
presumed "voluntary." First, as to harmless error, after an exoneration,
by definition, there cannot have been overwhelming reliable evidence of
guilt. It is unlikely there will be confession cases in which there is not
scientific evidence of innocence, because confession evidence is so
strong, that the confession itself would likely have to be proven false to
a moral certainty for a court to agree to a vacatur.28' Similarly, one
cannot presume a confession voluntary based on the totality of
circumstances surrounding the confession, and a court cannot consider
such a confession probative of guilt once the conviction is vacated or a
person is actually found to be innocent. At that point, one knows to a
moral certainty that the confession is false.
Exoneration also provides powerful evidence of a civil rights
violation because, if the person was innocent, why would he or she
confess and how could he or she possibly know what to confess to?
Lowery, for example, could not possibly have known, as only the police
and the actual perpetrator knew, that the victim was attacked with a
silver table knife from her kitchen, and that the perpetrator broke in by
tearing the screen door.' If the plaintiff was innocent and could not
have known anything about how the crime actually occurred, where
could the details of the confession come from-the very details that
make the confession seem reliable and probative-except from the
police? A jury can conclude-and the false confession will speak for
on two valid confessions and other evidence); Killebrew v. Endicott, 992 F.2d 660,
663-64 (7th Cir. 1993) (finding a statement obtained in violation of Miranda based on
in-court identification and bank videotapes of the robbery to be harmless error); Rollins
v. Leonardo, 938 F.2d 380, 382 (2d Cir. 1991) (applying the harmless error doctrine to
a Miranda violation); United States v. Maguire, 918 F.2d 254, 262 (1st Cir. 1990)
(holding that an incriminating statement taken in violation of Miranda was harmless
error because the gun involved in the crime could have been properly seized under the
automobile exception to the warrant requirement).
280. See, e.g., Hopkins v. Cockrell, 325 F.3d 579, 584 (5th Cir. 2003) (finding
that portions of a confession were not voluntary, but finding the coercion to be harmless
due to "overwhelming" evidence of guilt); United States v. Thompson, 286 F.3d 950,
962 (7th Cir. 2002) (finding harmless error where "the government presented
overwhelming evidence of the defendants' guilt," and where "to the extent the
statements were important, they were cumulative"). A court may sidestep the question
whether a confession was coerced by finding any error harmless. See, e.g., United
States ex rel. Smith v. Walls, 208 F. Supp. 2d 884, 889 (N.D. Ill. 2002).
281. For example, in Patterson, the court concluded that "Patterson's conviction
rested almost entirely on his involuntary confession, and at most on his involuntary
confession plus the coerced testimony of a 16 year-old girl." 328 F. Supp. 2d at 897.
282. See Lowery Complaint, supra note 269, 53.
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itself, res ipsa loquitur-that any facts offered that indicate a voluntary
and credible confession instead had to have been "fed" to the plaintiff by
police officers (thus a fabrication claim also exists, and a Brady claim
for concealing this misconduct). 3  Because no sane person would
purposely confess to a crime they did not commit, two possibilities
exist: (1) that the police took advantage of a person who was mentally
incompetent to secure a confession; or (2) that the person was coerced
into allowing police to feed facts to him or her in order to obtain a false
confession. The third possibility, that the suspect was of a pliable
nature and the police did not realize it, seems unlikely because to
actually obtain a false confession, police must do more than secure
cooperation. They must then secure details of how the crime was
committed from a person who does not know any such details.
This Article contends that a jury should not be instructed in a civil
rights case to examine the "totality of the circumstances," at least not in
order to excuse coercion based on other evidence of guilt. Instead, the
jury should ask whether coercion or fabrication of a confession caused
the unfair trial. Juries would likely conclude that coercing a confession
foreseeably causes a wrongful conviction, given that a confession is
"probably the most probative and damaging evidence that can be
admitted" 24 at a criminal trial: "a confession is like no other
evidence."' A civil rights case thus provides a deterrent against
serious police misconduct that under criminal law has no consequence
for police officers, as any violation is typically found harmless, and at
best, the confession would simply be excluded.
Several cases have raised civil confession claims, and by and large,
courts have treated them properly as independent Section 1983 claims
based on the Fifth Amendment.m Some courts have also based these
283. See supra note 30; infra notes 286-87 (discussing civil cases bringing such
claims); see also Walker v. Lockhart, 763 F.2d 942, 958 (8th Cir. 1985) (finding a
Brady violation on habeas review when a state ballistics expert suppressed the transcript
of the inmate's confession); Patterson, 328 F. Supp. 2d at 897 (denying a motion to
dismiss on a claim that officers suppressed evidence, and that they coerced and
fabricated a confession). Bringing fabrication claims will often make more sense when,
in addition to coercive means, it is the fabrication and the false nature of the evidence
that caused the harm.
284. Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 139 (1968) (White, J., dissenting).
285. Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 296.
286. Wilson v. Lawrence County, 260 F.3d 946, 952 (8th Cir. 2001)
("Fundamental to our system of justice is the principle that a person's rights are violated
if police coerce an involuntary confession from him, truthful or otherwise, through
physical or psychological methods designed to overbear his will."); see also Griffin v.
Strong, 983 F.2d 1540, 1542 (10th Cir. 1993); Bradt v. Smith, 634 F.2d 796, 800 (5th
Cir. Unit A Jan. 1981) ("[The fifth amendment privilege against compulsory self-
incrimination is a creature of federal law secured by the Constitution of the United
States, and if abridged under appropriate circumstances it may indeed support a claim
under section 1983."); Lewis v. Brautigam, 227 F.2d 124, 128 (5th Cir. 1955).
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claims on substantive due process, when the coercive techniques were so
egregious as to shock the judicial conscience.W A civil claim based
solely on a Miranda violation is another story. The Supreme Court held
that the failure to provide Miranda warnings may only be remedied at
the criminal trial,2 not in a civil suit, 9 because Miranda is not a
federal right but rather, a prophylactic protection against the underlying
right to self-incrimination. 2' Nevertheless, the fact that Miranda
warnings were not given or were improperly given can serve a powerful
evidentiary purpose in a civil rights lawsuit under a theory of
coercion.29
Civil claims return the focus to what can deter coercive confessions
in the first place. Civil suits have focused on not just individual bad
actors, but on systemic allegations that inadequate supervision, training,
and policies caused officers to engage in such coercion; several civil
suits have alleged widespread toleration of coercing, torturing, and
fabricating confessions from suspects.29  Structural protections like
videotaping interrogations and confessions can reduce the likelihood that
coercion will occur by providing in every case the kind of information
that DNA provides by happenstance in a few egregious cases. Given the
287. DeShawn v. Safir, 156 F.3d 340, 348 (2d Cir. 1998) (noting that "[t]he
due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits self-incrimination based on
fear, torture, or any other type of coercion"); Willkins v. May, 872 F.2d 190, 195 (7th
Cir. 1989) (finding a viable Section 1983 substantive due process claim based on the
right to "freedom from severe bodily or mental harm inflicted in the course of an
interrogation" where the suspect was interrogated at gunpoint).
Not all courts have handled such claims properly. One district court strangely held
that a claim of a coerced confession did not challenge the conviction, and thus,
misunderstood the nature of a fair trial claim, which alleges police misconduct that
caused an unfair trial and a faulty conviction, and which under Heck may be brought
only when a conviction is reversed or there is a pardon. Swopes v. Snyder, No. 02-C-
1868, 2002 WL 731775, at *2 (N.D. Ili. Apr. 22, 2002). For a case rejecting that
approach, see Patterson, 328 F. Supp. 2d at 889.
288. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 264 (1990). A separate
issue is whether a coerced confession might give rise to damages for a person not
brought to trial. The Court indicated there would be no civil remedy for such a person
in Chavez, 538 U.S. at 766-67.
289. For criticism of this result, see Steven D. Clymer, Are Police Free to
Disregard Miranda?, 112 YALE L.J. 447, 452 (2002), and Klein, supra note 95, at 417-
21.
290. See supra notes 95, 258.
291. See supra note 95.
292. See supra note 30 (discussing the Lowery, Salaam, and Ochoa cases); see
also Kittler, 2004 WL 1698997, at *7 (upholding Monell claims on the basis that "'[t]he
City of Chicago deliberately abides a culture of coercion in the Chicago Police
Department'") (alteration in original) (quoting the complaint); Patterson, 328 F. Supp.
2d at 898-99, 903 (denying a motion to dismiss as to a Monell claim alleging, among
other violations, failure to supervise officers engaging in a pattern of using torture to
coerce and fabricate confessions).
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nominal costs of such safeguards, the benefits to law enforcement and
prosecutors, as well as to courts and defense lawyers, civil suits may
lead to more widespread adoption of videotaping and other policies and
protections.293
E. Fabrication of Evidence
In the years to come, fabrication of evidence claims may be at the
forefront of efforts to reform shoddy scientific practices used by forensic
crime labs responsible for many wrongful convictions. Fabricating
evidence by manufacturing it during investigation, or through perjury
during judicial proceedings, is illegal and has violated due process
dating back to the Court's early decisions in Napue v. Illinois"9 and
Mooney v. Holohan.295  As the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First
Circuit recently put it, "if any concept is fundamental to our American
system of justice, it is that those charged with upholding the law are
prohibited from deliberately fabricating evidence and framing
individuals for crimes they did not commit." 296  Yet, such grave
misconduct has occurred with surprising frequency, by one account in
almost half of all exonerations, 29 and has led to a series of civil rights
lawsuits that may provide a deterrent in the future.29
293. See infra note 333. For a discussion on law enforcement justifications for
videotaping, see GOVERNOR'S REPORT, supra note 80, at 24 ("[Interrogations of a
suspect in a homicide case occurring at a police facility should be videotaped.
Videotaping should not include merely the statement made by the suspect after
interrogation, but the entire interrogation process."). As Profesorr Richard Leo has
written:
Videotaping improves the quality of interrogation practices and lends
greater credibility and legitimacy to police work. And videotaping
memorializes the details of the interrogation and confession for future
review, details that may become indispensable in the process of convicting
guilty defendants and acquitting innocent ones. These are all unqualified
social goods. It is therefore not surprising that both liberal and conservative
legal scholars have recommended the use of videotaping inside the
interrogation room.
Richard A. Leo, The Impact of Miranda Revisited, 86 J. CRuM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 621,
692 (1996).
294. 360 U.S. 264, 269 (1959).
295. 294 U.S. 103, 112 (1935).
296. Limone, 372 F.3d at 44-45.
297. See GRoss ET AL., supra note 75, at 18 ("Overall, in 44% of all
exonerations (145/328) at least one sort of perjury is reported-including 57 % of murder
exonerations (114/199), and 24% of rape exonerations (29/120).").
298. See infra notes 305-09 (discussing civil fabrication cases); see also Paine
v. City of Lompoc, 265 F.3d 975, 982 (9th Cir. 2001) (denying absolute immunity for
the fabrication of evidence); Wilson, 260 F.3d at 952-54 (denying a grant of summary
judgment to the defendant officers, who coerced a confession, and describing the law on
coercion and why the plaintiff's rights were violated); Jones, 174 F.3d at 1279, 1289-90
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Harmless error has not been incorporated into the claim for
fabrication of evidence as with the preceding fair trial claims;
fabrication claims are, however, commonly brought in wrongful
conviction actions and raise overlapping issues.
Fabrication of evidence claims may be brought when officers falsify
evidence, either physical or testimonial.299 Officers may fabricate
physical evidence by altering that evidence, or more commonly, by
lying about its characteristics. Increasingly common are cases where
law enforcement officers claim that physical evidence matches the
defendant's blood, hair, etc., when it does not, often by employing
"junk science" to lend credence to false testimony. 30' Forensic
laboratory technicians often work alongside law enforcement during
criminal investigations and may share liability. Such laboratories have
increasingly come under public scrutiny for lack of independence,
questionable scientific standards, lack of outside auditing, and instances
of outright fraud in forensic testing, reports, and testimony.
3°2
(denying summary judgment to an officer who fabricated a bootprint); Spurlock, 167
F.3d at 1005 (finding that the right to be free from police fabrication of evidence is
clearly established). For a discussion on the lack of deterrence in criminal procedure,
see Schwartz, supra note 7, at 1125 ("Even if they do get caught, the police do not lose
much, since the only work they put into the fabricated confession was creating it, and
the case against the defendant is not harmed beyond the exclusion of the confession.").
299. See infra note 301.
300. The Court has held that destruction of potentially exculpatory evidence, on
the other hand, does not violate due process absent a showing of bad faith. Arizona v.
Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 57-58 (1988). Thus, such a claim would be difficult to bring
in the typical civil case. Problematically, such a rule provides law enforcement an
incentive to fail to preserve evidence rather than merely suppress it (although to garner a
conviction they must have some evidence of guilt, so the officer bent on securing a
wrongful conviction would have a contrary incentive to fabricate it). A work in
progress will criticize the Youngblood rule, which stands alone among fair trial rights in
requiring fault, as part of a larger discussion of the role that tort law conceptions of fault
play in civil versus criminal procedure constitutional rights.
301. See, e.g., Pierce, 359 F.3d at 1281-83 (denying motions to dismiss by a
defendant forensic laboratory criminologist on fabrication and malicious prosecution
claims); Jones, 174 F.3d at 1289-90 (denying summary judgment to an officer who
fabricated a bootprint); Gregory, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7046, at *6, *33-43 (denying
absolute immunity to the hair examiner who fabricated hair results in false reports and
testimony, and to the officers who allegedly created a false police report accusing the
plaintiff of describing objects taken from the victim's apartment); DWYER Er AL., supra
note 62, at 115-25, 161-71 (describing "white coat fraud" that so often leads to
wrongful convictions, and addressing shoddy "junk science," especially with regard to
hair evidence that is routinely tolerated in courtrooms and forensic crime laboratories);
supra note 30 (discussing the Atkins, Green, Miller, and Sarsfield complaints which each
contained fabrication claims); see also D. Michael Risinger & Michael J. Saks, Science
and Nonscience in the Courts: Daubert Meets Handwriting Identification Expertise, 82
IOWA L. REv. 21, 21-22 (1996) (discussing the validity of handwriting identification).
302. The Montana, Cleveland, Houston, and Virginia crime labs are among
those that have come under scrutiny. See Kris Axtman, Bungles in Texas Crime Lab Stir
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Officers fabricate testimony by testifying falsely, coercing a
confession, or eliciting perjury from a witness in order to secure an
arrest warrant or an indictment of a suspect.303 In a wrinkle that seems
Doubt over DNA; Botched Tests Cast Inmates' Guilt into Question-An Error that May
Be an Anomaly, or an Indicator of a Wider Problem, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Apr. 18,
2003, at 3 (describing the "shoddy scientific practices" performed at the Houston Police
Department crime laboratory that resulted in the announcement that over one hundred
DNA cases would be subject to retesting); Editorial, Experts Blister State's DNA
Results, VIRGINlAN-PMOT, June 20, 2004, at J4 (discussing a critique of three nationally
recognized DNA experts which raised "alarming questions about the integrity of the
[Virginia] state lab's work" after Earl Washington, Jr. was pardoned because DNA
evidence implicated another man already in prison for sexual assault); Adam Liptak &
Ralph Blumenthal, New Doubt Cast on Testing in Houston Police Crime Lab, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 5, 2004, at A19 (discussing an expert report concluding that the Houston
crime lab's chief of serology, and later chief of DNA, falsified or used unsound DNA
evidence leading to George Rodriguez's wrongful conviction and seventeen-year
imprisonment, and calling for the reexamination of thousands of closed cases); William
C. Thompson & Michele Nethercott, The Challenge of Forensic Evidence, CHAMPION,
Oct. 2004, at 50 (describing crime lab malfeasance in Houston, Cleveland, and
Montana); see also Burrell Complaint, supra note 193, 62-69 (naming as defendants
employees of the North Louisiana Criminalistics Laboratory); Complaint 88-101,
Gregory (No. 3:01CV-535-R) (alleging fabrication of hair evidence and naming as
defendants members of the Kentucky State Police Crime Laboratory); supra note 262
(addressing reforms put in place by the City of Boston requiring certification of their
crime lab).
303. See, e.g., Zahrey v. Coffey, 221 F.3d 342, 344 (2d Cir. 2000) ("We hold
that there is a constitutional right not to be deprived of liberty as a result of the
fabrication of evidence by a government officer acting in an investigatory capacity.");
Whiting v. Traylor, 85 F.3d 581, 585 n.5 (11th Cir. 1996) (alleging that an officer made
"material misstatements of fact in support of the prosecution"); Robinson v. Maruffi,
895 F.2d 649, 650-51, 655 (10th Cir. 1990) (denying a defendant's appeal for summaryjudgment based on "the testimony the defendants manufactured for.., the state's key
witnesses"); Jones, 856 F.2d at 993 (finding that police officers were liable under
Section 1983 for the suppression and fabrication of material facts to the prosecutor);
Anthony v. Baker, 767 F.2d 657, 662 (10th Cir. 1985) (finding that a Section 1983
action may be pursued for fabricated evidence or perjurious testimony). There is no
absolute immunity for such actions; officials "[o]bviously' enjoy no immunity for 'non-
testimonial acts such as fabricating evidence." Paine, 265 F.3d at 981 (internal
quotations omitted); see also Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 274 & n.5 (1993)
(stating that absolute immunity for fabricating evidence would not be granted, because
absolute immunity did not exist at common law); lenco v. City of Chicago, 286 F.3d
994, 1000 (7th Cir. 2002) ("Neither the withholding of exculpatory information nor the
initiation of constitutionally infirm criminal proceedings is protected by absolute
immunity.").
Police officers or prosecutors may be cloaked with testimonial immunity if they
testify about fabricated evidence. Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 335-36 (1983).
This will not follow if they act as a "complaining witness" providing crucial evidence of
probable cause or the impetus behind prosecution. Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118,
129, 131 (1997); Gauger v. Hendle, 349 F.3d 354, 358 (7th Cir. 2003) ("There is an
exception for 'complaining witnesses'-the instigators of the prosecution-and it might
embrace police officers who pushed aggressively for a prosecution."); Vakilian v. Shaw,
335 F.3d 509, 516 (6th Cir. 2003) (discussing absolute immunity and the "complaining
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to confuse courts, evidence can be fabricated by police officers acting
through others as intermediaries. Perhaps the most common source of
false testimony leading to wrongful convictions is the testimony of a
third party who has something to gain by lying, typically a "jailhouse
snitch."' Other cases, like Newsome, involve witnesses through which
law enforcement secures perjured testimony by coercion."° Fabricated
confessions can fall into this category. The obvious case is where the
police fabricate the confession by writing a false report after the fact or
doctoring tapes.3 6 Police can also fabricate a confession in a more
devious way-by coercing the suspect or witnesses and by "feeding"
details of the crime to make the "confession" sound plausible.'
A majority of the circuits have upheld Section 1983 claims for
fabricated confessions.08 However, several courts somewhat confuse
the issue by treating fabrication as part of a malicious prosecution claim,
and then holding that if police had probable cause to arrest, their
fabrication of evidence is rendered, in effect, "harmless." 30 9 Doing so
witness" exception); Cervantes v. Jones, 188 F.3d 805, 809-10 (7th Cir. 1999) (same).
Further, testimonial immunity poses no obstacle to a Brady claim. Manning, 355 F.3d
at 1031.
304. See GRoss ET AL., supra note 75, at 18 (finding that "in at least 94 cases a
civilian witness who did not claim to be directly involved in the crime committed
perjury-usually a jailhouse snitch or another witness who stood to gain from the false
testimony").
305. See supra note 30 (discussing the Blake and Burrell complaint allegations
regarding the use of informants). Blake involves allegations that officers repeatedly
relied on a neighborhood informant who they fed facts to in order to clear homicide
cases. Complaint & Jury Demand 17-18, Blake (No. CV-01-6954). The Burrell
case involves the use of a jailhouse snitch and the coercion of the ex-wife of a suspect by
threatening to take away custody of her children. Burrell Complaint, supra note 193,
48-51, 88-99. On the use of jailhouse informants, see DWYER ET AL., supra note 62, at
156-57.
306. See, e.g., Castellano v. Fragozo, 311 F.3d 689, 704-05 (5th Cir. 2002)
(finding that a due process claim had been stated where a police officer and witness had
altered tapes of a defendant's interrogation to make it sound as though he had confessed,
although he had not), rev'd on other grounds, 352 F.3d 939, 943, 959 (5th Cir. 2003).
"[P]lainly, the perjury and manufactured evidence that tainted Castellano's arrest also
denied him due process when used again at trial to convict him." Castellano, 352 F.3d
at 959.
307. See Devereaux v. Abbey, 263 F.3d 1070, 1074-76 (9th Cir. 2001)
(construing allegations that police interrogated children to elicit falsely inculpatory
evidence as invoking "a clearly established constitutional due process right not to be
subjected to criminal charges on the basis of false evidence that was deliberately
fabricated by the government"); see also supra note 30 (discussing the Lowery and
Ochoa cases). In this situation, a plaintiff may also bring a Brady claim; not only is the
evidence fabricated, but police claimed that the evidence was accurate and suppressed
the fact that it was manufactured. See, e.g. Manning, 355 F.3d at 1031 & n. 1.
308. See supra notes 301, 303, 306-07.
309. See Mahoney v. Kesery, 976 F.2d 1054, 1061 (7th Cir. 1992) ("[A] police
officer who procures a prosecution by lying to the prosecutor or to the grand jury can be
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misunderstands Section 1983, as fabrication is a separate, freestanding
constitutional due process claim long recognized by the Supreme
Court.3'0  As with other claims discussed, the jury answers whether
fabricating evidence caused an unfair trial and wrongful conviction.
Fabrication of evidence claims point in the direction of simple
inexpensive reforms designed to prevent the recurrence of such
misconduct. A recent settlement of a civil case in Cleveland, Ohio, sets
an example for other lawsuits and for law enforcement-it calls for an
audit into the work of a forensic scientist who fabricated false
inculpatory hair and serology evidence, as well as for random testing of
other scientists' laboratory work.311 The result provides a permanent,
independent scientific monitor that can provide more reliable scientific
evidence for law enforcement and detect errors that lead to wrongful
convictions.
Lawsuits may then push local government to operate independent,
up-to-date, and peer-reviewed forensic science agencies that are far less
sued for the consequences of the prosecution."); Sanders, 950 F.2d at 1163 (stating that
"'maliciously tendering false information to the prosecutor which leads him to believe
probable cause exists where there is none ... can be grounds for a § 1983 action'")
(quoting Wheeler v. Cosdin Oil & Chemical Co., 734 F.2d 254, 260 (5th Cir. 1984));
Smith v. Springer, 859 F.2d 31, 34 (7th Cir. 1988) (finding a proper claim for
fabrication of evidence leading to an arrest, which could be brought without challenging
the legality of a conviction where damages were sought only for a Fourth Amendment
violation); Jones, 856 F.2d at 992-95 (upholding a jury verdict on the claim that a police
officer signed "a deceitful report for use by the prosecution" in a case bringing only
malicious prosecution and false arrest claims); Geter, 849 F.2d at 1559 (permitting a
cause of action based on fabrication as to procuring false eyewitness identifications); see
also Douglas J. McNamara, Buckley, Imbler and Stare Decisis: The Present
Predicament of Prosecutorial Immunity and an End to Its Absolute Means, 59 ALB. L.
REv. 1135, 1194 (1996) ("[Tihe status of malicious prosecution and fabricated evidence
remain unclear.").
310. See Napue, 360 U.S. at 269 (recognizing that this right is "implicit in any
concept of ordered liberty"); Pyle v. Kansas, 317 U.S. 213, 216 (1942) (holding that the
knowing use by the prosecution of perjured testimony in order to secure a criminal
conviction violates the Constitution); Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103, 112 (1935)
(stating that due process is not satisfied "if a State has contrived a conviction through the
pretense of a trial which in truth is but used as a means of depriving a defendant of
liberty through a deliberate deception of court and jury by the presentation of testimony
known to be perjured"). In contrast to a malicious prosecution claim, "[n]o arrest, no
matter how lawful or objectively reasonable, gives an arresting officer or his fellow
officers license to deliberately manufacture false evidence against an arrestee." Ricciuti
v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth., 124 F.3d 123, 129-30 (2d Cir. 1997) (rejecting an argument
that "so long as there was probable cause for Alfred Ricciuti's arrest-independent of
the allegedly fabricated evidence-the fabrication of evidence is legally irrelevant").
311. See supra note 34 (discussing Green); see also GOvERNOR'S REPORT, supra
note 80, at 22 (recommending that "[a]n independent state forensic laboratory should be
created, operated by civilian personnel, with its own budget, separate from any police
agency or supervision" and recommending adoption of minimal standards for DNA
evidence).
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likely to permit shoddy science or fabrication. As evidence of shoddy
forensic science practices mounts, perhaps states will consider adopting,
not just auditing, and also undertake the additional structural reform of
creating truly independent regional crime laboratories that would have
less of an incentive to fabricate evidence in particular cases.312  Again,
the remedies focus on data gathering, here in the form of audits, and
rather than intruding on law enforcement prerogatives, they empower all
sides by providing them with more reliable investigative tools and
results.
V. RETURNING THE CONSTITUTION TO CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
A. Deterrence and Section 1983 Suits as Structural Catalysts
Despite no change in the underlying law, we are likely to see more
far-reaching criminal procedure reform in the years to come than we
have seen in the last several decades. The recent wave of exonerations
demonstrates how starkly outdated and unreliable criminal procedure
protections remain. New evidence suggests that wrongful convictions
arise from shoddy science, suggestive identification procedures, and
fabricated and suppressed evidence, yet nothing in our criminal
procedure addresses those causes of error.3"3 Criminal procedure has
long failed to consider the adoption of even the most unobtrusive
protections. Developing substantive values through criminal procedure
has been met with hostility by the Supreme Court,314 and indeed, the
Court has restricted due process remedies based, ironically, on the
deterrence rationale, citing to a lack of a need for deterrence.315
312. See HOUSE RESEARCH ORG., TEx. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, SHOULD
TEXAS Do MORE TO REGULATE CRIME LABS? 1-3 (2004) (discussing the problems and
debate surrounding whether Texas crime laboratories are properly regulated and have
sufficient safeguards to ensure accurate analysis), available at
http://www.capitol.state.tx.us/hrofr/focus/crimelab79-2.pdf.
313. See, e.g., Clymer, supra note 289, at 551-52 (noting the Court's lack of
enthusiasm for deterrence by using exclusionary remedies and recounting decisions
undercutting exclusionary protections).
314. DRIPPS, ABOUT GUILT AND INNOCENCE, supra note 21, at 169-73; Amar,
supra note 23, at 811.
315. The Court's discomfort may not be surprising where exclusion, in effect,
asserts the rights of others in cases where police misconduct did not result in unreliable
evidence presented at trial. See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984) (concluding
that the purposes of the exclusionary rule would not be served, and therefore the rule
should not be applied in cases where officers relied on an invalid search warrant unless
the "officers were dishonest or reckless in preparing their affidavit or could not have
harbored an objectively reasonable belief in the existence of probable cause"); see also
Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 494-95 (1976) (denying habeas corpus relief to a
prisoner, although the evidence used to convict the prisoner was seized in violation of a
state constitutional provision that provided the opportunity for the "full and fair
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Supreme Court jurisprudence, thoroughly infected by harmless error,
encourages courts to limit remedies for the very rights whose violation
raise the greatest dangers of wrongful convictions. This hopeless state
of affairs, in part, is due to the remedial context-criminal procedure
remedies defer to law enforcement discretion, to state policy judgments,
and most fundamentally, to the judgments of a jury that delivered a
guilty verdict.
Wrongful conviction actions finally provide a mechanism to return
the deterrent power of the Constitution to our criminal justice system,
but in a civil forum. The deterrence rationale should have more traction
in civil cases, in which damages both compensate and punish actors
known to have engaged in misconduct.316 Civil constitutional law also
permits the evolution of something powerful-a civil, substantive fair
trial jurisprudence.317 Rather than focusing simply on the efficiency of
procedures used in criminal trials, Section 1983 lawsuits focus on what
measures could be taken to prevent official misconduct that predictably
causes the wrongful convictions.
Significant reforms may arise out of a convergence of interests-the
remedies for many serious wrongful convictions are inexpensive, readily
available, and beneficial to law enforcement. Many of the reforms that
can prevent wrongful convictions, such as double-blind lineups,
videotaping, outside auditing, and open file discovery, are procedural,
like the fair trial rights themselves. These reforms are also modestly
litigation" of Fourth Amendment claims); United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 459-60
(1976) (holding that the exclusionary rule does not apply in civil cases where evidence is
seized by law enforcement officials of one sovereign to be used against another
sovereign); United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 342, 354-55 (1974) (holding that
the exclusionary rule does not apply in grand jury proceedings). See generally Meltzer,
supra note 130.
316. See Myron W. Orfield, Jr., Comment, The Exclusionary Rule and
Deterrence: An Empirical Study of Chicago Narcotics Officers, 54 U. CHI. L. REv.
1016, 1051-54 (1987) (explaining that in a survey of Chicago police officers' views of
the exclusionary rule, police unanimously favored the rule over tort suits against
individual officers for violations because such tort claims would overdeter officers).
317. Substantive due process claims for wrongful conviction, however, claiming
that police misconduct offended basic principles of justice and not any specific
constitutional guarantee, have fallen flat in the courts. See, e.g., Newsome, 256 F.3d at
751 (rejecting the application of a substantive due process approach to a malicious
prosecution claim); Taylor v. Waters, 81 F.3d 429, 436 (4th Cir. 1996) (denying a
substantive due process right against prosecution absent probable cause where "there is
no quantum of harm occurring between the initiation of groundless charges and the
seizure"). But see Alders v. Schebil, 966 F. Supp. 518, 532 (E.D. Mich. 1997) (noting
that the Brady right is "firmly grounded in substantive due process"); Avery, supra note
7, at 47 (describing the support for a procedural, rather than substantive, due process
theory of the Brady right, but criticizing courts for failing to then adopt a civil
procedural due process analysis).
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expensive and unobtrusive, provide great benefits to law enforcement,
and increase the reliability of investigations and prosecutions.
Preventing these worst miscarriages of justice from occurring
provides great political and economic savings to government. As noted,
potential jury awards and exposure in wrongful conviction cases remain
particularly high where the exonerated person lost so many years of his
or her life.318 Adverse publicity imposes additional costs in cases in
which innocent people are imprisoned. As Professor Daryl Levinson
points out, law enforcement may sometimes respond more to political
pressure than to monetary judgments; these actions should trouble law
enforcement on both fronts.319 Of great institutional concern is the loss
of legitimacy to the criminal justice system. Law enforcement is tasked
with apprehending the guilty, and in every wrongful conviction case,
they failed, and not only was an innocent person incarcerated, but a
criminal remained at large (undercutting any asserted law enforcement
interest in "finality"). Police and prosecutors must constantly rely on
the trust of their community-witnesses, jurors, and also defense
lawyers-trust which can be shattered by the public perception that not
just unfairness, but egregious miscarriages of justice can occur. That
trust can only be repaired by taking public action to assume
accountability and to prevent future harm.
The enhanced deterrent effect of Section 1983 litigation also arises
structurally from the nature of federal litigation, particularly federal
discovery rules. Unlike a defense counsel litigating a criminal trial with
only bare-bones discovery and poor resources from the state, plaintiffs,
once exonerated, in a federal case, have access to the district attorney's
files and police files, and can individually depose each of the police
officers, district attorneys, jailhouse snitches, or witnesses responsible
for the wrongful conviction. Federal discovery alone may go a long
way toward uncovering and providing the remedy for patterns of error
318. See AVERY ET AL., POLICE MISCONDUCT: LAW AND LITIGATION §§ 13:1-:9,
:13, at 597-609, 618-19 (3d ed. 2004). Compare id. §§ 13:15-:17, at 602-24
(describing sample wrongful death awards), with id. § 13:18, at 624-29 (describing
awards for permanent injuries), and supra note 32 (citing wrongful conviction verdicts
and settlements).
319. Daryl J. Levinson, Making Government Pay: Markets, Politics, and
Allocation of Constitutional Costs, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 345, 370-71, 420 (2000)
("Constitutional cost remedies make government pay dollars for constitutionally
problematic conduct, but government cares not about dollars, only about votes."). See
generally Meltzer, supra note 130. Additional work is needed to reexamine how law
enforcement in fact responds to litigation. High profile wrongful conviction suits
already have brought about systemic reform both in response to high profile cases, class
actions and cases in the aggregate, suggesting that contrary to such theory on deterrence,
properly targeted constitutional tort suits can have a significant deterrent and reformative
effect. For an examination of the surprising structural and remedial role of civil suits to
reform discriminatory policing, see Garrett, Remedying Racial Profiling, supra note 16.
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in our criminal justice system. For example, in order to assess whether
law enforcement engaged in a pattern of fabrication of evidence, the
court could order an independent audit of several years' worth of
forensic tests. The ultimate remedy would merely continue that
discovery audit.
Other actors focus on reform. Many of these cases are being
brought by civil rights lawyers more focused on systemic reform than
the personal injury bar at large might otherwise be.3" District
attorney's offices named as defendants for the first time in these cases
may, as in Boston,32 take a special role in adopting reforms given their
interest in securing reliable convictions.
The scientific community also takes on an important role in such
litigation, serving as expert witnesses who can educate all sides and
courts on the causes of wrongful convictions. In a federal case, there
can be an analysis of forensic evidence, of identification procedures
used, or of investigative missteps. Such expert analysis may
encourage trial judges in criminal courts to look more closely at
eyewitness identifications. If experts notice systemic violations, that
kind of "pattern or practice" evidence may also be introduced during
suppression hearings to educate the judge as to where misconduct is
systemic.
The press will continue to play a crucial role, especially given the
exposure civil cases provide regarding the misconduct that leads to
wrongful convictions.3' The combination of deterrence through
litigation costs, uncovering public information about the causes of
wrongful convictions and the resulting public pressure, as well as the
benefits to law enforcement may result in sustained institutional
reform.32
320. See supra note 32 (discussing various verdicts and settlements). Many of
these cases are brought by Cochran Neufeld & Scheck, LLP and the People's Law
Offices in Chicago, and emphasize the requested reforms to the criminal justice system.
To a surprising degree, their clients, the exonerees, have also been supportive of
settlements providing for such reform. See supra notes 34 (discussing the Green
settlement).
321. See supra note 262.
322. See, e.g., supra note 256 (discussing Professor Gary Well's testimony in
Newsome).
323. For a discussion on the role of press coverage in encouraging the adoption
of videotaping of confessions in Prince George's County, Maryland, and Broward
County, Florida, see Steven A. Drizin & Marissa J. Reich, Heeding the Lessons of
History: The Need for Mandatory Recording of Police Interrogations to Accurately
Assess the Reliability and Voluntariness of Confessions, 52 DRAKE L. REv. 619, 642
(2004).
324. For a discussion on the subject of structural reform, see Keith A. Findley,
Learning from Our Mistakes: A Criminal Justice Commission to Study Wrongful
Convictions, 38 CAL. W. L. REV. 333 (2002) (proposing the creation of state and federal
innocence commissions to uncover the causes of wrongful convictions); Lissa Griffin,
Federal Wrongful Conviction Law
B. Institutional Reforms to Come
The reforms that flow from the fair trial rights previously described
prove inexpensive and easy to adopt. They are largely information-
driven remedies, that is, remedies designed to collect more reliable
evidence. Thus, one would expect police departments to adopt these
reforms in the interest of arresting the true culprits. Most departments
have not done so, but civil suits provide a strong public incentive to
examine such remedies. In doing so, a crisis surrounding the legitimacy
of law enforcement can be redirected toward an opportunity for law
enforcement to improve the reliability of criminal investigations.
One such simple reform is routine videotaping of confessions to
help avoid fabricated or coerced confessions and protect against
suppression of evidence in violation of Brady. Videotaping is cost-
effective and benefits the police by providing reliable evidence against
those who properly confess.3" Yet, despite Miranda's hearty invitation
to adopt further safeguards against the longstanding danger of improper
confessions, which the Court recently affirmed in Dickerson a  and a
few state courts adopting such a requirement as a matter of state
constitutional law,327 police have made little movement to adopt
videotaping.3" Instead, civil rights litigation may finally provide the
legal impetus for such safeguards. Highly publicized exonerations,
information uncovered in civil discovery, and the threat of significant
civil damage awards have begun to lead to the adoption of videotaping
The Correction of Wrongful Convictions: A Comparative Perspective, 16 AM. U. INT'L
L. REv. 1241, 1302-03 (2001) (proposing, in addition to legislative and judicial
measures, the creation of an independent commission, modeled after the Criminal Cases
Review Commission in England, to review innocence claims).
325. David A. Sklansky, Quasi-Affirmative Rights in Constitutional Criminal
Procedure, 88 VA. L. REv. 1229, 1254-62 (2002).
326. See Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 440 (citing with approval "the Miranda Court's
invitation for legislative action to protect the constitutional right against coerced self-
incrimination"); Michael C. Doff & Barry Friedman, Shared Constitutional
Interpretation, in THE SUPREME COURT REvIEw 61, 61-63 (Dennis Hutchinson et al.
eds., 2000) (discussing the Court's affirmation of Miranda in Dickerson).
327. Stephan v. State, 711 P.2d 1156-57 (Ala. 1985) ("[A]n unexcused failure
to electronically record a custodial interrogation conducted in a place of detention
violates a suspect's right to due process, under the Alaska Constitution"); see also State
v. Scales, 518 N.W.2d 587, 592 (Minn. 1994) (holding that custodial interrogation and
questioning should be recorded where feasible, that they must be recorded at a place of
detention, and that any violative statements are subject to suppression).
328. As Professors Michael Doff and Barry Friedman have noted, even if
Congress wanted to pass a statute requiring police to use videotaping, recent
commandeering and limitations on the commerce clause might inhibit such a measure.
Dorf & Friedman, supra note 326, at 86-96.
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in a growing number of jurisdictions.329 The City of Austin's $14.3
million settlement with two innocent men who were imprisoned as a
result of police coercion would pay for years of videotaping
interrogations."
Similarly, in the area of suggestive identification procedures,
scientific data has long shown that double-blind lineup proceedings
dramatically reduce the dangers of eyewitness misidentifications and
remain inexpensive to adopt.33' Such procedures only require having a
second officer present for the lineup, who does not know which person
is the suspect. The Supreme Court, however, has not required double-
blind procedures or other reforms, such as presenting persons
sequentially rather than in a lineup, asking witnesses how certain they
are after an identification, and providing witnesses with a "none of the
above option," despite the known dangers of eyewitness
misidentifications and the striking new evidence that eyewitness
misidentifications caused three-fourths of all wrongful convictions, and
the negligible cost of preventing misidentifications.332 Each reform
provides law enforcement with more reliable information regarding
identifications. Perhaps for that reason, both the City of Boston and the
State of Illinois have adopted a series of such protections in response to
highly publicized exonerations and several wrongful conviction
lawsuits.
329. For example, the Illinois Governor's Commission Report recommended in
2002 that police videotape interrogations from start to finish. See GOVERNOR'S REPORT,
supra note 80, at 24 (discussing the Illinois legislation adopting that recommendation in
homicide cases). Maine and Washington D.C. also statutorily require law enforcement
agencies to adopt videotaping policies and procedures. D.C. CODE ANN. 5-133.20; ME.
REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 25, § 2803-Bl.k (West Supp. 2004). In addition to police
departments in Alaska, where videotaping is required by the state constitution, other
police departments that require videotaping include San Diego, California, Boulder,
Colorado, Prince George's County, Maryland, and a series of cities in Connecticut and
Florida. See Jan Hoffman, Police Refine Methods So Potent, Even the Innocent Have
Confessed, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 30, 1998, at Al. See generally PRACrICES OF U.S.
POLICE DEPARTMENTS REGARDING RECORDING INTERROGATIONS (2003),
http://www.law.northwestern.edu/depts/clinic/wrongful/jurisdictionpractices.
pdf.
330. See supra note 32 (discussing the Ochoa and Danziger cases).
331. See supra note 220-28.
332. See supra notes 260, 262. Canadian judges have ruled that investigators
should follow double-blind procedures. See Canadian Judge Rules that Lineup Should
Have Followed Blind Procedure!, at http://www.psychology.iastate.edu/
faculty/gwells/canadianjudgeblindrulingwells.htm (last visited Mar. 28, 2005)
(presenting an account from the June 24, 2002 issue of Law imes detailing a Canadian
judge's findings that a police lineup "should be conducted by an officer who has no
knowledge of the case and does not know whether the suspect is contained in the
lineup").
333. See supra note 262 (describing the reforms adopted in Boston). While the
Illinois Governor's Commission recommended the adoption of double-blind procedures,
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Nor has the Supreme Court been willing to require as a
constitutional matter open file discovery in criminal cases in order to
prevent Brady violations 4.3 ' Requiring such discovery costs little and
such a clear cut policy (permitting exceptions for confidential informants
and the like) would make it easier for officials to self-police compliance
with Brady.
In the area of fabrication of evidence, particularly forensic
evidence, advocates and scientists have long called for a system of peer
review of police forensic laboratories to avoid the kind of shoddy or bad
faith junk science that leads to wrongful convictions.335 Lawsuits name
state or city-run crime labs and forensic criminologists for the first time
as defendants for fabrication of blood, hair, and fingerprint evidence.
The first such lawsuit to settle resulted in an agreement to conduct
internal auditing and a review that provides a model for reform. 336
Recent federal legislation provides grants to encourage the
accreditation and independent auditing of crime laboratories and training
on best practices, which should make adoption of reforms more
attractive, especially when negotiating a litigation settlement.337
Similarly, federal grants to provide effective, trained, and sufficiently
compensated capital defense counsel should make it harder for local law
enforcement to argue that they cannot afford reform.338
In each context, the remedy provides all sides with enhanced
information about the reliability of investigative evidence. Exonerations
and civil suits may provide the right catalyst to encourage all sides to
benefit from adopting such data-driven remedies.
Going forward, as these reforms are adopted, more will be learned
about what makes evidence reliable. As best practices evolve, more
reliable techniques will be available to prevent scientific error or fraud.
Police and prosecutors who fail to adopt them will appear increasingly
remiss. Evolving remedies may eventually lead to a set of more difficult
sequential lineups, and the videotaping of interrogations, the legislature passed Senate
Bill 472, a law which only created pilot projects in jurisdictions to test the use of double-
blind and sequential line-ups and videotaping. 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/107A-10.
The law does require asking eyewitnesses about their certainty, access to DNA testing,
and reliability screening of jailhouse snitches. See Edwin Colfax, Summary of the
November 19, 2003 Veto Override by the Illinois Legislature, Death Penalty Information
Center, available at http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?scid=6&did=784 (last
visited Mar. 28, 2005). A separate measure, Senate Bill 15, requires videotaping of
interrogations in homicide cases only. See http://www.law.northwestern.edu/depts/
clinic/wrongful/DeathPenaltyReformiBill.htm.
334. See supra note 189.
335. See supra notes 301-02, 311-12.
336. See supra notes 30, 32, 34 (discussing the Green settlement and the
Burrell, Gregory, and Miller complaints naming forensic scientists).
337. See supra note 20 (describing the Justice for All Act).
338. See supra note 20.
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choices. More finely tuned procedures may be more expensive, and
unlike auditing, double-blind lineups and videotaping may appear to
cause some number of "false negatives" to law enforcement-raising the
hard question of whether preventing, say, five wrongful convictions is
worth the cost of one hundred "guilty" suspects going free. Hopefully,
the positive experience and reliable results obtained through
implementing the "first order" remedies described will encourage a
meaningful debate over whether such "second order" procedures should
be adopted next. We will have to ask more nuanced questions as to
what degree we should tolerate predictable error and grave miscarriages
of justice in our criminal justice system. That is a laudable policy and
values debate, and it will be more informed from the data generated by
reforms. Just as exonerations provide a catalyst for the first set of
reforms, adopting those structural protections in turn may generate data
to provide a broader catalyst for problem-solving around the question of
how to obtain reliable evidence of guilt.
C. Systemic Claims
While tort suits, even constitutional tort suits, typically target only
individual bad actors, wrongful conviction suits instead focus on
systemic deficiencies because of the procedural nature of the underlying
fair trial right. Wrongful conviction suits thus uniquely lend themselves
to Monell claims against municipalities for failure to provide training or
supervision, or tolerance of a policy, custom, or practice which leads to
predictable errors.339
In cases nationwide, exonerated persons have brought systemic
claims against police departments, crime labs, and district attorney's
offices (while individual prosecutors are often absolutely immune, an
office may be liable for policies, customs, or practices causing wrongful
convictions).' Cases have sought to hold entities liable for the failure
to adopt practices that prevent Brady violations, the fabrication of
evidence, improperly coerced or fabricated confessions, suggestive
339. See 436 U.S. at 699 (holding that a local government may be held liable
when "execution of a government's policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or
by those whose edicts or acts may fairly by said to represent official policy, inflicts the
injury"); see also City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 398 (1989) (establishing that
"deliberate indifference," such as failure to provide training that would obviously serve
to prevent likely constitutional harm, supports municipal liability).
340. See cases cited supra notes 30, 32. For a discussion on the lack of
immunity of prosecutors as to official capacity MoneU! claims, see Burge, 187 F.3d at
466-67 (reversing the trial court's decision to grant absolute immunity to a district
attorney).
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identification procedures," or the allocation of adequate funding for
qualified counsel. 342 More often than is typical in civil rights litigation,
exonerees may be able to show a custom, pattern, or practice of
violations because the underlying causes of constitutional violations are
procedural. The advance deterrent effect of such systemic claims will
place the focus on what institutions can do to prevent wrongful
convictions. 43
Constitutional tort law, unlike our current criminal procedure
regime, accounts for social science and industry practice. Preventative
practices may be adopted in response to rules of decision in Section
1983 cases. One reason is that Monell liability can be premised on a
police department's deviation from national police practices.' If police
practices experts agree that, given the known dangers of false
eyewitness identifications, double-blind procedures are the accepted
police practice, then a police department may be on "notice" and liable
for failure to implement them. 5 As federal courts determine that the
failure to adopt obvious and accepted precautions amounts to "deliberate
indifference," police and municipalities will be held in a rolling fashion
to higher standards of care, with widening ripple effects throughout the
policing industry.' Such judicial pronouncements may have a great
341. For recent cases raising such claims, see Lowery Complaint, supra note
269, 95-100 (raising issues regarding a pattern and practice of fabricating evidence
and coercing confessions in Riley County, Kansas). Similarly, identification practices
that may lend themselves to suggestion, but which the Supreme Court hesitated to rule as
being per se suggestive and unreliable, may lead to Monell liability. See supra notes
261-63 and accompanying text.
342. See discussion supra Part IV.B.
343. See Amato v. City of Saratoga Springs, 170 F.3d 311, 317-18 (2d Cir.
1999) ("A judgment against a municipality not only holds that entity responsible for its
actions and inactions, but also can encourage the municipality to reform the patterns and
practices that led to constitutional violations, as well as alert the municipality and its
citizenry to the issue.").
344. See, e.g. Voutour v. Vitale, 761 F.2d 812, 821-22 (1st Cir. 1985)
(recounting the testimony of police practices expert Dr. James Fyfe, who stated that the
failure to provide relevant training was "violative of generally accepted police
practice").
345. See, e.g., id. (finding that effectiveness of training as compared to national
practice could lead to a finding of department liability).
346. Prior work discusses civil rights remedies that explicitly utilize such rolling
standards or benchmarking. See Garrett, Remedying Racial Profiling, supra note 16, at
81 (explaining that as compiling data regarding racial profiling becomes the norm,
failure to do so may "become prima facie evidence of racial profiling, a sign of
deliberate indifference to unconstitutional practices"); Garrett & Liebman, supra note
16, at 319-20 (explaining that experimentalist data collection and public reporting
requirements place officials on notice that a group is systematically disadvantaged,
creates pressure when that data is related to the public, and by comparison with
benchmark remedies adopted by others, the failure to take adequate responsive action
provides strong evidence of discrimination).
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impact on law enforcement, which may already be considering reform in
response to exonerations. For example, when the New Jersey Supreme
Court carefully examined the issues relating to cross-racial identification
procedures, the state's law enforcement agencies responded by
voluntarily adopting both double-blind and sequential lineup
procedures. 34'7 In that fashion, a select few wrongful conviction suits
can propagate reforms nationwide.
D. Immunity
Civil doctrines that often limit civil rights may have a reduced
impact in the wrongful conviction context. While the Supreme Court
has repeatedly expanded qualified immunity doctrines that rule out
claims against officers who acted reasonably based on clearly established
case law," s the criminal procedure rights implicated, protection from
police fabrication of evidence, suppression of evidence, coerced
confessions, and suggestive identifications, were established long ago."
The Supreme Court has already held that absolute immunity does not
apply when officials fabricate evidence, such as confessions or testify
falsely about manufactured evidence.35  Qualified immunity does not
347. See State v. Cromedy, 727 A.2d 457, 458-59 (N.J. 1999) (examining
social science research, and requiring that jury instructions be provided on cross-racial
identifications); see also Jascha Hoffman, Suspect Memories, LEGAL AFF., Jan.-Feb.
2005, at 42.
348. See Briscoe, 460 U.S. at 335 ("[Section] 1983 does not authorize a
damages claim.., against judges or prosecutors in the performance of their respective
duties."); Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982) (holding that qualified
immunity protects conduct that "does not violate clearly established statutory or
constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known").
349. Courts would have to undo decades of substantial criminal due process
jurisprudence (something the Rehnquist Court has been unwilling to do, preferring
instead to preserve those constitutional rulings but adding layers of harmless error) to
avoid civil liability for their violation. No court could take such an unprincipled position
(except toward the margins like the Fourth Circuit did in manufacturing a "bad faith"
requirement for a civil claim for a Brady violation). See supra notes 185-88 and
accompanying text. For a typical decision, see Pierce, 359 F.3d at 1299 (denying
qualified immunity, and stating that "[elven if there were no case directly on point
imposing liability on officials whose falsification of evidence occurred at the post-arrest
stage, an official in [the defendant's] position could not have labored under any
misapprehension that the knowing or reckless falsification and omission of evidence was
objectively reasonable").
350. See Buckley, 509 U.S. at 274 & n.5 (1993) (denying absolute immunity for
fabricating evidence because there was no absolute immunity at common law); Milstein
v. Cooley, 257 F.3d 1004, 1011 (9th Cir. 2001) (explaining that "acquiring known false
statements from a witness for use in a prosecution is likewise fabricating evidence that is
unprotected by absolute immunity"); Cunningham v. Gates, 229 F.3d 1271, 1291-92
(9th Cir. 2000) (evaluating for the purposes of qualified immunity whether officers
fabricated evidence); Spurlock, 167 F.3d at 1001-02 (holding that nontestimonial acts
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apply, as the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has put it,
because there is a "right not to be deprived of liberty as a result of the
fabrication of evidence by a government officer acting in an
investigating capacity." 3"' Similarly, with regard to Brady, the courts
have held that the relevant law has long been established, so officials
lack qualified immunity.5 2
Prosecutors for the first time may face institutional liability, both
for policy and practice, and also individual liability when acting in an
investigatory capacity, such as by fabricating evidence or assisting with
suggestive identification procedures.53 Interestingly, prosecutors may
also be liable for making defamatory statements attempting to discredit
efforts by a person, later exonerated, to appeal a conviction. Thus,
courts will increasingly reach the substance of constitutional criminal
procedure protections3 5 by limiting the discretion of law enforcement
officers to adopt practices that predictably result in wrongful
convictions. The result enhances the deterrent effect of wrongful
conviction litigation, and further encourages the adoption of preventative
remedies.
aimed at eliciting false testimony were not entitled to absolute prosecutorial immunity);
Geter, 882 F.2d at 169-70 (holding that a police officer was not entitled to qualified
immunity for procuring a false identification by unlawful means or for concealing
exculpatory evidence); Olson v. Tyler, 771 F.2d 277, 281 (7th Cir. 1985) (holding that
an officer was not entitled to immunity for false statements made in an arrest warrant
affidavit).
351. Malley, 475 U.S. at 340-41 (holding that an officer was not entitled to
immunity for false statements made in an arrest warrant affidavit); Devereaux, 263 F.3d
at 1074-75 ("ITihere is a clearly established right not to be subjected to criminal charges
on the basis of false evidence."); Zabrey v. Coffey, 221 F.3d 342, 344, 349 (2d Cir.
2000); Jones, 174 F.3d at 1282-84 (finding that officers were not entitled to qualified
immunity for a warrantless arrest when they lacked probable cause); Ricciuti, 124 F.3d
at 130 (finding that officers were not entitled to qualified immunity for conspiring to
fabricate and forward to prosecutors a known false confession).
352. See, e.g., Manning, 355 F.3d at 1033 (holding that officers lack
testimonial immunity as to a Brady claim that they suppressed the exculpatory fact that
they engaged in perjury or fabrication); supra note 175.
353. See Milstein, 257 F.3d at 1009-10 (affirming the principle that prosecutors
lack absolute immunity for fabricating evidence and conducting investigations); Houston
v. Partee, 978 F.2d 362, 367 (7th Cir. 1992) (explaining that prosecutors lack absolute
immunity for the failure to disclose exculpatory evidence acquired when not involved in
postconviction proceedings).
354. See Patterson, 328 F. Supp. 2d at 902 (reasoning that a district attorney
could have been liable for defamation where statements could adversely influence then
pending pardon applications, prosecution, and judicial tribunals hearing criminal
appeals, if the statements made were unrelated to the state's prosecution or subsequent
pardon proceedings).
355. Sklansky, supra note 325, at 1231 (reasoning that, although "[c]ourts have
often shied away from doctrinal paths in criminal procedure that seem to pose
affirmative obligations on government," by recognizing the common features between
the rules of constitutional criminal procedure, and the features of increasingly prevalent
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E. The End of Exoneration?
Exonerations came to light as a fragile product of scientific and
social serendipity. One final deterrent effect of the lawsuits described
could be broader access to pretrial DNA testing that would in turn make
future DNA exonerations scarce. If DNA testing does become routine
pretrial, subsequent DNA exonerations may slowly disappear. Then
again, while exonerating innocent people as early and often as possible
would be laudable and just, access to both pretrial and post-trial DNA
testing is often vigorously opposed by prosecutors.356
Unfortunately, DNA testing, if it were to become routine, will not
be enough to make wrongful convictions or exonerations a thing of the
past. In most cases, DNA testing can not be performed because there is
no relevant or preserved biological evidence. 3" Even given pretrial
DNA testing of biological evidence, laboratories have been scrutinized
for shoddy or falsified DNA testing,"' just as many of the exonerations
to date have been due to false fingerprint comparison, blood type
testing, or hair comparison, and suppressed evidence of constitutional
violations. 35 9 The same sham evidence will continue to convict innocent
people absent the sorts of systemic reforms discussed.
DNA and forensic technology continues to evolve to permit more
powerful testing of evidence previously thought to lack sufficient
biological material. 3' Nevertheless, if pretrial DNA testing becomes
routine, the window of opportunity that exonerations provide may begin
to close. This makes it particularly urgent that the cases of the wrongly
convicted are used to illuminate solutions that can make such wrongful
convictions a thing of the past.
quasi-affirmative rights in constitutional criminal procedure, courts may be more willing
to further develop that body of law).
356. Federal law now provides some incentives to conduct DNA testing. See
supra note 20 (describing the new federal incentive grant program).
357. See Gross, supra note 80, at 127 (explaining that, because of the common
lack of relevant or preserved biological evidence, DNA exonerations remain a "fluke").
358. See supra notes 301-02 (discussing the controversy regarding revelations
of forensic fraud).
359. See Gross, supra note 80, at 127 (explaining that, while many wrongful
convictions will continue to be difficult to prove given a lack of DNA evidence to test,
postconviction DNA testing may continue to reach wrongful convictions if biological
evidence that could have been tested to exclude a defendant was suppressed by police at
the time of trial; that exonerations represent only "the tip of the iceberg"; and that
efforts to apply technology or investigative efforts to other cases would likely result in a
greater number of exonerations).
360. See NAT'L RESEARCH COUNSEL, THE EVALUATION OF FORENSIC DNA
EVIDENCE (1996) (providing an overview of the development of DNA technology); see
People v. Holtzer, 660 N.W.2d 405, 411 (Mich. Ct. App. 2003) (admitting
mitochondrial DNA evidence and describing recent advances in testing).
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VI. CONCLUSION
The years to come may provide the most far-reaching and effective
criminal justice system reform that our country has experienced since
the Warren Court's criminal procedure revolution. None will be
accomplished through change in legal doctrine, but rather, through a
surprising explosion in public information about the causes of the most
egregious errors in our criminal justice system, this information will
lead to reform through the conduit of civil rights suits. Wrongful
conviction law suggests a positive illustration of the time-worn adage
that for every violation of a right, there is a remedy.361 Constitutional
criminal procedure takes on a new bite in the most unexpected of all
places, in federal court and in civil rights lawsuits brought by people
never before thought to have existed-innocent people who were
wrongly convicted.
Through a circuitous and unprecedented route, the underlying
constitutional rights ultimately reassert themselves, but only after due
process violations at a criminal trial occur, a wrongful conviction
results, substantial obstacles imposed during criminal appeals and habeas
review are overcome, access to DNA testing and exonerating results are
obtained, and then finally a vacatur of the conviction is obtained. So
many wrongly convicted people suffered during that arduous process
and more surely languish unaided. Our civil rights regime operates only
to compensate a few after the fact-but it is also able to deter injuries
before the fact.362 Although few are exonerated, and even fewer
exonerees receive compensation, the small cohort of exonerees who can
make out civil rights claims may disproportionately impact our criminal
justice system in the years ahead.
Substantial reform in our criminal justice system may follow where
the actors responsible for unfair trials, in particular, forensic scientists,
prosecutors, inadequate defenders, and law enforcement officers, have
until now been insulated from tort liability. Incentives to adopt
corrective measures should be radically altered where in the past, even
when misconduct was uncovered, error was so readily found
harmless.363 Now some of the most harmful errors in the criminal
justice system are being uncovered, through an external control, DNA
361. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803) (quoting 3
WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *23) ("[IWt is a general and indisputable rule,
that where there is a legal right, there is also a legal remedy, by suit or action at law,
whenever that right is invaded.").
362. As the Seventh Circuit noted in the Newsome case, "[r]equiring culpable
officers to pay damages to the victims of their actions, however, holds out promise of
both deterring and remediating violations of the Constitution." 256 F.3d at 752.
363. See supra Part II.B.
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testing, that reveals these errors with scientific certainty. Perhaps more
importantly, actors previously operated in the dark as to the causes of
egregious error. Exoneration now selects the worst miscarriages in the
criminal justice system, and then civil rights litigation explores the
systemic causes of those miscarriages of justice, provides public data
regarding predictable causes of error, and in doing so, places sustained
public pressure on institutions to come together and adopt reforms.
Reforms flowing from wrongful conviction suits already point in
the direction that social science research has indicated for some years,
but which the recent wave of exonerations highlights with greater
urgency."3 ' Structural safeguards that can prevent wrongful
incarceration of innocent people are often not expensive or structurally
intrusive. 365 Although law enforcement has often fiercely resisted their
adoption, measures improve reliability of investigations and benefit all
actors: law enforcement, prosecutors, courts, and defense lawyers
alike.3s Videotaping confessions, full disclosure of police files, use of
double-blind eyewitness identification procedures, and scientific peer
review of forensic laboratories all provide system-wide information that
we now only have through DNA in a small cohort of the worst
miscarriages of justice.
Such information-driven remedies may also substantially prevent
future unjust convictions by widening the outlook of institutions. Each
such remedy enables ongoing problem solving by continually exposing
error and unreliability during criminal investigations, which in turn will
continue to suggest further reforms to address problems uncovered.
New institutions such as state innocence commissions or the Federal
National Forensic Science Commission may further propagate and
implement reforms. 7 Future work should examine ways to foster such
ongoing institutional monitoring and reform.368
That same problem-solving outlook may affect courts'
understanding of constitutional rights, which originally evolved as
procedural, but which will now be developed substantively for the first
364. See, e.g., Hoffman, supra note 347, at 42, 45 (discussing the reforms in
eye-witness identification procedures, including sequential and double-blind lineups,
instituted in New Jersey, Chicago, Santa Clara, California, and several Minnesota
counties).
365. See supra Part V.B.
366. See supra Part V.B.
367. For a discussion on innocence commissions, see supra note 324; see also
Christine C. Mumma, The North Carolina Actual Innocence Commission: Uncommon
Perspectives Joined By A Common Cause, 52 DRAKE L. REv. 647 (2004) (describing the
creation and work of the first state innocence commission). For a discussion of federal
legislation, see supra note 20.
368. A work in progress will pick up where this piece leaves off by examining
institutional reform arising out of wrongful conviction litigation and the possibilities for
further systemic reform involving all actors in the criminal justice system.
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time since their inception. 9 Our criminal procedure has long remained
frozen in time.37 The development of many due process rights has been
a path dependent, a historical accident of their origin in the criminal
context, which focuses on evidentiary rights at trial. Criminal trials
have not been a hospitable locus for criminal justice reform. Fair trial
rights and remedies balance interests to decide admissibility in the heat
of short, resource-poor criminal trials and subsequently, defer to the
verdict of a jury entrusted with judging credibility and finding facts.
Yet, harmless error turns into a mirror image of itself after exoneration.
The Supreme Court's stunted remedial paradigm, that almost without
fail denies relief in criminal cases, is replaced by a robust new paradigm
where fair trial rights deter government misconduct. Civil courts can
magnify the focus on broad deterrence by holding institutions
accountable for patterns and practices that predictably cause wrongful
convictions.
Systemic reform may then feed back from civil suits to underlying
constitutional criminal procedure rights. None of the reforms discussed
are among those the Supreme Court has been willing to require as a
matter of due process law, where the Court's paramount postverdict
concern is that the guilty not go free.37' Wrongful conviction cases may
focus courts' attention on the causes of wrongful convictions and
encourage a more forward-looking perspective. In particular, criminal
trial judges may become more open to ordering remedies, such as
requiring double-blind lineups, suppressing unreliable evidence,
admitting expert testimony regarding the causes of wrongful convictions,
allowing evidence of systemic violations to support claims of
misconduct, or providing jury instructions regarding the reliability of
evidence and the predictable causes of wrongful convictions. Appellate
judges, both in state courts and on habeas review, rather than rubber-
stamping error as harmless, could also employ the data that these actions
and remedies provide in order to focus their review on cases raising the
indicia of wrongful convictions.
Federal cases brought by exonerees promise to return the deterrent
power of the Constitution to the place it belongs-protecting the right to
a fair trial. By incorporating constitutional criminal procedure rights in
civil claims, wrongful conviction actions aim to cure the Supreme
Court's recent preoccupation with guilt-based limits on remedies for the
violation of fair trial rights. Unshackled by such myopic harmless error
369. See Eli Paul Mazur, "I'm Innocent": Addressing Freestanding Claims of
Actual Innocence in State and Federal Courts, 25 N.C. CENT. L.J. 197, 240-41 (2003).
370. Sklansky, supra note 325, at 1231 (developing reasons why there has been
little growth in our criminal procedure).
371. See supra Parts I.B., V.B.
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doctrines, and finally attentive to eradicating the underlying causes of
convictions of the innocent, the body of law growing out of civil rights
actions filed by exonerees may finally encourage the widespread
adoption of meaningful protections for Brady rights as well as the
constitutional guarantees of effective assistance of counsel, and the
freedom from fabricated evidence and coerced confessions. By
illuminating the worst errors that any criminal justice system can
possibly make, these actions align the incentives of actors on all sides to
prevent the systemic errors that cause wrongful convictions. In so
doing, federal wrongful conviction cases provide a catalyst for remedies
that promise to reshape our criminal justice system in the years to come.
